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MINOR—THE EASTERN QUESTION
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THE ASIATIC REVIEW

APRIL, 1940

PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

INDIA'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR FREDERICK O'CONNOR,
C.S.I., C.I.E., C.V.O.

WHEN Sir Frank Brown invited me to speak on the subject of this address I hesitated at first to accept, as, although I spent my early years in India as a soldier, the greater part of my service was in the Foreign and Political Department in stations actually beyond the Indian frontiers—Tibet, Persia, and Nepal. But even in these trans-border countries, and in consular and diplomatic posts, I was able, perhaps even better than if I had been in India itself, to assess the significance of India to our Empire, and the immense importance in time of war both of her geographical situation and of her man-power and resources.

Before attempting to give some account of the contribution which India is making to the war, and of her present and potential value to Great Britain and her Allies, I should like to make a few general remarks on points which are, no doubt, already familiar to most of my audience. For I feel that there may be a tendency sometimes in this country to confuse the wood with the trees, and that a recital of mere facts and figures may tend to dwarf the impressive background of the whole subject. We should try to bear in mind that we are dealing with a country with an area of some 1,600,000 square miles (roughly thirteen times the size of the British Isles), extending 2,000 miles from the extreme north to the extreme south, and for the same distance from east to west, and containing a population of no less than 370,000,000 people—almost one-fifth of the population of the globe. This vast area necessarily includes practically every variety of climate, from Himalayan

heights and valleys to the tropical forests and rice-fields of the south, and from the waterless deserts of the north-west to the steamy water-logged districts on the east; and thus we find within the limits of India an almost infinite range of vegetation and of agricultural products—timber, fruits, seeds, rubber, cotton, jute, sugar-cane, grains, etc. Similarly, the varying geological formations which make up the surface of the Peninsula include a great diversity of minerals. The population of the country, too, as we know, is equally varied. India is, indeed, a sub-Continent of almost incalculable wealth in commodities, and practically unlimited resources in man-power. For Great Britain to have such an ally at her back in the present vital struggle is clearly a factor of the highest importance.

INDIA'S CENTRAL POSITION

Next let us consider the significance of India's geographical situation. A glance at the map will show how this great Peninsula juts down into the Indian Ocean midway between Suez on the west and the Malay Peninsula on the east, and is thus placed in the position of being able to despatch reinforcements, supplies and stores to various strategic points or to theatres of war situated either to the east or to the west. We know from the experiences of the last war that, besides the troops sent by India to France and various Mediterranean theatres, her forces served on the Canal, in Egypt, on the shores of the Red Sea, at Aden, in Mesopotamia, and elsewhere on the shores of the Persian Gulf on the one hand; and further east in Singapore, and as far afield as Hongkong, Shanghai, etc. Similarly at the present time we see Indian troops helping to garrison Egypt, Aden and Singapore, and we have recently heard with keen satisfaction of the arrival of Indian transport contingents in France. And all this without for a moment dislocating or impairing India's own powers of defence against external dangers on her frontiers or the possibility of internal disturbance. India occupies, in fact, a central position with regard to the eastern outposts of the British Empire, and also with regard to any theatres of war which may arise at any time in any part of this vast area.

I will now endeavour, without citing too many statistics, to give some estimate of the resources of India both in man-power and in commodities, and of the steps which are being taken to utilize these resources to the full and to improve and expand them.

RECRUITMENT

First, as regards man-power. India, considering the size of her population, maintains in peace-time only a small standing army—some 150,000 men, besides the British troops normally stationed in the country; but this number can be multiplied almost indefinitely from the warlike sections of the population. During the course of the last war about one and a half millions of men were sent overseas to serve on many different fronts. This is an impressive total, and serves as an indication of the untapped reserves fit and eager for military service. Plans are now in course of preparation for considerable increases in the Indian Army. Recruiting offices have been set up, and we learn from India that recruits are flocking to them in thousands. Here they are examined, and a roster is being prepared of the men to be called to the colours as required. The stream of applicants is so great that at present it is quite impossible to find employment for them all. The supply, in fact, largely exceeds the demand, and we have the satisfaction of knowing that we are assured of an immense number of volunteers who are only too anxious to serve whenever they may be wanted. Five new battalions of the Indian Territorial Force are also being formed.

In the vital matter of the provision of suitable officers, too, great advances have been made in the period since the last war. Certain sections of the Indian Army are being rapidly Indianized under their own officers, and since the last war there has been established an Indian Sandhurst at Dehra Dun where young Indians are being trained and fitted for commissions. Further arrangements are in progress to secure the services of more men of Indian birth of the upper and middle classes as officers in an emergency. These are men aged from 18 to 20, and the Indian Government have recently announced the recruitment of the first batch of such

volunteers to supplement the supply from the Military Academy at Dehra Dun.

Besides this, the cadre of officers for service in India is also being augmented by the calling up of groups of Europeans resident in India who are being specially trained at Belgaum. Here again the supply exceeds the demand, and several hundred volunteers are still awaiting a summons.

In this connection it is particularly gratifying to note that, largely owing to representations made by the East India Association, and the active efforts of the present Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, Indians and Anglo-Indians resident in England, hitherto debarred as not being of pure European descent, are now being enlisted in this country for combatant service. There has been a good response to the relaxation of this anomalous rule. A number of Indian doctors practising or studying in this country, too, are serving with ambulance corps. Another new development is the enlistment and training of men of Indian birth as pilots and observers in the Air Force. Some commissions have already been granted in this branch of the service to Indians resident both in England and in India.

Since the last war another branch of the fighting services has been created in India in the shape of the Royal Indian Navy, and this force has been mobilized and is now working in co-operation with the Royal Navy in all the activities necessitated in time of war. The neighbouring seas are being patrolled and the coasts and harbours of India are being protected. Further shipping also is to be provided by the commandeering of other vessels as and when necessary and advisable. Controllers of Shipping and Enemy Trading exercise functions analogous to those of corresponding authorities in this country in the regulation of exports to neutral countries, the prohibition of exports to Germany, and so on.

Those of us who have served with Indian troops, and who have had experience of the splendid types of Indian officers with whom we worked, will appreciate these developments, for we know what wonderful material there is to be found in India for men of the officer class, and the courage, loyalty, and devotion such men display. These few bare facts which I have presented

may help us to realize what it means to have behind us an almost immeasurable reserve of men born and reared in martial traditions, hardy and vigorous, who will fight to the death for a cause they approve. I shall take the liberty later of citing a few instances of this spirit which have come under my own observation in the field.

MATERIAL

The more prosaic matter of the provision of supplies for the fighting forces has already been exhaustively dealt with in the course of a paper read by Sir Frank Noyes to the Association on November 14 last, but as any account of India's war contribution would be incomplete without some mention of supplies, I shall venture to make a few general remarks, emphasizing particularly the military aspect of the question.

It is estimated that during the last war India despatched to the various fronts equipment and stores to the value of some £80,000,000 sterling, in addition to vast quantities of raw and semi-manufactured articles, and since then her output of raw products and her manufacturing resources have been greatly expanded. A few figures will give an idea of this expansion in certain important particulars. Take, for instance, the production of iron and steel. Since 1913 the production of pig-iron has multiplied eight times, that of steel nearly thirty times. Other metals of vital importance for armament manufacture are also being produced in large and increasing quantities, such as manganese (of which over one million tons were exported during 1937-8), chromite, and high-grade mica—all metals essential for armaments or aeroplane manufacture.

Equally important is the great increase in India's manufacturing power effected since the last war. Numerous developments have occurred, and a fresh range of articles can now be made in India. The various Ordnance factories are being largely and rapidly expanded to meet war requirements, and are supplying vast quantities of munitions of war for the use of the British and Indian forces overseas.

There is just one more commodity which I think deserves a special mention—namely, jute. Jute is a monopoly of India and

a very important one it is. Some idea of its output and the prodigious quantities of its manufacture is given by the following figures. In the first thirteen weeks of the war oversea orders were placed for jute manufactures to the value of some £8,000,000, which include 713 million sandbags. Over one million sandbags per month can now be supplied if required. Orders have also been placed for great quantities of khaki drill and cotton cloth, and for woollen cloth and blankets.

In fact, with the exception of such specialities as motor-cars, ships, aeroplanes, locomotives, and a few others, India is now not only self-supporting, but capable of supplying Great Britain and her Allies with large quantities of raw materials, and of equipping her own troops for war and supplying them either in India herself or overseas. This power, of course, immensely enhances her military value to the Empire. The strain on the manufacturing resources of this country is greatly relieved, and the indigenous products of India can be transformed on the spot into the vast range of articles required to equip armies in the field.

It is interesting to note, too, that before the declaration of war Germany was a large purchaser of certain Indian products—notably oil-seeds, vegetable oils, oil cake, chromite, mica, rubber, hides and skins, etc.—and this source of supply will now, therefore, be denied to her.

SUPPORT OF THE STATES

I have spoken hitherto of India as a whole, and with reference chiefly to those great provinces which constitute what we call "British India." Now I should like to say a word or two about the Indian States—Independent principalities, feudatory to Great Britain and ruled by their own Princes and Chiefs. Of these there are several hundred, ranging in size from kingdoms as large as some European countries (such, for instance, as Hyderabad and Kashmir, both over one and a half times the size of England) to estates of a few hundred acres. It is not, I think, generally recognized in this country how great a part of India is occupied by these States, or what a large proportion of India's population is composed of their subjects. Their combined area, in fact, covers

approximately one-third of India, and their population amounts to 90 million, almost one-quarter of India's total.

During the last great war these States rallied solidly on the side of Great Britain and her Allies, and helped to win the war by their contributions of men, money, and resources. And in the present war we find the same spirit of loyalty and co-operation. Over 300 of the States have offered their support, and all those possessing troops of their own have volunteered the services of those troops.

It would not be possible in this address to give a detailed account of the contributions to the war of each individual State, but we may take a few examples. We have, for instance, the great State of Hyderabad in the south with an area of 83,000 square miles and a population of over 14 million, a State with a predominantly Hindu population and a Muslim ruler. His Exalted Highness the Nizam, in addition to offering his own troops, is providing a complete squadron of aeroplanes for the British Air Force, to be known as the Hyderabad Squadron. The Maharaja of Bikanir, of the fighting Rajput stock, who served at the head of his own troops in the last war, has offered to raise and maintain six battalions of infantry and the services of his Camel Corps doubled in strength. He is prepared himself to take the field again, and has offered the services of his only surviving son. The Hindu ruler of the mainly Muslim State of Kashmir is providing two infantry battalions and one mountain battery. Modern motor ambulances have been offered by the Rulers of Rampur, Bhopal, and Bahawalpur, and by the Eastern States Agency group. Offers of personal service and other support have been received from numerous other States in all parts of India—Sikkim, Chitral, the Gilgit Agency in the north, ranging through Rajputana and the Punjab down to the south of the Peninsula.

Great sums of money have been offered by many of the Princes and Chiefs—H.E.H. the Nizam £11,200 monthly towards the cost of his troops required for service outside the State—T.H. of Indore £38,000, Bikanir £11,000, Travancore £45,000, the Jam Sahib of Nawanager a monthly contribution representing one-tenth of the income of his State, and so on. Up to November last

30 such contributions amounted to £330,000, and recurring donations to £105,000.

These great Princes are all rallying round the Empire in her time of need of their own free will, and it is scarcely necessary to add that the influence of these rulers, all of pure Indian race, extends far beyond their borders, and that they are setting an example which is being eagerly followed by thousands of their co-religionists and fellow-countrymen all over India.

NEPAL'S SUPPORT

There is still one great fighting race which I have not mentioned—the Gurkhas of Nepal. Here the situation is somewhat different. Nepal is not one of the Indian feudatory States, but is an entirely independent kingdom, situated, it is true, within the natural boundaries of the Indian Peninsula, but possessing its own monarch and system of government. She is free to ally herself with us in this struggle or to stand aloof as she wishes. But I feel that no account of India's war effort would be complete without a mention of Nepal's share. In the first place, her geographical position in a 500-mile stretch of the Himalayas overlooking the plains of India gives her automatically a high strategic importance; and secondly, as we all know, she voluntarily furnishes some 20,000 Gurkhas to the 20 Gurkha battalions of the Indian Army.

These Gurkhas have fought side by side with British soldiers in innumerable campaigns for over a century, and their soldierly qualities and courage are legendary. Now, in addition to this, Nepal has an army of her own, composed of the same splendid material, well drilled, equipped, and disciplined. On the very first day of the last war the then Prime Minister of Nepal, Sir Chandra Shumahere Jung, placed the whole resources of his country at the disposal of the King-Emperor, and, in addition to doubling the number of Gurkhas serving with the Indian Army for the period of the war, he despatched a large force of his own army to India under the command of his own sons and nephews. It is estimated that during the course of the war Nepal supplied no less than 200,000 men to help the Allies—a splendid contribution from a small country of only some 5 million inhabitants.

Sir Chandra's brother and successor, the present Prime Minister, Sir Joodha Shumshere Jung, has espoused our cause in the same spirit of friendship, and a force of 8,000 men of the Nepalese Army is now in India under the command of His Highness's eldest son, Sir Bahadur Shumshere Jung, who was Nepal's first Minister to Great Britain when her Legation was inaugurated in London some five years ago. It was a source of great satisfaction to all of us who know Nepal and who appreciate the high qualities of her Prime Minister to learn of the bestowal of the G.C.B. upon Sir Joodha Shumshere Jung last Christmas.

INDIA'S VIEW OF THE WAR

I have tried to present a brief outline of what India's support means to us in men and material, and from her geographical situation, but there is still one aspect of the matter upon which I should like to say a few words. Almost as important as India's human and material aid to us is the spirit in which it is given. One hears nowadays a good deal about political differences in India, and of party quarrels and dissensions, and of criticism of the Home and Indian Governments. The political situation was ably dealt with by Sir Alfred Watson in his address to the East India Association on December 8, so I shall only touch upon it lightly now. But the fact that differences exist does not mean that these antagonistic views as to constitutional changes imply any difference of opinion regarding the main question of the justice of our cause or the necessity of waging war against aggression. On the contrary, on this fundamental aspect of the present war, Indian opinion is united. In his speech at the opening of the Annual Meeting of the Associated Chamber of Commerce of India at Calcutta on December 18, His Excellency the Viceroy brought out this point very clearly. He said :

From the beginning there has been no question as to the attitude of public opinion in India, whether in British India or in the Indian States, towards our objectives in fighting this war—the destruction of Hitlerism, the restoration of the standards of fair dealing and of morality between nations, the re-establishment of the sanctity of the pledged word, of treaties between great peoples—all those have, from the beginning, had the whole-hearted support of public opinion in every party and in every community in this country.

Party differences do exist, but India, one may remember, is not the only country where party politics and disputes are to be found. For just as in this country an opposition may be critical of the Government, and may not always see eye to eye with it, whilst at the same time supporting the prosecution of the war with heart and soul, so it is in India. And I hope that the High Commissioner for India, from his own much greater knowledge of the subject, may be able to support these views. This being so, then we need have no fears or anxiety on this score. It is indeed an added factor of strength for us that in India, as in England, freedom of speech is allowed to all parties and to all individuals, that legitimate ideals and grievances can be openly discussed. We know very well that no such freedom exists in Germany, and in the end her totalitarian system will, as we hope and believe, prove a curse, and sooner or later come to disastrous destruction.

INDIAN MARTIAL QUALITIES

Before I close I should like to add a few words, based partly on personal observation and knowledge, on the Indian soldier. We all know that he is brave and loyal, but besides this I have often been struck by his amazing adaptability, and his endurance in extremes of climate and the hardships of warfare in extraordinary circumstances, utterly alien to his natural surroundings. We might expect, no doubt, that he would be capable of withstanding great heat—as indeed he is. I have served with Indian troops in the Derajat, that trans-Indus territory which is such an inferno in the hot weather, and elsewhere on the North-West Frontier, where they were put to the test. I remember in July, 1897 (I am going back a good many years!), passing the Indian regiments who were marching up from Nowshera for the relief of the garrison on the Malakand Pass. The heat was terrific. It must have been over 120 degrees in the shade, and in the little post of Dergai, at the foot of the pass, I saw a number of men, both Indian and British, laid out with sunstroke and heat apoplexy—some dead, some still breathing. But the bulk of the troops marched gaily along with comparatively few casualties, and, as we know, relieved the garrison and drove off the tribesmen.

I mention this instance merely to point the contrast between such conditions and those of another long-ago campaign—the Mission to Lhasa in 1904. The Mission with its escort (almost entirely composed of Indian troops) marched up into the Chumbi Valley in December, 1903, about the very worst month in the year, perhaps, for the purpose, over a 14,000-foot pass, and the Mission itself with a small detachment of Sikh Pioneers pushed ahead on to the Tibetan plateau over a 16,000-foot pass, and spent the next three months on this open wind-swept plain at an elevation of nearly 16,000 feet. There was no shelter other than the ordinary tents and rough stone walls which the men built for themselves as a screen against the continual blizzards. And all through these trying months the garrisons there and in Chumbi were kept supplied by lines of communication which crossed the Sikkim border by two passes, each nearly 15,000 feet high, deep in snow and exposed to icy winds. Yet these plainsmen stood it all pluckily and cheerfully, and with the minimum of sickness.

Again, take our skirmish on the Karo La Pass in the following May. Our small column was held up by a strong defence wall which the Tibetans had built across the narrowest part of the gorge, and it seemed impossible to force it by frontal assault. In order to outflank this wall a detachment of Muzbi Sikhs under one of their own Indian officers scaled the steep hillside to the right, crossed the snout of a glacier, and from a height of over 18,000 feet opened fire on the flank and rear of the Tibetan position. The Tibetans fled in panic and the wall was taken. This was a very remarkable feat, unequalled, as far as I know, in warfare—certainly as far as the actual elevation reached is concerned—and constitutes another proof of the hardihood and adaptability of the Indian soldier.

My aim today has been to show that it is not merely by statistics of the numbers of men available, and of the millions of tons of supplies at our command, that we should reckon the value of India's contribution to the war. Those numbers and that tonnage are impressive, and they are susceptible of almost indefinite increase. But besides this it must be a source of satisfaction to us all to know that we can count upon the right spirit—the approval

by India as a whole of the prosecution of the war against tyranny and bad faith. We have the support of all classes from the almost fabulous Mahārajas to the humblest peasant, and of all political parties. We have a valuable friend and ally in the gallant little country of Nepal. And we have the knowledge and assurance that the men who keep the peace in Eastern garrisons and who will be fighting side by side with our own troops and those of our Allies will be men of loyalty, courage, and hardihood.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

At a joint meeting of the Association and the Over-Seas League at Over-Seas House on January 23 Lieut-Colonel Sir Frederick O'Connor, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.V.O., read a paper on "India's Military Contribution to the War." Sir Firoz Khan Noon, K.C.I.E. (High Commissioner for India), presided.

The CHAIRMAN : I must apologize for my own presence here because, as you know, Lord Willingdon was to have presided at this lecture today, but, in spite of the disappointment that you may have, I personally feel it a privilege to act the substitute for Lord Willingdon and a pleasure to preside at the lecture of my friend Sir Frederick. I am sure you will all be pleased to know that Lord and Lady Willingdon have arrived safely in New Zealand. They are doing excellent Empire work, and may therefore be excused their absence this afternoon.

The lecturer needs very little introduction from me. He has had a most brilliant career in India, having served in the Indian Army and in the Political Department. If any of you are fond of shooting tigers, he is the man to make friends with. Soon after the last war he was the Resident in Nepal, and one of his greatest achievements was the Treaty which he so successfully negotiated between Great Britain and Nepal. He has travelled all over India and served in most of the important frontier areas of our great country. Whatever opinions he has formed are worthy of our profound respect.

Lieut-Colonel Sir FREDERICK O'CONNOR then read his paper on "India's Military Contribution to the War."

Commandant HUBERT COULON (Assistant Military Attaché at the French Embassy) : When Sir Frank Brown kindly invited me to attend today's meeting, he suggested that I should make a speech either in French or in English. I will try to deliver it in English, relying on your kindness.

My first duty is to express the deep regret of General Lelong, the Military Attaché, who has been prevented from coming. I shall report to him how much I have been interested by the lecture that has been given by Sir Frederick O'Connor. I already had some idea of the significance of India to Great Britain, but Sir Frederick's lecture has given me the opportunity fully to understand the importance of the contribution of this great Eastern country in man-power as well as in resources of many kinds. Being a soldier, I have particularly been struck by the information contained in the last part of the lecture, which concerns the Indian soldier's capacity to adapt himself to any sort of climate and any form of warfare.

In fact, I have today had an exceptional opportunity of adding much that is interesting to my somewhat rudimentary knowledge as regards India and her potentialities.

Mention has just been made of the loyalty and the high spirit of the Indian people. This reminds me of a little anecdote. I heard it from a lady, much appreciated in French and British society for her wit and her talent

as an author. I quote this anecdote, as it may serve to show that France also can rely upon the loyalty of the people overseas who depend on her.

The story, as far as I can remember, runs as follows: Once upon a time—it was not very long ago—the lady I referred to was travelling in North Africa. While on a visit to a small village in Morocco, she happened to meet a modest native digging in his field. "Tell me," she said to him, "how are you getting on with the French? Do you get accustomed to their rules and manners?" The Moroccan peasant answered simply, "Well, madame, what can I tell you? I am French." This answer, though not legally quite correct, nevertheless proved that the man had the right spirit.

It may be placed side by side with one of M. Mandel's quotations in his recent broadcast.* He there referred to the loyalty to France of the natives and their chiefs. But our Minister for the Colonies not only spoke of the character of the natives. He also emphasized the very important French Colonial contributions to the cause of the Allies. We can place reliance upon it, for M. Mandel is indeed a trustworthy statesman. I had the honour of meeting him, at the end of the last war, when he acted as Chef de Cabinet of M. Clemenceau. Since that time I have been impressed by his ability and capacity for work. It may be taken for certain that he will do his utmost to increase still further the French Colonial contribution in the near future. So much the better for the cause of the Allies! Their united efforts, strongly supported by their overseas territories, cannot fail to lead to victory. (Cheers.)

Lieut-General Sir GEORGE MACMUNN: It is a very great pleasure to be allowed to say a few words here to endorse most heartily all the lecturer has said. He and I first met with Indian artillery in the frontier campaign of 1897, and since then he and I have spent our days in different spheres, very largely in India and with the Indian soldiery; and, as he rightly says, there are no more manly or delightful people to serve with than the fighting races of India. Whether they come from the north or from the west, they are the most sturdy comrades to serve with and the most loyal supporters of this great civilization of ours.

But there is one point I would like to remind you of. The Sikhs, whose fighting powers have been compared with the majesty which Napier ascribes to the British soldier, are a small community, three million souls in all. The chivalry of the Dogra Hills of the Punjab is that of a small community. The great bulk of the modern fighting army comes from the Muslim tribes of the Punjab, that race to which your Chairman himself belongs, the great land-owning people and yeoman peasantry of the Punjab. Always loyal, they are even more so when Britain has the support and sympathy of the Muslim world. It was these people who formed the bulk of the infantry and artillery of the old Sikh kingdom.

That brings me to the over-riding point of diplomacy of the British and French Empires. There are in these Empires millions and millions of

* Published in English translation in the January issue of the *ASIATIC REVIEW*.

Muslims, and those Muslims are united by one common culture and civilization, which runs from opposite Gibraltar right away as far as Central China, united in one religion and one culture. If you throw a stone into a pond in Morocco, that ripple spreads right away from there into Central China. Therefore heartily may we deplore any of our policies which bring us into conflict with Muslim opinion.

Heartily, too, must we rejoice that we now have on our side once again our ancient friends, the Turks, who by misadventure and perhaps bad policy were driven into the hands of the Central Powers in the last war. That means that all Muslim opinion in the world is in sympathy with us, and especially our Muslim soldiery.

The loyalty of the Indian soldiery is astounding. I must tell you a story. In 1924 I was up the Nile, and I lunched at Luxor with Mr. James Breasted, the American historian of Philadelphia University, and Mr. Oscar Straus, who had been American Ambassador or Chargé d'Affairs during the war in Constantinople. He told me this story, which I can well understand. A patrol of Indian soldiers was captured by the Turks, a havildar and three men, in Sinai. They were brought before a German officer of the German Staff at Beersheba to be cross-examined. He said to them, "How is it that you Muhammadans are fighting against the Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey, from whom has been declared a Holy War?" These three men said, "We serve the British Raj, and we consider that this is a political war and not a religious war." So the officer of the German General Staff said, "I do not care a damn about that. There are four Turkish uniforms. I give you five minutes to put them on, or you will be shot." The havildar said, "May I consult my comrades?" They were marched out for five minutes. When they came back the Prussian asked, "Well, what about it?" They drew themselves up and shouted, "Three cheers for King George!" They were taken out and shot.

Mr. Otto Straus said the story was told him by an officer of the Turkish General Staff at Constantinople. General Birdwood tried to trace the names and help their families, but that could never be done. That was a most typical and heartrending story of the fidelity of the Indian soldiery, and especially this great backbone of the Army, the Punjabi Muhammadan.

Here is one more story. I was commanding on the Tigris and a Labour Corps came up from India. These Labour Corps were largely officered by retired officers of the Indian Army. I went down to see one disembark, and standing on the quay was an enormous old Sikh with a great white beard. I said, "When did you go on pension, old friend?" He laughed a deep laugh, "Ho! Ho! Ho! Eleven years ago, but when this war broke out, father said to me, 'I won't have you young fellows loafing about the farm. Get out and serve.'"

I should like to add my appreciation to the lecturer for the way he has put the services of India in the last war and in this war before us today. (Applause.)

Lieut.-Colonel E. F. W. LASCELLES: May I, from a Dominion point of view, say just a word? It was my privilege as a New Zealander and an

officer of British Regulars to serve alongside our French Allies and our Indian fellow-subjects in Gallipoli in the last war, and I was interested particularly in hearing what Sir Frederick had got to say about the Indian soldiery. When we found their dead, the men who had been killed in action were never found with their backs towards the enemy. (Applause.) I do not as a soldier want to say anything more about India's contribution. If you can say that of any section of the people of the British Empire, then you know well what is going to happen in this war. (Applause.)

Sir JOHN WHITTY (Chairman of the India Group, Over-Seas League) : I hope you will forgive me if I keep you for a few extra minutes. I feel it is a little bit of an anticlimax to make an appeal at the end of all we have heard today, but I hope we shall get a generous response. I have been asked to say a few words to request your support for the Indian Comforts Fund. I do not think I could have chosen a more opportune time to appeal for this fund, because Sir Frederick O'Connor and others have just told you what India's contribution to the war is likely to be, and I am sure will be. The severe weather has told all of us what the need for extra comforts is for people who come over from India to help to try and win this war.

There was a notice in *The Times* which explains what this fund is for, and I think I cannot do better than read it out to you :

At the instance of the High Commissioner for India, Sir Firozhan Noon, a meeting of the council of the Indian Comforts Fund has been held at India House. The project has the patronage of the Secretary of State for India and the support of the Ministry of Shipping.

The Dowager Lady Chelmsford, chairman, presided, and the meeting was attended by a large and representative number of men and women interested in the welfare of Indian sailors and of Indians serving in His Majesty's forces. It is estimated that there are not fewer than 30,000 Indian lascars in the British mercantile marine, many of whom, after being shipwrecked by enemy action, have been landed without possessions of any kind. It is proposed to supplement with comforts the assistance given to these men by the shipping companies and also by the Shipwrecked Mariners Society, with which the fund will co-operate. A contingent of Indian troops has arrived in France, an Indian Pioneer Corps is being recruited in London by the War Office, and two Indian ambulance units have been formed.

As the war proceeds it is anticipated that calls upon the fund will greatly increase. It is proposed to provide pullovers, socks, scarves, and other knitted goods, as well as cigarettes, Indian gramophone records, wireless sets, and games requisite for units and for individuals. The Viceroy of India has shown his practical interest in the scheme by allotting Rs. 25,000 to the fund.

Now I would like you to get out your pencils. Subscriptions may be sent to the Hon. Treasurer, Indian Comforts Fund, India House, Aldwych, W.C.2, or to the credit of the fund at the Imperial Bank of India, 25, Old Broad Street, E.C.2. Knitted goods and other comforts should be sent to the Hon. Secretary, India House. All I am going to add is that I hope members of the India Group and all present here today will make a splendid response. Those who cannot give service can contribute money to the fund in the complete confidence that it will be properly administered by the very distinguished and capable Committee that have been appointed.

There are many ladies, I am sure, who are willing and able to buy wool and knit these scarves, socks, etc. If there are others who cannot afford to buy wool, I am glad to be able to tell them that a certain amount of knitting wool can be supplied. Lady Wheeler has come here with a supply of wool, which she will give to those who ask for it. I hope there will be a very generous and general response to this appeal. All of us who know India know how much a little comfort and warmth will mean to the people who come here from the sun of India to the bitter weather we are having this year to fight for freedom and right.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I wish to express my own gratitude for and, may I say, your pleasure with what we have listened to this afternoon. Sir Frederick has given us a very illuminating picture of what India can do, and I was most interested to hear the spirited speech by Sir George MacMunn. As a matter of fact, when he and Colonel Lascelles were speaking, I was trying to blush all the time, but it was my colour, I think, which prevented you from catching me out.

I take this opportunity of welcoming Commandant Coulon from the French Embassy. (Applause.) France today is our best friend in the world, and we should lose no opportunity of showing our great regard and respect for any individual Frenchman, wherever we may meet him in the world.

So far as the military contribution of India to the war is concerned, the position during this conflict is quite different from what it was in the last war. Today India is not a colony or a possession held by a foreign Power and ruled without the consent of the people. In the Provinces we have our completely equipped and responsible Parliaments and Ministries in full charge of their Government. The Punjab, Bengal and Sind Parliaments have passed resolutions giving proof of the public support for England in this great war. That support is not the support of a people on whose behalf a foreign Government is acting. That is the expression of the feeling of the people themselves.

As regards the other parts of India, let there be no mistaking, either in Germany or anywhere else, that the fact that the Congress Ministries have resigned shows that the people living in those Provinces are not wholeheartedly with Great Britain. They definitely are wholeheartedly with England. It is only owing to certain political differences with regard to the time when certain reforms ought to come into the Central Government in India that those Ministries have gone out, and I am sure that there is a great deal of feeling in this country in favour of India's demand for being mistress in her own house. The Viceroy has only recently made pronouncements which almost amount to begging the people of India to come together and be in a position to assume responsibility at the Centre. But in spite of all those differences today, the feeling is that the people are wholeheartedly with England—people who have never been with England up to now in anything she has done.

For the first time in the political history of India in this century the Viceroy of India has been moving about in Bombay, the hotbed of sedition,

openly and unguarded, and nobody has raised a finger against him. That shows you the spirit of the people of India today.

Therefore I think, apart from the military support which Sir Frederick has mentioned which can be expected from India—and which, as a matter of fact, can be expected from any possession held by a European Power—India's contribution today is voluntary. This is where India's contribution in this war is going to be much more valuable and much stronger than was the case in the last war, and I think that the world and our Allies have not yet seen a hundredth part of what India can do in this war to bring it to a successful conclusion. (Applause.)

Sir FREDERICK O'CONNOR : Fortunately there was nothing contentious in any of the remarks.

What our Chairman has just said chimes in with what another speaker remarked—that we are all Britishers, whether we are born in Australia, New Zealand or India or anywhere else. We are all subjects of one great Empire and we are all keen to work together wholeheartedly to win the war. (Applause.)

Lord LAMINGTON : Before we separate I have a very simple and pleasant task. Though I arrived very late at the meeting, I had had the advantage of seeing a copy of Sir Frederick's very valuable address which he delivered this afternoon. I knew therefore more or less the contents of it.

I do not know how it strikes others, but it seems to me, when a moment of doubt or questioning arises as to whether anything can be said in criticism of our policy as being a right one, the answer is given by these great communities of Canada, Australia, and India, coming together with such unanimity to help in this gigantic struggle that lies before us. Their action cannot be due to a mere question about Danzig being a free port or not. The issues are greater than that, and I think the Viceroy's words read out by the lecturer show clearly the object of our Empire at the present time and also of the great French people.

Sir Frederick has very clearly set before us the wonderful way in which Indians of every caste and class have come forward to show their determination to try and support the Allies' interests in this great war, and how abundant are the resources of needed materials. We are very grateful to him for having prepared this very succinct lecture.

We have also the pleasure of welcoming the High Commissioner for India. We are always very pleased to see him. He is constantly engaged in some great and good work. I would therefore ask you one and all to show your appreciation first of Sir Frederick's excellent paper, and secondly to Sir Firoz Khan Noon for coming to preside over our gathering. (Cheers.)

Mr. H. S. L. POLAK writes :

There is a point of view that has not been brought out in Sir Frederick O'Connor's interesting paper. It is one that has been constantly brought forward in India generally, and with the greatest emphasis in particular, by the Indian Liberal leaders. They insist that the process of Indianization of

the army has proceeded far too slowly, and that the classes recruited are far too closely limited. In their view, the result has been to prevent India from dealing efficiently with her own defence and from throwing herself more effectively into the present struggle on the side of the Allies. With the growing tendency to rely upon brains and technical equipment in perfecting the strategy and the material of the armed forces of the Crown, to continue to divide the Indian peoples into the martial and the non-martial communities is to pursue a policy that can and ought no longer to be justified. The following quotation from the *Leader* (Allahabad) may be usefully pondered over :

Martial qualities are not the monopoly of any particular community or communities. Just as all communities can produce efficient engineers or surgeons or teachers, so also they can produce good soldiers. There are some Governments which take steps to inculcate in the people a martial spirit. There are other Governments which try to crush such spirit. If Germany were to conquer Britain, one could be sure that her policy would not be to martialize the British. . . . The army, which would be recruited from the class of people who are supposed to be the least intelligent, would be officered by Germans, and the navy would probably be manned and officered entirely by Germans. The argument would be that the British were a nation of shopkeepers. Let the people of Britain try to imagine what their feelings would be, and then let them place themselves in the position of Indians and try to realize what our feelings must be. Can it be seriously believed that the whole of Bengal is incapable of furnishing a single soldier for the army or that the Central Provinces can produce only six soldiers in five years? This classification of the people into martial and non-martial communities for purposes of recruitment to the army has caused the deepest resentment in the country, and if Britain valued India's goodwill and co-operation she will be well advised to revise her present policy, which is based on the distrust of Indians.

THE MUSLIMS OF INDIA, THE WAR, AND THE POLITICAL FIELD

By A. YUSUF ALI, C.B.E., I.C.S. (RETD.)

The Muslims of India form an interesting section of the Muslim world. Their past history is interesting; their present position gives them some importance in India, in the British Empire, and in the international movements of Islam; and if they follow a wise policy, they are likely to have considerable influence on the course of future events. According to the census of 1931, they numbered some 78 millions in British India and the Indian States taken together, out of a total population (then including Burma) of 353 millions. It is estimated that their number now should be in the neighbourhood of 88 millions. Some authorities estimate the figure as high as 90 millions. Their proportion to the general population stood at something between one-fourth and one-fifth. As each decennial census shows a slightly higher proportion on account of a slight relatively higher fertility, it is probable that it is nearer one-fourth than one-fifth at the present day.

They are scattered all over India. Their proportion is very low in the Central and Southern Provinces. But in four out of the eleven major Provinces they form the majority of the population. These majority Provinces are the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal. The majority is particularly striking in the Frontier Province and Sind. In the Punjab and Bengal they form a majority, but not an overwhelming majority, being in both cases under 60 per cent. In Bengal they form mostly the cultivating classes. In the Punjab their strength is mostly in the rural districts; but in recent years they have made great strides in the learned and urban professions, but not much in trade and commerce and manufactures. In Sind and the Frontier Province there is not much in the way of trade and commerce or modern manufactures, but such as there is is not in their hands.

It is to be noted, however, that the old traditional crafts, such as dyeing, weaving, and the manual industrial arts, have been in their hands. Many of the landholders in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh are Muslims. But they are largely in debt, and their position seems to be deteriorating from year to year.

The political contact of Islam with India began in the seventh century of the Christian era, with the invasion of Sind by Muhammad bin Qasim. The Arab element came in through this door from Iraq. Arab families are scattered through India. The rulers of Bahawalpur State trace their descent from Arab families. Afghan and Turkish blood came in from the North-West Frontier. It is well known how Mahmud of Ghazni made more than twenty-four invasions from this direction. In the thirteenth century Turkish and Pathan dynasties were established in Delhi, and they gradually extended their influence all over the country. In the sixteenth century the Turks and Mughals of Central Asia came and established their power under that great soldier of fortune, Babur, whose Memoirs are still extant, revealing a forceful and romantic personality.

Gradually Mughal power or Mughal influence extended over the whole of India. We have detailed records and statistics of the Mughal Empire in the reign of the great Emperor Akbar. Under him and his successors down to Aurangzib the Empire was consolidated and came to occupy an important position in the international world. This was also the most glorious period of Muslim architecture in India. The Taj Mahal and the Pearl Mosque in Agra, and many notable buildings in Delhi and Lahore, bear witness to the refinement and skill of Mughal builders. A feature of their public works was the construction of large gardens with fountains, some of which still remain.

THE MUSLIMS AND BRITISH RULE

In the eighteenth century a decline set in in Mughal power and prestige. Some of the Provinces broke away; many local principalities were established; and the European nations came in, with powerful trade corporations, which developed political ambitions. Eventually British power was firmly established in

India. In spite of what its critics may say about its failings, its work has led to results of which any nation may be proud. The Muslims, after the loss of their power, felt for a long time unable to accommodate themselves to the new conditions. The foreign stocks, from which the governing body was derived, were largely absorbed in the general Muslim body, which is cognate in racial stocks with their Hindu brethren among whom they live. Their problems became more complicated.

Their social organization lost some of that democratic simplicity which belongs to a warrior and conquering class. They had been accustomed to employment in superior military, judicial, and administrative services. These were now closed to them. The inferior ranks in these services, which were open to the "Natives," were eagerly seized upon by their Hindu brethren, but the Muslims declined to be "submerged." Their languages had been the predominant official languages in India. Their place was taken by English, and they were too proud to adjust themselves to the change. The judicial administration had been modelled more or less on their ideas. Other ideas now came into vogue, with which they had no familiarity and no sympathy. Education necessarily takes its colour from language and religious and social institutions. The Muslims were not eager to enter the new educational system introduced in the early British period. They thus lost ground in every way, socially, economically, educationally, and culturally, in so far as the new Indian culture began to be flavoured with British ideas and usages. The non-Muslims, on the other hand, embraced their new opportunities.

The generation of Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan realized the new position and resolved to get rid of their handicaps by means of modern education. But Sir Saiyid's ideas of politics were necessarily conditioned by the position of the community as he found it. He was a staunch friend of the British Government in India, though he had on many occasions criticized its policy, especially as regards the Muslims. When the Indian National Congress was started in the 1880's Sir Saiyid denounced the movement as seditious and waged an acrimonious controversy against it. He was strongly opposed to a policy of agitation against the Govern-

ment, and his lead in this matter remained the guiding factor in Muslim politics till 1906-7, when the All-India Muslim League was founded. The partition of Bengal and the spirited attempt made unsuccessfully by Sir Bampfylde Fuller to support Muslim views must be considered as links in a chain of events which brought out the Muslims into the field of political organization.

THE CONGRESS AND THE LEAGUE

When the Indian National Congress was founded it was hoped in the early days that this body might act as the mouthpiece for the whole of India, including all communities. Some Bombay Muslims under the late Mr. Badruddin Tyabji joined it in that hope. But that hope has not been fulfilled. The internal history of the Congress itself has shown great fluctuations since its inception. But it may now be taken to be an organization of educated caste Hindus. Other ranks of Hindus are trying to perfect their own organization under Mr. Ambedkar. But the community that feels most need of a distinct organization, especially after the elective principle was introduced and votive power was given to the people to influence legislative and executive policy, is the great Muslim community with its important historical background. It could not be expected to be content to be swallowed up in the great mass of Hindu peoples with wholly different social and political traditions. This was the origin and the *raison d'être* of the Muslim League.

The central organization is called the All-India Muslim League, to which are affiliated most of the elected Muslim members of the Central Indian Legislature. They are led by Mr. M. A. Jinnah, of Bombay. Then there are Provincial Muslim Leagues in the different Provinces. In some Provinces there are also District Muslim Leagues, to keep in touch with the districts, which are the units of Indian administration. Quite recently an Indian States Muslim League has been constituted to deal with questions affecting the Muslim subjects of Indian States.

The Indian Constitution of 1935 transfers a great deal of power to Provincial Legislatures. It has not yet come into force as regards the Central (All-India) Legislature; when it does, it will

transfer the power at the Centre also. The principle of responsible government has been introduced by this Constitution. This means that the party commanding the majority of votes in the Legislature will form the Executive Government, with full powers under the Constitution. There may be fluctuations in Hindu parties; but the Muslim party will always be in a permanent minority, and this is entirely against the spirit of democratic institutions. To prevent oppression reserve powers are given to the Governors by the Constitution, but it can easily be understood that reserve powers can only be exercised in emergencies and cannot be accepted as an outside substitute for the privilege of joint co-operation in the framing of policies and in day-to-day administration. The League members have to exercise the fullest vigilance in safeguarding communal interests and make the Muslim voice heard in the Legislature.

There are separate electorates for Muslims. It is inherent in this arrangement that the Muslim League should act in the Legislatures as a separate organization. For general All-India policy the League claims to share with the Congress on equal terms the right of consultation and co-operation. This was the point on which the recent conversations between Mr. Jinnah (as representing the Muslim League) and Pandit Nehru and Dr. Rajendra Prasad (as representing the Congress) broke down. The aim was to establish full understanding and co-operation between the two bodies. If this had been possible, representatives of both the League and the Congress would have been invited to join the Viceroy's Executive Council, the supreme executive authority in India, during the war.

THE MUSLIM ATTITUDE

Such is the general position now. To come to closer grips with details, I would specially draw attention to the resolution passed by the Working Committee of the League on September 18, 1939.* You will note that the League's grievances and claims cover a much larger field than the question of their atti-

* Appendix D, *India and the War*. Statement issued by the Governor-General of India on October 17, 1939, Cmd. 6121.

tude to the war. They cover (1) certain provisions of the present Constitution; (2) the actual working of provincial autonomy; (3) civic rights; and (4) religious and cultural rights. I ought to add (5) certain aspects of Muslim education in India.

As regards the present Constitution, they wholly disapprove of the federal scheme embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935. They object to its mere suspension as announced by the Viceroy. They

"wish that instead of its being suspended, it had been abandoned completely, and desire to convey to His Majesty's Government that they should do so without delay. The Committee desire to make it clear that they do not endorse the 'federal objective' of His Majesty's Government referred to by His Excellency in his address to the Central Legislature, and strongly urge upon the British Government to review and revise the entire problem of India's future constitution *de novo* in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present provincial constitution of India and developments that have taken place since 1935 or may take place hereafter."

It is clear that they look upon the working of the provincial constitution as having been disastrous to Muslim interests.

"The developments that have taken place, especially since the inauguration of the provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of government and the recent experience of over two years, have established beyond any doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination by the Hindus over the Muslim minorities, whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Governments in various provinces."

GRIEVANCES

I should myself personally have put it less strongly, but I specially commend the words to your attention as expressing the strong feeling of a responsible body, not on the spur of the moment, but in a deliberate resolution drafted by men of education and adopted presumably after discussion. Similar complaints were recently made about the United Provinces, Bihar, and the Central Provinces by Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq, the Premier of Bengal. On a challenge by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq offered to go through the United Provinces with the Pandit and convince him that the grievances were real. This joint investiga-

tion has fallen through, but Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq's charges remain. They include the beating of tomtoms before mosques, boycott, assault, arson, murder, and mass terrorization in villages. It is not asserted that the Congress leaders order these, but their ignorant followers on the countryside presume on the fact that the Congress Governments were in power in these Provinces.

Apart from local village attacks on Muslim susceptibilities, Congress policy itself often gives rise to difficulties for Muslims in many ways. The shouting of *Bande Mataram* as a national greeting is obnoxious to them because of its idolatrous association in Bankim Chunder Chatterji's Bengali novel. Muslim endowments are often treated without understanding sympathy where a Congress Government comes into administrative contact with them or where some general legislation seems to affect them adversely. Many of these endowments are partly religious and partly educational. The educational part is often treated with scant courtesy in the matter of grants-in-aid, etc. The recent Shia-Sunni riots in Lucknow are attributed in some Muslim quarters to a clumsy if not provocative handling on the part of the Congress Government in power, which is supposed to incite mutual animosities among the Muslims themselves in order to intervene as arbitrators.

I have referred to educational activities in connection with endowments. Muslim educational grievances are also of a general character. Textbooks are often prescribed in State schools or institutions which are of a character repugnant to Muslim feeling if not actually hostile to Muslim traditions. The location of schools and colleges, and the appointments, promotions, and transfers of educational staffs are often made in a manner prejudicial to Muslim interests. The grants-in-aid question comes in here also. The Muslims would also like better representation in the educational Services.

This point is emphasized by Dr. Waheed in his recently published monograph on *The Evolution of Muslim Education*. He says :

"This need for adequate Muslim representation is as important in the educational as in the political world, and it is obviously no mere question of

Muslims seeking to obtain a share of the educational loaves and fishes. What Muslims want is to be free at once to make their own contribution to the cultural and educational development of the country, and equally to safeguard their own cultural and educational interests. They have a right to insist on being in a position to make this contribution. As a result of their exclusion from this position in the past, the education of India has been standardized . . . on wrong lines so that the stream of education is running in one definite direction, and thousands of young men brought up on this system find themselves unable to fight the battle of life. The attitude of the State should be to foster rather than discourage communal education and to preserve the cultural development of each community" (p. 55).

THE WAR SITUATION

All these many-sided difficulties arise because there is no working basis of unity between the communities. As Lord Linlithgow said,* he was disappointed at the "entire disagreement between the representatives of the major parties on fundamental issues." It is this entire disagreement on fundamental issues that prevents co-operation even in matters of common interest outside the communal sphere. This has been strikingly exemplified in the lack of wholehearted communal co-operation for the purposes of the war. There is no doubt whatever that the war aims of the Allies command the hearty support of all thinking Indians. They sympathize with Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and Finland, and they abhor methods of aggression, militarism, and race domination. But the two major political parties find it difficult to respond to the Viceroy's invitation to join the Central Government unconditionally for the vigorous prosecution of the war. At the Round-Table Conferences the British Prime Minister had to make a Communal Award, and a compromise Constitution was adopted, representing the greatest common measure of agreement among the parties. But that Constitution satisfies no one, and for the time being the impasse seems to be complete. There seems to be no outlet of escape. The gulf seems to be unbridgable.

UNITY AND CO-OPERATION

But is it unbridgable? It must be bridged. It is in the interest of the Muslims that it should be bridged. They are not going to

* Governor-General's Pronouncement, November 6, 1939.

remain always in the position of a discontented, impotent, and hopeless minority. Their talent, their past experience, their fitness for survival in many different kinds of environment—physical, moral, and spiritual—require that they should examine their own position and come to some understanding with the forces of unity, which, after all, are the only ones having a survival value. In the field of politics the counting of heads determines the vote value of groups of people. But there are combinations and adjustments possible, by which all intelligent minorities can pull their weight in composite communities.

Mechanical devices can help for a time, but can offer no permanent solutions. Communal electorates have been necessary and useful. But as a permanent wheel in the machinery of politics they will not enable the Muslims to impress their personality and contribute their reasonable share in the development of their country. Schemes of division into mutually exclusive zones—such as those propounded by Syed Abdul Latif in *The Muslim Problem in India*—may have some attractive features, but they imply almost impossible exchanges of populations and the abandonment of ground already won instead of moral and political expansion.

The way to unity and co-operation lies in other directions. The first step must be to cultivate the psychological desire for unity and co-operation. This can be fostered by education, intimate contacts in private and public life, business organization on modern lines, and consultations and meetings in friendly gatherings. A great deal of mischief is caused by unseemly journalism and gutter literature, which must be suppressed, if not by the good sense of the communities concerned, by other means open to the modern State.

The need for unity—and perhaps the opportunity for unity—has been emphasized in connection with the exigencies of the present war. There is no doubt that every section of Indian opinion is shocked by the way in which liberty has been trampled upon and confidence has been shaken in peaceful methods of settling differences, by the recent action of the totalitarian Powers. As the National Liberal Federation put it in their Resolution (September 10, 1939), "in this crisis India should unhesitatingly

and unconditionally support the democratic Powers by every possible means so that they may come out victorious in the struggle." This cannot be done by an India violently divided within itself. Such divisions should await a more favourable international atmosphere for their solution. Indeed, such an atmosphere would help in their solution. It has often been found by experience that co-operation for one particular end in which all parties believe greatly facilitates the solution of differences on other points when the particular end is won. Our Indian difficulties are not only as between ourselves—our own parties—but also between us and the British authority in whom the ultimate power now lies and who are quite willing to enter into consultations with a view to the transference of that power as far as may be practicable with the consent and goodwill of all parties in India. This would obviously be impossible while Britain is locked in a deadly struggle with a first-class Power or possibly with two first-class Powers.

The Governor-General's Statement of October 17, 1939, reiterated on many occasions since, contemplates such action, and has been received with satisfaction by the Muslims. It says:

"I am authorized by His Majesty's Government to say that at the end of the war they will be very willing to enter into consultations with representatives of the several communities, parties, and interests in India, and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and co-operation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable."

THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION

So far we have discussed only the attainment of *ad hoc* unity for the purposes of this war. But there is a permanent and radical solution of the minority problem which I should like to present for your consideration. There is no need to accept the dictum that it is the fate of a minority to suffer. All constitutions are made in order to safeguard various interests, and in the complicated business of modern government the chief test of good government is how far this requirement has been met. Democracy itself is on its trial from this point of view. Where it works successfully it does so because people have found by long experience that give-and-take is of the essence of co-operation for

common ends, and a citizen's life is a constant round of give-and-take. Even under majority rule the general consent of the whole population must be assumed for smooth working. The minority as well as the majority has to obey the law for the time being; only, the minority hopes some day to become the majority and to make the law more conformable to its views. Not that there should be constant friction, each party changing the law every time it comes into power. That would mean instability and perpetual want of confidence—ultimately confusion and chaos. Each party contributes something of its point of view until an equilibrium is reached, under which all sensible people accept the inevitable while not relinquishing their eternal and inalienable right to grumble.

THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

But such an equilibrium can only be reached where there is a two-party system in which individuals can and do change over from one party to another at different times. This is impossible as between the Hindus and Muslims as such. But it is not impossible as between the Congress Party as such and a coalition of groups opposed to the Congress. The largest and most important group in such a coalition will be the Muslims, but it is quite possible that some Muslims like Mr. Abdul Kalam Azad might throw in their political lot with the Congress. It is also possible that the various local or social groups—such as Khaksars and Ahrars, or sections of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, and some groups in the Frontier Province and in Sind—may, in politics, follow their own bents, though in social or religious matters they would be strong supports of unity among the Muslims. On the other hand, among the Hindus, taking the word in its widest generic sense, there are groups that are opposed to the Congress. The most important of such groups numerically is that of the Scheduled Castes, more generally known as the Depressed Classes, who may number anything up to 70 or 80 millions. They are not closely organized, and some of them would undoubtedly be under Congress influence. But the majority could be got into a new and composite political party. Another group, not numerically strong but con-

taining men of the highest standing and education, is that of the Liberal Federation. And then there are Congress men who belong to extreme sections at either end. The extreme Socialists (or Communists) think that the Congress is too bourgeois, too much in the hands of the propertied classes. As parties come into power and their labels receive precise definition, this section must part company with the Congress. In Indian conditions it can best work with revolutionary or anarchical groups, which have fortunately no strength among the people that actually count. But the conservative elements in Congress ranks will, when their allegiance is subjected to a practical test, find themselves more at home with the Liberals than with Congressites of the school of Mr. Subhas Bose.

Other lines of cleavage which sometimes make a sort of timid appearance in Provincial Legislatures are: Town *versus* Country, or Agriculturists *versus* Non-agriculturists, or Capital *versus* Labour. These lines of cleavage can also be utilized in forming composite parties.

A COMPOSITE PARTY

The upshot of this analysis is that there are many incipient lines of cleavage in Indian politics which can be appealed to for the formation of true political parties, as opposed to purely religious or communal groups. And I look to the Muslims—with their past history, their political experience, and their present insecure position—to take the lead in evolving a composite party which will safeguard legitimate interests and be available—when the need arises—for forming an alternative government. The task is not easy, and may appear impossible to minds wedded to intransigent traditions. But it must be attempted. Each Province will have to deal elastically with it according to its own local conditions. In the Punjab Legislature, for instance, the Sikhs form an element to be considered, and among them, again, the Akalis have a point of view different from their other Sikh brethren. The point would be to examine the purely political issues that arise out of these differences, and attempt a classification and a regrouping that will enable small minorities to pull their weight as

that the federal autonomy scheme "afforded the swiftest stepping-stone to Dominion Status." As this involves the consent and co-operation of the Princes, the prospect does not appear very rosy. Perhaps communal harmony in British India may help to accelerate the pace by limiting Dominion Status, at any rate at the first stage, to British India.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

At a meeting of the Association held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on February 6, 1940, Mr. A. Yusuf Ali read a paper on "The Muslims of India, the War, and the Political Field." Sir Harold Wilberforce-Bell, K.C.I.E., was in the Chair.

The HONORARY SECRETARY: I have a letter from Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, who was to have presided today, expressing his great regret that he cannot be with us. He has been called to the Mansion House to attend a meeting in honour of the Centenary of New Zealand, at which Their Majesties the King and Queen are to be present. His place has been kindly taken, at short notice, by Sir Harold Wilberforce-Bell.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that Mr. Yusuf Ali needs very much in the way of introduction, because I am sure that he is well known to most, if not all, of those who are present here today.

Mr. Yusuf Ali has had a career of much distinction in India. He was one of those who joined the Indian Civil Service—a very splendid body of men—in 1895, and he remained in the Service in India until some time during or towards the end of the last war. Since then he has devoted much time to lecturing and explaining matters of high import in connection with India, and particularly with the Muslim section of the great Indian population. The interest that he has aroused on many occasions has, I am aware, been considerable, and I congratulate the East India Association on having been able, at this particular juncture, to obtain him as a medium for elucidating something of Muhammadan thought and aspirations in India at the present time. Mr. Yusuf Ali's paper will, I am sure, be very illuminating.

(Mr. YUSUF ALI then read his paper.)

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we are all much beholden to Mr. Yusuf Ali for his excellent survey of the Muhammadan position in India at the present moment. He has—very wisely, perhaps—not attempted to enunciate a practical way of meeting the present difficulties, but he has suggested a number of ways in which Muhammadan unity can be obtained, and that, of course, is an important matter.

Sir Frederick Sykes, whose absence is so much regretted this afternoon, has written a letter to the Secretary in which he discusses one or two points that Mr. Yusuf Ali has raised. Sir Frederick's two main points are: first, that the chief consideration is really the question of education—by which I take it he means not only general education, but also political education—

and, secondly, that all these troubles and difficulties must be solved in India by the Muhammadans themselves, a view which I am sure Mr. Yusuf Ali will accept.

Mr. Yusuf Ali has mentioned the position of the Princes in the Indian polity, and he has come to the conclusion that they might just as well be left out of the question for the time being. I am not sure that the Princes themselves would quite accept that idea. I am not sure, for instance, that the appearance of utter dissatisfaction with the Federal Scheme which we have seen reported as the result of meetings recently held in Bombay is altogether expressive of what the Princes think as a whole. It is, perhaps, a little too early to know what the Princes' definite views really are. When I left India less than a year ago I am sure that the majority of the States which were comprised in the Punjab States Agency were prepared to accept the Federal idea and also the Instrument of Accession which was sent to certain of them for comment. That, of course, did not appear in the Press, and it was not made public in any other way, for the simple reason that the suggestion put forward to these States was put forward confidentially at that stage. I think we cannot assume that the States will be altogether opposed to the Federal Scheme as proposed in the Act of 1935.

With regard to the question of co-operation, I do not think there is a great deal of co-operation among Muhammadans in India. That matter is, of course, closely bound up with the questions of party discipline and education, to which Mr. Yusuf Ali has referred. But most important of all, in my view, is the question of the Press. If the Muhammadan political leaders as a whole are unable to influence their Press, I do not see how Muhammadan unity in India can be achieved, and without that it does not seem possible to consider that they could be by themselves an alternative to any other party in government.

The Right Hon. Major-General Sir FREDERICK SYKES, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.B.E., K.C.S., in the course of his letter, wrote: Mr. Yusuf Ali's paper provides a valuable stimulus for discussion of a most interesting and important aspect of Indian political development. That nearly ninety millions of Indian Muslims should constitute a political minority, although the greatest, gives startling reality to the immense complexities that envelop federation in India. It is as if the Germans of the Greater Reich, to make a purely numerical comparison, were deprived of autonomy in a federating Europe. The difference, and the essential difficulty, are that the Muslims are scattered throughout India instead of forming a compact block of people. As a result, they form a permanent minority in seven of the provinces.

Mr. Yusuf Ali traces the consequences of this dispersion with clarity and detachment. They can be shortly summarized. The Muslims are not prepared to agree to a political system that will consecrate their status as a minority. Safeguards are no compensation for this infliction. They demand a policy in which they can play an adequate rôle, and at the same time develop their distinctive faith and culture. This leads to open opposition to federation. This negative attitude is wholly unsatisfactory, as Mr. Yusuf Ali is quick to emphasize. It offers no remedy for the position of the

Muslims as a minority, and makes no contribution to achieving Indian unity, which is vital to Indian welfare.

I welcome the importance that Mr. Yusuf Ali attaches to unity, especially at a time when the Allies are fighting for a cause that commands overwhelming support in India. As long as India is rent by violent political divisions, she cannot make that support effective. I agree also that if Indians would co-operate to help in winning the war, this would make easier co-operation after the war in the solution of Indian difficulties.

Finally, as a means of attaining a permanent settlement of the rancorous divisions inseparable from communal parties, Mr. Yusuf Ali advocates the formation of purely political parties. By this means the dangers of permanent minorities will be removed; and a regrouping of interests will diversify, and, no doubt, enrich Indian political life. The suggestion in itself is attractive. But it contains an element of artificiality. Political parties cannot be forced like mushrooms. If there are now deep cleavages in India along religious and communal lines, it is hard to envisage that these loyalties and antagonisms will be abandoned for a new allegiance of a tentative kind. Mr. Yusuf Ali himself can only speak of "incipient lines of cleavage," and others that "make a sort of timid appearance in Provincial Legislatures."

It is a cause that makes a party, and not *vice versa*. That truth suggests a modification of Mr. Yusuf Ali's proposal. Begin, first of all, with causes that are capable of arousing positive loyalty for themselves, and that are embracing enough to bridge the gulfs between the present divisions. That leads back to the insistence of Mr. Yusuf Ali on the immediate need for education in its most generous sense. By education the desire for co-operation can be induced, and enthusiasm for broad causes can be implanted. By education also tolerance can be inculcated, and the discipline of good neighbourliness.

Ultimately, India must settle her problems for herself. To do so she must confront them with honesty and resolve. The solution will never be found in artificial devices and palliatives. When India accepts the need and value of a harmonious and unified community, it will be securely established; and the electoral problems will largely settle themselves. This does not mean that there is nothing to do but wait until India is blessed with political and social grace. Quite the reverse. But it does help to show that political machinery, however ingenious or elaborate, cannot of itself provide a way forward. To remember this will help us to keep our eyes focused on the roots of the problem, and this is to reach the beginning of its solution.

I should like to congratulate Mr. Yusuf Ali on a very opportune and interesting contribution to a very difficult and important subject.

Sir Harry Haig, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.: As this is the first occasion on which I have had the pleasure of speaking to the East India Association, I should have preferred to be one of the later speakers rather than one of the first.

I should like to express my great appreciation of the very able and lucid paper that we have heard from Mr. Yusuf Ali. He has given us the his-

torical background of the Muslims, and he has shown us very forcibly and clearly the existing unfortunate position, a position which affects not only the Muslims but the whole of India. In my own experience I have never known the communal situation as between Hindus and Muslims to be so acute. The Muslims appear to me to be profoundly dissatisfied and apprehensive. At the same time, I feel that, at any rate on the communal question, they are more united than I have known them to be before, and they are resolute. Although they have no clear idea of what the solution of their difficulties is, they do seem to me to be quite resolved that they are going to play their part in India and that they are not going to be dominated by the other community.

The situation has, I think, reached its present acute form within the last two and a half years and since the introduction of the new Constitution giving self-government to the Provinces. Actually, at the time of the general election (I speak of the United Provinces, with which I am acquainted), there was a widespread belief that after the election there would be some sort of alliance between the Congress and the Muslim League. The views of many members of the Muslim League on general problems were not very different from those of the Congress. It is only since the general election, which gave the Congress in the United Provinces an enormous majority, and from the time when the Congress decided that it would not offer an alliance to the Muslim League and invite representatives of the Muslim League to join the Ministry, that conditions have steadily been getting more acute and more difficult. That is a very natural development, because in the Legislature the main permanent opposition is a communal one. There have been many complaints made by the Muslims that they are treated unfairly both administratively and in matters of policy. I do not wish to say anything in detail about that. I have heard assertions, both on one side and on the other, which do not altogether accord with my experience. I am certainly not prepared to admit (and I do not suppose you would expect me to admit) that Governors have failed in their duty of protecting minorities so far as the Constitution lays that duty upon them.

I think the difficulty goes much deeper than any particular incidents, whether of policy or of administration. There is a feeling amongst the Muslims in the United Provinces that they are living under a system which they describe as Hindu Raj, and it is that psychological feeling which has produced the conditions which are making the communal situation so acute at the present time. There is justification for that. Under the present democratic system the political leaders in the districts and in small places have a pull in ordinary matters of controversy, patronage, and so on, which they used not to have in the old days, and, when the local political leaders, the small men in the districts, are found to be having that influence, those who have not got the ear of the Ministers and who feel that they cannot get their views represented to the Ministers are aggrieved and feel that they have no part or lot in the government or administration, that they are being ruled by others.

What is the way out? I was greatly interested in what Mr. Yusuf Ali

suggested. He suggested, I think, that a solid communal bloc of Muslims might be a nucleus round which some alternative to the Congress Government would be built. One would certainly not suggest that anything was impossible in politics, but it does seem to me difficult to expect such a development, because, after all, if there is this Muslim bloc it is a communal bloc, and that will set up precisely the same reactions among the Hindus that a Hindu Government has set up amongst the Muslims. I do not think that we can really expect developments on those lines. Recently in the United Provinces the Congress Government, which, we must remember, professes a completely non-communal attitude, has been losing ground to the Hindu communal organization on the allegation that it has been too sympathetic to the Muslims. There is a very strong Hindu communal feeling, just as there is a strong Muslim communal feeling, and a communal Government on one side or the other is bound to lead to the most intense friction.

Personally I have always believed that the right solution—and the only solution that I can see—is for the Congress to accept the proposal that it rejected at the time when the new Constitution was introduced and form a coalition with the Muslim League. If that were to work for a few years we might then get, as Mr. Yusuf Ali has explained to us, by the process of working together, a unity which would gradually transcend the communal difficulties. If the political difficulties which have arisen between the British Government and the Congress are overcome in a short time, as I profoundly hope they may be, and the Ministries are reformed in the Congress Provinces, I sincerely hope that they will be reformed not as Congress Ministries, but as coalition Ministries, including representatives of the Muslim League. If that were done I believe we should have gone a very long way towards solving those communal antagonisms which at the present moment seem to me to make further political progress in India almost impossible.

Sir ALBION BANERJI, C.S.I., C.I.E. : I wish to say that I am not speaking either as a Muslim or as a Hindu, but I speak as an Indian. I wish also to pay a compliment to the learned author, who, like myself, was formerly a member of the Indian Civil Service (I think we entered the Service in the same year), for the very moderate view he has taken of his subject. Retired Civil Servants are generally inclined to take conservative views on all questions affecting the very acute problems that India is facing today. We have amongst us in India "die-hard" politicians, as you have in England, but Mr. Yusuf Ali, as one who has had long administrative experience, has prepared his paper with a moderate outlook. As a Muslim of reputed culture and scholarship he has shown no communal bias, and has discussed the subject dispassionately and with, as far as possible, that detached point of view which is so valuable, especially when passions are running high in the Indian political field.

The cause of the present Hindu-Muslim tension, I fear, is not generally understood today. My personal opinion is that it is not due to the foreign Government that we have had for so many years, nor is it due to the fault

of any one community, Hindu or Muslim. It is essentially due to economic and not entirely religious causes. Let me tell you what my experience has been during thirty-four years of public service in India. I have been in more than a dozen districts in Madras, in one of which the Muslim population predominated, and I have been in three Indian States, in one of which the Muslim population was over 90 per cent., and during the whole of the thirty-four years I never had to face a single instance of Hindu-Muslim disturbance, major or minor. On the other hand, I had to face many riots and many disturbances between the different communities and sects of the Hindus, some of them so serious that the military had to be called in. The fact is—and we do not always realize it—that Hindus and Muslims have lived in perfect amity and concord, attending to their own agrarian occupations, grain and money dealings and many other business enterprises, in unbroken friendship. Anti-communal riots due to cow-killing and processions in front of mosques there have always been. They have generally been dealt with by the Courts. People did not attach so much importance to them as they do now. The Hindu intercaste riots are never reported in the papers. But in the olden days the differences between Hindus and Muslims on account of cow-killing or musical processions were not, as I believe from my own experience, deliberately provoked from political motives. Music was never played before mosques and cow-killing was never practised in Muslim-inhabited quarters, because of the so-called gentleman's agreement.

The truth lies in the changed economic, social and political conditions, which may be summarized very briefly as follows: Growth of class consciousness; disabilities of backward communities, which are more keenly felt; unfair distribution of wealth, which gives more power to the rich and influential over the poor and the oppressed, and the monopoly of trade and commerce amongst the majority, representing capitalists who are, for the most part, caste Hindus.

Totalitarian tendencies on the one hand, in a partially developed democratic Constitution, in which the best organized political party—Congress—assumed the reins of government, and a hostile opposition on the other hand, organized by the Muslim Party on a strictly communal basis, have created a gulf which seems, according to Mr. Yusuf Ali, to be unbridgeable.

The Congress is not entirely, to quote the author's own words, an organization of educated caste Hindus. He has himself, in another part of the paper, admitted that amongst Hindus, taking the word in its widest sense, there are groups that are opposed to the Congress. Not merely the Scheduled Classes, but also the Justice Party of Madras, for example, a very influential group which was formerly in power, is opposed to the Congress. There is also the National Liberal Federation. The inference is that the movement towards party formation in India is at present in a transitional stage and will not, in the future, take an entirely communal line. That is my hope. Whatever may be the nature of future development in this respect, India has need to protect itself against the growth of a native Fascism, and it is quite possible that a strong and well-organized Muslim

Party may prove itself stronger than any federation of non-Congress minority parties envisaged in the concluding portion of Mr. Yusuf Ali's paper.

The difficulty of defining an Indian minority is that a minority in one part may be a majority in another part. Thus laws for the protection of a minority in one Province will not be needed for the protection of the same community in another.

With regard to the totalitarian tendencies that develop when a majority party rules over a minority, the problems in India are not new. The same problems exist in modern civilized countries, such as Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia. Certain instances were reported in the *Danubian Review* of last month, and the complaints tally almost exactly with what the Muslims complain of in regard to their oppression by the Congress Party. The *Danubian Review* mentions the following: Expropriation of properties of minorities, unofficial arrests on the flimsiest excuses, neglect and non-enforcement of special laws for the protection of religious and civil liberties, unjust punishment of officials recruited from minority communities, and decrees paralyzing the activities of minority cultural societies and interfering with the education and schools of minorities. The Muslim League complains of the destruction of Muslim culture, interference with the religious and social life of Muslims and trampling upon their economic and political rights.

The demand of the Congress for a Royal Commission and the demand of the Muslims for a Constituent Assembly are two important matters. The granting of the first would widen the gulf, and the granting of the second would be a repetition on different lines of the experiment which was made by the abortive All-Party Conference, presided over some years ago by the late Pandit Motilal Nehru.

As there is no working basis of unity between the Hindus and the Muslims in sight, why not leave the future Constitution alone for the present and take in good part the gesture which the British Government has already made as regards the grant of Dominion Status? There is no real disagreement in the whole of India amongst all classes about full co-operation with the Allies in the war. If there is unity on this point, which is vital to the safety and security of India as a whole, it is not altogether impossible that we ourselves may be able to settle our differences and present to the British Government a united front, which will then be irresistible, for the grant of full Dominion Status after the war.

Sir WILLIAM BARTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.: I should like to add my congratulations to Mr. Yusuf Ali on his very sane and balanced statement of the Muslim case.

I am afraid the spirit of compromise is lacking in the psychology of political India, and as long as that is the case the system of party government will be very slow in developing. In fact, competent observers in India are inclined to think that party government on the parliamentary model of Britain is almost impossible in India so long as there are great blocs of the population isolated from each other by almost insuperable

barriers of culture, creed, traditions, personal laws and political outlook. The position would be different if the majority community were prepared to invite the minorities to work with them and would assure the minority communities that their interests would be safe under a responsible government. One sees no sign of any such sweet reasonableness on the political horizon at the moment.

Hindu-Muslim tension exists in an acute form in the great State of Hyderabad, and we might consider how Hyderabad statesmanship is attempting to solve the problem. The position is peculiar. There is a Muslim community dominating the countryside with a Muslim Government in power; but there are only 2,000,000 Muslims as compared with 13,000,000 Hindus, including 2,500,000 of the depressed classes. If parliamentary government on the British model were to be introduced in conditions of that kind, the result would be that the Muslims would be relegated to the position of a permanent minority with no voice whatever in the government of the country which they have ruled for six centuries. If any attempt were made to impose such a régime from without, it is absolutely certain that there would be civil war; it would be a civil war in which the whole of the 90,000,000 Muslims in India would give their material and moral support to the Hyderabad Muslims. In fact, it would be an all-India quarrel.

It is obviously in the interests both of Hyderabad and of India as a whole that a middle course should be chosen if possible, and it is a middle course that His Exalted Highness the Nizam and his distinguished Minister Sir Akbar Hydari and his colleagues are endeavouring to steer. Their ideal is to associate the people so closely and cordially with the administration that both policy and administration will conform with the interests and wishes of the people. How do they propose to achieve this? They propose to throw communalism overboard and to have representation in the legislature by economic interests, such as the professions, trade, commerce, banking and the depressed classes. The Hyderabad Government has refused to give a majority of the votes to the Muslims, but at the same time it has recognized their historic position by giving them representation equal to that of the non-Muslims. In order to ensure the close association of the people with the Government, Advisory Committees will be set up, associated with the so-called nation-building departments. Another point is that the Hyderabad Government is considering a comprehensive scheme of economic reconstruction. It realizes that the new measure can be successful only if the peasantry are prosperous and contented. At the same time it is considering an extensive scheme of industrialization. I am sure that this experiment will be watched with interest throughout India, and, if it is successful and Hyderabad is prosperous and contented, the reactions on India as a whole may be of some importance. In the long run, if the scheme works, the foundations may be laid of responsible government.

In framing the scheme of reforms, British statesmen realized that it would be very difficult to introduce parliamentary government into India, and for that reason they based the reforms on the theory of a British partnership. Unfortunately, however, the Congress Government has repudiated

that partnership. The Muslims relied on it for the protection of their interests, and I think too that the Princes regarded it as an essential element in the situation. If Congress would agree to recognize the principle, I feel that we should find in it a key to the solution of the present problems. If it would work with the British, and if, as Sir Harry Haig has suggested, it would form coalition Ministries, with Muslims and Hindus working together, I feel sure that ultimately the present difficulties would be overcome and the way to Federation would be opened. With Federation, Dominion Status might be achieved, and with Dominion Status possibly the communal trouble would disappear.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call upon Mr. Yusuf Ali to reply to the discussion, I should like to read the following letter which the President of the Association, Lord Lamington, has written to him from Scotland : "I am sorry indeed not to be present tomorrow when you read your paper. I am glad that I have a copy of it and will study your wise words tonight. I am sure my description is a right one. With kindest regards, and hoping you may have a large audience, Yours sincerely, Lamington."

Mr. YUSUF ALI: I should like to say that the discussion has been extremely valuable, and I am very much obliged to the speakers who have contributed to it and who have added several very important points in the consideration of the problems which I tried to place before you.

The wise and weighty words of the ex-Governor of the United Provinces were especially welcome to me. He, in his experience in the United Provinces, saw things from a certain angle. I was in the United Provinces both before and during his Governorship, and also since, and I saw things from perhaps a slightly different angle, but I can say that the remarks which he made are fully justified by the facts of the case as they exist in the United Provinces. I will go further and say that those remarks lend a certain amount of support to the kind of proposals which I adumbrated in my paper. It is not a communal bloc that I advocate, but the organization of the Muslims themselves in such a way that they will be able to work with other elements that are not working for the Congress. As Sir Harry Haig pointed out, there are Hindu elements that are opposed to the Congress. In the United Provinces there is a large body of opinion in the villages which, if it were properly organized and used for political purposes, might help in the solution of many of our problems.

I think it was unfortunate that the Congress Government which was formed in the United Provinces did not take up the question of coalition. In such matters I have always felt that the Governor, although he is outside politics, can in many undefined ways help to give a certain shape to the policies of the Governments that are actually working in his Province. I hope that it will be possible, with further experience of Ministries in India, to bring forward this idea of co-operation more and more. Perhaps "coalition" may not be quite the right word to use in this connection, but, if when a Congress Ministry came into power it brought in people who could carry weight amongst the communities not directly represented, I think

it would add to its own strength. Congress Governments should be able to do what the Punjab Government has done so effectively.

I am also very glad that Sir Albion Banerji spoke and gave his analysis of the causes which are responsible for the present differences. He quite rightly mentioned the differences amongst the Hindu castes themselves, and he put it rather strongly when he said that in his wide administrative experience he had never come across Hindu-Muslim differences but had frequently come across differences between the different classes of the Hindus themselves. Sir Albion Banerji's remarks about the way in which the minority question has arisen in various parts of Europe help us to understand, I think, a little of the conditions under which minorities can ultimately influence those whom they could not influence merely by the counting of votes. I am quite sure that, with greater experience, majorities will learn how to respect minorities and minorities will learn how to influence majorities.

I am especially obliged to Sir William Barton for his references to Hyderabad. He has a very intimate knowledge of Hyderabad, and so have I. The scheme which he mentioned is an exceedingly interesting one. How far it is practicable time alone can show, but I fully agree that, if the scheme of bringing in the various economic interests and grouping them together, and having a responsible Government representing not religions or communities so much as sections of the people with distinct interests that can be influenced by politics, is successful, it may do a great deal both for Hyderabad and for the whole of India.

Sir William Barton said that the spirit of compromise was wanting in India, and I think that is perfectly true. It is wanting because we have not had that long experience by which alone we learn that compromise does not necessarily mean giving up wholly one's own point of view. Compromise implies that one's own point of view has had its share in bringing about the final result. It may be compared with different forces pulling in different directions; the ultimate direction which is taken is the result of the complex working of a number of forces, none of which is itself alone responsible for the final result.

I am sure we all regret that Sir Frederick Sykes was not able to be present today. The two points that he mentions in his letter are of great importance.

I should like to express to you, sir, my thanks for taking the Chair and for adding so greatly to the value of the discussion by your preliminary remarks.

Sir JAMES MACKENNA, C.I.E.: As another member of the 1895 group of the Indian Civil Service, I have particular pleasure in proposing a hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Yusuf Ali. I think I am correct in saying that he passed out first in the final examination in that year—a particularly good year, I believe! Mr. Yusuf Ali left the Service before he had run his allotted course, but since then he has been extremely active, in a quiet, unobtrusive manner, in upholding the position of his co-religionists in India and in doing a great deal of very useful work in all matters connected with the

good relations which we want to exist between England and India, the establishment of which is one of the main objects of this Association.

To you, sir, we are under a particular obligation for taking the place of Sir Frederick Sykes at very short notice and fulfilling so adequately the duties of Chairman.

I move a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Yusuf Ali and to Sir Harold Wilberforce-Bell. (Cheers.)

WORLD-WIDE REACTION TO EVENTS IN INDIA

BY PROFESSOR BASIL MATHEWS

A CARTOON produced by the Soviet propaganda in *Pravda* (January 19, 1940) represents the British Empire as "a free federation of many Governments." The nature of this federation is shown in the picture. The British lion, with a top-hat poised uneasily on his head and some coverings on his cold feet, reclines on a strong-box marked "India." One side of this cage has open bars, out of which two skinny Indian legs protrude. Below is a dungeon marked "African colonies." From a small opening in the dungeon an equally skinny hand protrudes. The lion has a whip in his paws, and the Union Jack is tied to his tail, which itself is in the form of a broomstick.

That cartoon presents in a grotesque way the surface view of the British Empire, especially in its relation to India, that has most frequently given rise to critical comment in the world's press since the outbreak of war.

The *New York Times* has piquantly described it as, "the paradoxical situation by which India, as part of the British Empire, is being forced to fight for democracy, while being informed that she is not yet ready to enjoy its privileges." From Moscow to Chicago, from the microphone of Mr. Stalin to the megaphone of Mr. Hearst, that is the main theme of the strange world symphony of comment, both critical and constructive, upon India and the war.

A study of the news about and the comments upon India during the past six months brings home again the fact that another cause of this world-wide interest is that Britain is the only world power in existence, in the full and strict sense of that word. The fact that peoples owing allegiance to the Crown live in territories that are not only in every continent and sub-continent, but are on every shore of every ocean, as well as along the Mediterranean, makes the Empire's future central to world-war and to the reconstruction after the war. And obviously India is central in that Empire.

The other outstanding cause for the continuous presence of

India in the news of a world preoccupied with a European war lies in the personality of Mr. Gandhi, which, even in a decade of super-dictators, ranks among the four or five most famous persons familiar to all classes and grades of education in all continents. The fact that his familiar face and form have captured the interest and for the most part the admiration of the world, that sees him as an unarmed fighter for freedom against tremendous odds, sets an extremely difficult task before those of us who would interpret the true perspective of the Indian scene.

I have been led by an analysis of the world's press in relation to India to divide the areas of the world roughly into three.

THE SOVIET PRESS

First there is the press and the radio of the great dictatorships, and particularly of Berlin and Moscow. They know their subject-matter well—better, I think, than most British journalists. They seize on every actual weakness and exploit it in propaganda to our full disadvantage. They take the favourable elements such as the Indian Constitution which began to function in 1937, a Constitution which any detached observer who knows about its action must recognize as the greatest adventure in democracy ever made on the soil of Asia, and they ignore completely all its positive and constructive freedom, concentrating only on its few safeguards, calling them cruel shackles, and all the time they play fortissimo on the theme of economic exploitation and the deliberate policy of maintaining Indian illiteracy.

The second area is that of the small neutrals in Europe and of the Near and the Far East, who, by and large, make fair and even well-informed comment.

The third outstanding area is that of the United States of America.

Moscow gives more sustained attention to British rule in India than does any other Government in the world. Nor does her propaganda activity against our rule in India confine itself to papers and broadcasts in Russian—she broadcasts every day and night in different languages. There are also a certain number of periodicals in other parts of the world which are clearly financed

from Russia. For instance, the Norwegian Communist paper *Arbideren*, which is a far more prosperous looking paper than the *Daily Worker*, consistently takes the line illustrated by the only sentence that I will quote from it: "The Indians are an oppressed and exploited people, united in their hatred of England."

From time to time long, carefully-reasoned and well-informed articles are published that would inevitably prove convincing to any ordinary reader, who lacked a realistic background. For instance the *Izvestia* of December 20 had a long article on "The Sahib in India." The theme of it may be indicated in two sentences, first that "England goes on the principle that East is East and West is West, and keeps democracy for home consumption, while exercising despotism in Asia," and "today he needs the help of his colonial slaves: he dare not command them, so he tries persuasion." This is followed by a description of how the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which, the writer says, is now "the General Staff of British foreign policy," set up before the war as an elaborate propaganda machine. The principle on which that machine is used is, for example, to pretend to the Mohammedans that Islam is the central concern, and to join in the prayers of the Maharaja of Mysore to Rama against the powers of evil incarnate in Germany, and indeed to woo all her subject populations by posing as their supporter.

A second example of these long articles is an article in a periodical called *Machinostroenia*, signed by D. Granov, which uses the historical narrative from 1914 to the present day. The new Constitution is described as having for its object "the preservation of the domination of English imperialists, the maintenance and consolidation of the régime of national suppression and ruthless exploitation of the toiling masses. It is characteristic that according to this slavish Constitution 90 per cent. of the population of India are deprived of voting rights." The article concludes by saying that the Indian population are becoming more and more alive to the methods of English reactionaries who are "playing on religious, national and caste feuds to direct the struggle of the Indian people for freedom and independence."

The messages of Moscow over the wireless are given in different

languages to all parts of the world, including even French broadcasts for French-Canadians. The different notes in the theme include reiterated messages from Kabul, which is evidently the main centre for direct information about India for Moscow, giving details of riots in India, consequent in a number of places of famine in Amritsar, and of murderous air-raids on helpless Afghans.

News paragraphs are concerned with such statements as the following: "Bombay Constituent Assembly censures Sir Samuel Hoare's statement." There are interviews with people like Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose; and continual references, either directly, or through the speeches of people like Mr. Molotoff, to Britain as an imperialistic power, holding down hundreds of millions of colonial slaves under the yoke of exploitation.

MR. NEHRU'S STATEMENT

In recent weeks nothing in the Soviet propaganda about India has been more interesting than Moscow's reiterated wireless declaration to the world that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru supports Stalin in his attack on Finland. Those who know best how Mr. Nehru blends passionate and sacrificial nationalism with full-blooded socialism, would expect that Stalin's aggression might create a distressing perplexity in the Pandit's mind. Early in January a long leader appeared in the *National Leader*, which is controlled by Mr. Nehru. This article, evidently from his own hand, pleaded for suspended judgment on the Finnish invasion, on the ground that all news was poisoned by propagandist aims, and that therefore it was unwise to make emphatic and dogmatic statements in the absence of full knowledge. As those who know Mr. Nehru best, however, would realize from the start when the full and authoritative news did come, his stand would be uncompromising. I make no apology for giving a long extract from the article that he subsequently wrote, condemning Soviet Russia for bartering away her moral prestige and the friendship of her many friends. Mr. Nehru says:

Nothing is more significant today or more full of sorrow than the weakening almost everywhere (though not so much in India) of progressive

forces. Soviet Russia, their symbol of hope and fulfilment, has descended from the pedestal on which her ardent champions had placed her and bartered away her moral prestige and the friendship of so many of her friends for seeming political advantage.

With the invasion of Finland, Russia lined herself with the aggressor nations and thereby was false to the traditions she had herself nourished for these many years. She has paid heavily for this vital error and paid in a coin which cannot be counted, for it is made up of the wishes and ideals of innumerable human beings. No individual, no nation can play about with this priceless coinage without suffering grievous loss; much less a nation which has prided itself on its basic principles and ideals. There can be little doubt that the Finnish people are resisting an invasion as a united nation, and both Finnish trade unions and peasantry are backing this resistance.

There are those who have made it their creed to defend every activity of the Soviet Government and who consider it heresy or lèse-majesty for anyone to criticize or condemn any such activity. That is the way of blind faith which has nothing to do with reason. It is not on that basis that we can build up freedom here or elsewhere. Integrity of mind and sincerity of purpose can be given up only at peril to ourselves and to our cause. We are not tied down to any decisions made for us elsewhere; we make our own decisions and fashion our own policy.

We in India extend our friendly sympathy to the Socialism of Russia, and any attempt to break it will meet with our strong disapproval, but we do not give our sympathy to the political manœuvres and aggression of Russia's Government. In the war against Finland our sympathies are for the people of Finland who have struggled so gallantly to preserve their freedom. If Russia persists in this the results will be disastrous for her and for the world. We have to remember yet again that in this revolutionary age of transition and change, when all our old values are upset and we seek new standards, we must retain our integrity of mind and purpose and hold fast to means and methods which are right and which are in conformity with our ideals and objectives. Those objectives will not be achieved through violence or authoritarianism or opportunism of the moment. We must adhere to non-violence and right action and evolve through this the free India for which we labour.

THE NAZI PROPAGANDA MACHINE

Moving from Moscow to Berlin, and still remaining within the orbit of the dictatorships, we find a sustained reiteration in the controlled press, whether of Berlin, Vienna or Prague, of the same motifs of throwing scorn on Britain for her economic blood-sucking of the Indian peoples, who are forced to pay immense sums of money to sustain rich Indian Civil Servants, both in India and in retirement in Britain; for their dropping of bombs on defenceless

villages on the North-West Frontier; for their deliberate incitement through what is amiably called a "British *cheka*" of riots between Moslems and Hindus; and their cynical holding of the Indian people down intellectually to levels of illiteracy.

This propaganda is carried on by radio incessantly, not only in the West, but in Hindustani in India.

Germany does not refer so often as other countries to Russian interest in the conquest of India by Communism, but we do find, for instance, in the *Angriff* of October 25 that the Institute for Oriental Languages, attached to the Soviet Academy of Science, is issuing new dictionaries for many of the Indian languages beginning with Hindustani-Russian, Bengali-Russian, and Mahratti-Russian.

Without spending time in reiterating detailed German paragraphs of news, which sustain the attack on our rule in India in the daily papers, we may give here a little attention to one or two of the more serious articles appearing in Germany on India.

In the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* for November 8, a writer called E. C. Graf Pückler has an article on the political position in India, which is moderate and, in general, accurate. He says that the reopening of the Indian question is the most important consequence that the war has raised for the British Empire. The immediate cause, he says, is the action of the British Government "involving India in the war without consulting the Indian people or its leaders." He gives a short, but accurate, history of the Indian National movement from the Montagu Declaration of 1917 to the Government of India Act of 1935. There is no word about cruelty or exploitation in this carefully reasoned article.

In the *Frankfurter Zeitung* for November 11, an article entitled "Uneasy India: Unfulfilled Promises and their Consequences," signed W. v. D., declares that Britain has broken faith with India on three outstanding occasions. First, we did not keep the promise made in the Proclamation of 1858 about no differentiation on grounds of colour, race and religion. Second, we evaded the pledge given during the world war of substantial expansion of political rights. Finally, we vitiated, through the safeguards, the grant of the Government of India Act of 1935 and its promise of

Dominion Status. The writer goes on to say that the Indians now demand unlimited power to decide their own future, at a time when Britain is dependent on India's central position, her vast resources, her harbours, crops, and army, in addition to her enormous value both as a market for British goods and as a source of cheap labour to be exported all over the world. He concludes by presenting the predicament in which the British Government finds itself as between Congress, the Moslems, and the Princes, with the India Office still further perplexed by the far-reaching support of the Congress politicians by the British Parliamentary Opposition, and the United States of America, where "public opinion has assumed the rôle of Censor of British policy in India."

An article of more than usual significance about India is found in the *Neuer Tag* of Prague (October 23), entitled "Indian Volcano." A careful analysis by this article of the condition of India leads the writer to the conclusion that, with the inner division and feebleness of the Indians :

So long as England's power was intact and concentrated on the oppression of India, the movement of liberation had little chance of early success. But today there are powers beyond the frontiers of the Indian Empire, which are by no means uninterested in expelling England from her key-position in Asia.

The writer then traces historically the rivalry between Britain and Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Russia's consideration during the South African War of whether she should not undertake operations against India's Northern Frontier. He shows how Britain organized her strength in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet, and concludes :

This position, however, was bound to undergo a revolutionary change as soon as Russia abandoned her policy of passivity. It is easy therefore to understand the anxiety with which London is following events in India and their careful reproduction in the Soviet press.

A bitter element in the German attack on British rule in India is revealed in an article in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of January 25, entitled "False Wooing for India." The writer describes Lord Linlithgow's Bombay statement that our aim was Dominion Status for India, and internal unity, as "an ice-cold frivolous fraud. The same trick was tried in the last war by Mr. Montagu

and Mr. Lloyd George, and it led India to put 1,100,000 men into the field. The upshot was Amritsar and the Rowlatt Acts; this time the attempt will fail."

India's own reaction to sympathetic articles about her position and future, emanating from Germany, is well indicated in this striking outburst from Mr. Nehru:

The Indian political situation has suddenly assumed extraordinary importance for German radio propagandists, who are pouring out chivalrous tales all over the world of this distressed and unfortunate country. The "sympathetic" mention of India and the Congress struggle in the broadcasts and in the press is really part of the heated political argument against Britain. There may be nothing particularly wrong in Herr von Ribbentrop's reference in his Danzig speech to the long series of broken pledges, pacts and declarations made by Britain to India, but it does not come gracefully or truthfully from the mouth of Hitler and Ribbentrop, whose hands are reeking with the blood of mutilated Poland. India does not disdain the world's sympathy in her righteous struggle for freedom, but let it not come from the Nazis. For, even when they tell the gospel truth, the world will not believe them, and to that extent India will lose her case in its estimation.

We cannot also forget that, according to Hitler and the Nazis, Indians occupy a place in the ladder of creation, somewhere between ape and man. Is it these anthropological experts that are to speak for this country before the world?

The motif reiterated most frequently from Moscow and Berlin is that our deliberate aim on the economic side is to bleed the poverty-stricken peasant, already anaemic under exploiting Indian landlords, and simultaneously to starve education so that the multitude of illiterates may remain still subject serfs.

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Passing from Moscow and Berlin to the European neutrals, we need not stay long examining them. A survey from Greece to Norway and across to Spain gives the impression that a considerable proportion of the newspapers are under such pressure of one kind or another from the warring Powers that often we must discount either the spontaneity or the sincerity of their language, whether favourable to or critical of British rule in India. Partly for this reason they are inclined to confine themselves to the publication of news.

The *Dagposten* of Norway on November 11 gives us a balanced

picture, saying that "the Congress Party did not seem to dare to take action which would free the country from the British yoke because, bad as British rule is, it is preferable to that of Soviet Russia."

Swedish papers give special statements from writers like Krishna Menon of London and from the London correspondent of the *Hindustan Times*. The *Göteborgs Handels Tidning* of November 15 says that if anything could stop the emancipation movement it would be the threat from Russia. In that event the desire to get rid of British protection would certainly become less. The *Göteborgs Handels Tidning*, itself strongly anti-Nazi, makes the interesting comment that "India regards the war as a conflict between two imperial powers, one tired and easy-going, the other more vigorous and brutal." This same paper is quite sure that Berlin and Moscow are working out plans for the invasion of India via Persia and Afghanistan.

The Hungarian papers generally give well-informed and moderately worded comment, often based on a reading of the British press and the *Hindustan Times*. For example, the *Pester Lloyd* of November 8, after analyzing the constitutional crisis, says that "We believe that it will be solved by a compromise, since neither the British Government and people, nor Mr. Gandhi, wish to push matters to extremes."

As we move farther into South-Eastern Europe the interest in the possibility of attack on India from this direction becomes notable; for instance, *Ethnos* of November 7 prints a wireless message, from a special correspondent, declaring that when Dr. Schacht returned from India he laid before Herr Hitler a complete plan for a German-Soviet expedition to the East, by way of Irak and Afghanistan. The comment made is that "the object of this expedition would be to ensure Indian self-government, which would be the severest possible blow to the British Empire." Another Greek paper, *Typhos*, of November 3, describes the conversations between members of a London club, laughing to scorn any Russian threats against India.

The Italian newspapers are confining themselves largely to news paragraphs, and urge the development of compromise between

the Government and Congress, the comments being normally well informed and not at all bitter.

We must resist the temptation to spend time over the Turkish press, which, nevertheless, is of unusual interest and importance at this time because, although under Mustapha Kemel's leadership Turkey became drastically unorthodox, from the Moslem point of view, her lead is still closely watched by Mahomedan countries.

Generally speaking, the articles in Turkish periodicals like *Tan* are well informed in presenting news and regarding historical background. A few sentences from an article in *Tan* of November 7, signed by Omer Riza Dogrul, gives us a sufficient picture of the normal line of Turkish comment:

The great difference between the Indians' position in the Great War and their voluntary action today is so important that it will escape the attention of none. The Indians participated in the last war without terms or conditions, and when it was over waited for the reward of their devotion. Today, however, they want to know beforehand why the war has broken out, and what is the value of the war aims adopted by England; they want to establish a relation between the general objective and their particular objective, and to find out to what extent support of the general objective will advance their particular objective, and where it will lead to. They wish to make their decision in accordance with these matters.

This means that the period between the last Great War and the present Great War has not been entirely in vain in that part of the world. The idea of nationality and independence has shown tremendous development in India . . .

The Viceroy is trying to end the resignation of Congress ministries, and has invited the leaders of India to a meeting. Depending on the result of this meeting, the differences will either take definite shape, or else they will be settled.

But the events we have described show clearly how great is the importance of the problem of India.

JAPAN AND CHINA

Moving from the Near East to the Far East we find two opposing attitudes, as we would expect. On the one hand, in *Hsinminpao*, a Japanese-controlled paper in Peking, articles concentrating on the British monopoly and exploitation of India's economic and military resources, her discouragement of education, her neglect of health services, and her division of the Indian communities. We then have the comment that "the Japanese

victories have led Indians to think that they could drive out the British and establish self-government. These thoughts are having a great influence over the youth of India. The British are consequently belittled."

On the other hand, in a paper like the *North China Star* we get moderate articles emphasizing elements like the hopefulness of Mr. Gandhi's work in getting communal co-operation.

So far as the present government of China is concerned, it would appear that Mr. Nehru's visit, just before the war, to China to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, and their long conversations in the limestone tunnels of Chunking, while Japanese bombs fell on the city, has developed a deeper understanding between these two men, who, so far as the future is concerned, are the outstanding leaders of Asia, and who both combine nationalist enthusiasm with a strong passion for real international understanding.

AMERICAN OPINION

Turning to the United States of America, we see that, with regard to the declaration of war, the immediate American repercussion is of considerable interest. In no case was there any virulent attack, although most comment was critical. The paradox stated by the *New York Times* of asking India to fight for a democracy that she is not regarded as fit to exercise perplexes many writers. The Hearst press, astonishingly enough, has been far less hostile than usual in its tone. The reason is evidently its preoccupation with the Communist menace. It describes Mr. Gandhi himself as "in a talking, not a fighting, mood." The Hearst view is summed up in a sentence: "The Mahatma has apparently decided that, while Britain may be a poor master, the Nazis or the Communists would be worse still."

The Middle Western press gave much greater space to India than is normal with them. This reflects the fact that the Middle West has, since the tremendous development of radio commentators and columnists, and since the shake-up of the depression, become much more conscious of its interdependence with the rest of the world. A large number of comments could be given, run-

ning right through October, 1939, showing how Russian ambition in regard to the Middle East and India looms up larger with them than it does in the British press. To give only two examples out of the scores that we find in the *Youngstown (Ohio) Daily Vindicator* an article (October 15) by Constantine Brown, which discusses Russia's threat to India as part of a well-planned programme to distract British attention: "From all reports it appears that the Indian people are not quite ready to be Communized. But the preparations of the Russians close to the Indian border are not taken lightly by the British High Command." The *Globe-Democrat* (October 22) noted that "the All-India Congress has already indicated it will live up to past performances by embarrassing the British Government if it can." It described Gandhi as "ever the opportunist," and presented the British Government's case sympathetically.

The radical weekly press, in its ordinary run of news, is typified by this extract from the Left-wing *New Republic*. This describes the Viceroy's statement as "a blunder of the magnitude of a crime all the more so as India will be asked to give men and money on the heroic scale." They declare that the Viceroy's words play into the hands of the Germans, who argue that this is not a war of ideologies, but of empires.

As another illustration of the preoccupation with the Russian Communist pressure, we have an article in the *New York Post* (October 24), in which Mr. Ludwig Lore asks, "Will Russia strike at Britain through India?" and goes on to say:

Russia's invasion of Sinkiang is not directed against either Japan or China at all, but against the British Empire via India. There is a new angle to the question of Indian independence—the widespread sympathy for the Soviet Union which in years past gave a great deal of propagandist paper support to the cause of Indian freedom. Progressives everywhere have always demanded either Dominion Status or complete independence for India, but I fail to see why this issue should be made a test for the sincerity of England's war aims in her fight with the authoritarian states. One cannot blame the Indians for taking advantage of this opportunity to fight for freedom, but that still does not make their fight the touchstone of Allied motives. In the final analysis the Indian people today have greater political and economic freedom than either the German or the Russian people. They can strike, they have independent labour unions and their party is free to act within the broad limits of the law.

In the subsequent weeks the attitude to Britain in this area grew more critical. The same Mr. Ludwig Lore, who wrote sympathetically on October 24 in the *New York Post*, said in the following month (November 8) :

In the end the English will have to give the Indians what they want. Then it will be a reluctant concession, wrung from them by the strength of 350 million rebellious Indians. How much wiser to come to terms now. Certainly it would improve England's influence and standing, not only in India but before the democratic peoples in all other parts of the world as well.

A comprehending comment is made by the famous radio speaker Gram Swing (November 6, in *Mutual Network*), who said : "If the Hindus and the Muslims did come to an agreement, British rule in India would end," and he went on to say that the old accusation of our policy of divide and rule is not true.

The 77 million Muslims constitute the most important minority in the world. They are less nationalistic than the Hindus, would accept dominion status, but the Hindus do not even want that. . . . However, the British will never walk out of India, as the Hindus demand, until India can give assurance of adequate national defence, and so be in a position of preventing another country from walking in.

A good many American periodicals reflect the view that the real battle about India is not in India, but between the imperialist and progressive elements in Britain. For instance, one of the two Hearst papers on the Pacific Coast, the *San Francisco Examiner*, in a special despatch from Allahabad, affirms that "this is the greatest crisis in the history of British India since the Rebellion of 1857," and goes on to say that the general picture of India resembles that of Ireland in 1914-15. The conclusion is that the presence of Mr. Winston Churchill in the Cabinet is an evil factor in the Indian situation, since he had been "a stubborn opponent of Indian aspirations."

Other elements in the American press analyze, on the other hand, the predicament of Mr. Gandhi, who, as the *New York Times Weekly Magazine* says (October 1), "finds himself once more in a dilemma, lending moral support to the Allies, and demanding India's freedom."

A number of Indians lecturing in the United States of America get considerable space in the American press. These include:

Krishnalal Shridharani, who has had a series of articles in the *Nation*, nationalist, without being bitter; Mrs. Kamaladevi, who has been interviewed in the *New York Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *New York World Telegram*, and who emphasizes the need for education and social work; Rajni Patel, who has been on a very widespread lecture tour among college students; and Miss Bichoo Batlivala. Only two of these have sailed to America since the outbreak of war. They went to fulfil lecture contracts entered into before war began. The fact that Britain has given exit-permits from England to the United States of America at this time to persons known to be critical of our rule in India is living evidence of Britain's refusal to restrain freedom of speech and suppress criticism in war-time.

A writer in the *Boston Transcript* says that, in relation to India, the United States of America is Britain's greatest difficulty. "She could put down the Indians ruthlessly," writes Bruce Bliven, "were it not that she fears to alienate the Americans." This kind of irresponsible nonsense is, however, entirely uncharacteristic. Real knowledge of India does, of course, vary greatly. At the one end we get, at the war desk of the *New York Times*, a great journalist, like Mr. Birchell, who himself last year in India gave as penetrating a series of reports of Congress as appeared in any paper in the world. Similarly, the *Christian Science Monitor* sustains a valuable flow of first-hand news material. In a recent number an article sent direct from India by a special correspondent ran to something like five columns of analysis of the situation in India. Again, *Life*, with its wide circulation of two million copies, and its much greater number of readers, produced a long article on Jawaharlal Nehru by John and Frances Gunther. The authors, while their sympathy lies with India, present a scrupulously fair picture of the attitude of England. An article like this tends to strengthen American opinion in favour of the Nationalist cause, but it does not blind it at all to Britain's side of the case.

The desire to avoid maintaining the spotlight always on Mr. Gandhi is leading a number of American papers to give biographical treatment to Nehru and Jinnah. This has happened in papers as different from one another as the *Christian Science Monitor*

and the New York tabloid *Daily Mirror*. *Time*, indeed, has recently produced the life-story of Mr. Jinnah, of a singularly uncomplimentary character. His career is described as "a series of coat-turnings."

THE AMERICAN OUTLOOK

We may possibly best conclude this short study of the American press by saying that the general attitude of warm sympathy with Nationalist aspirations is tempered by two considerations. The first is that when Britain is in the unique crisis of her career, it is hardly playing the game to hold a pistol to her head in the form of threatened upheaval. The second is the position stated succinctly by the *Fort Worth (Texas) Star Telegram*, which says:

The theory of freedom for India is sound only if Gandhi can be certain it would be preserved after Britain granted it. China's fate is an instance of precarious freedom in the Orient during the era of aggression. Gandhi would be wise to wangle material reforms from the British Government at this time rather than break loose from the Empire.

The fact that Bruce Bairnsfather's "Old Bill" has penetrated the American consciousness is shown in the similar comment of the *Washington Post*, which puts its widely expressed view thus:

Until the present war is ended it appears the counsel of wisdom for the people of India not to undertake too strenuously the search for a "better 'ole."

Fresh reflections of the world's reactions to the most recent events in India keep coming into my hands. The Viceroy's third attempt to find agreement with Mr. Gandhi, with the subsequent interviews given by Gandhi and Nehru to the American press, secured a greater publicity space than all the previous events put together, much greater than it received in the London press. The Hearst Chicago paper published a column and a half report of Gandhi's statement featuring in bold type his warning: "If India's demands for self-rule do not succeed in the near future, heaven help India, Britain and the world."

The radio work in America on this breakdown was remarkable. Raymond Gram Swing and Steel discussed the reasons for the breakdown. Steel summed up in a balanced statement what is the dominant view of informed Americans. He said that there is a

good deal more harmony in the movement for independence "than the Viceroy cares to admit." But he stressed the strength and importance of the minority groups opposing Congress and concluded that Gandhi is fighting as much against his own people as against the British, ". . . who," he said, "are fundamentally inclined to grant India full Dominion status in the end."

The Columbia Broadcasting System printed in its Talks digest the talk by Edmund D. Lucas, the American Vice-Principal of Forman Christian College, Lahore, which is the best summary of the whole situation that I have read anywhere.

In reading the American editorial comment on that breakdown I have been struck by the degree to which they take the view that when the Congress leaders demand an Indian Constituent Assembly they envisage an assembly controlled by their own party. The New York *Daily News*, which has been isolationist throughout the war, came out surprisingly with the flat statement that if India suddenly got the self-determination that Gandhi wants, "it would be more than likely to turn into self-extinction." Practically the only note really hostile to the Viceroy was struck by the Boston *Globe*.

On the other hand, references to Lord Zetland's statements have reached me which are critical, but critical of their manner more than their matter. His statements are described as "unimaginative and minatory."

I have so far received no American reactions to the new crisis that has arisen following Lord Zetland's article in the *Sunday Times* and the cabled resolution of the Working Committee of Congress issued on February 29—a resolution put forward for adoption at the annual session of Congress at Ramgarh on March 19, forecasting an early practice of Civil Disobedience followed by a statement made to Reuter by Mr. Gandhi that it is Lord Zetland who has closed the door and not Congress.

We know that Lord Zetland in that article believed himself to be holding a door open. Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru evidently honestly believe that he has closed it.

Many of us in Britain, with the terrific tension of this war on our minds day and night and with our hearts lacerated by the fear-

feel daily toll of innocent victims of bombs from the air and torpedoes from the sea, find it almost inconceivable that men of the calibre of Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru can so fail in imaginative insight as to make no allowance for this incessant fraying of our nerve.

When I say this about our Indian friends I feel bound to add that on the British side we must try to comprehend the Indians' passionate intensity and their concentration upon that cause for which they have worked so long and suffered so much.

If, indeed, I had a voice that could reach the leaders on both sides I would urge that today in the heart of this supreme struggle for freedom and against the reign of violence, they should put aside exasperation and irritation and remember that the eyes of a wistful, watching world are upon them on both sides and should again, in a spirit of conciliation and with their eyes upon the longer perspectives of the future, seek afresh to find a way along which Britain and India can walk together into a new world of liberty and co-operation.

Not many days pass without one's receiving enquiry from entirely sympathetic but distressed Americans as to what they are to say when asked why Britain, who stands for freedom, can keep 370 million people in serfdom in India. The situation in America, we see, is precisely the opposite from that in Berlin and Moscow. By and large there is a desire in America to believe that we want to do the right thing, but, on the other side, there is on the whole extraordinarily little knowledge in the United States of America as to the almost revolutionary process of advance toward democracy that lies behind phrases like "Dominion Status under the Statute of Westminster" and "The Government of India Act, 1935." If you cross-questioned the membership of every Rotary Club from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and took 1,000 forums in women's clubs, and even went further and were able to talk with the occupants of editorial desks in all areas of the United States of America, you would find in comparatively few people any conception of the fact that since the Statute of Westminster the stupendous areas of the Dominions are absolutely self-governing nation-states, in all respects, and secondly that, under the India

Act, the eleven Provinces, most of them larger than the average European Scandinavian or Baltic or Balkan nation-state, have control of the government of their own life.

The vital thing here, it seems to me, is to secure a grasp, not simply of the details, but of the supreme fact of this continuous process of achieving increasing freedom among peoples with a common loyalty to the British Crown, involving a quarter of the human race. Once this process has impressed itself as a reality Britain can afford to admit her failures, and indeed her sins, in imperial government.

That these facts are not well known is natural enough. They are a part of a process that has gone on without catastrophic revolution. Therefore they are not news. But knowledge of them in America is of high importance for our future co-operation in the development of freedom and justice in the world.

We know that a continuous process toward increasing self-government is going on within the frontiers of the British Commonwealth of Nations. By and large that process has never been made clear to the peoples of the world. The Statute of Westminster, the India Act of 1935 are not dramatic in a superficial sense. Nor have they been interpreted to the teachers in schools and universities in different lands. They do not in themselves appeal to the imagination of the press and radio commentators, or the film directors of the world. Yet, in fact, they are capable of dramatic presentation in the press, over the air and in the pictures, as well as in educational and historical literature. To undertake so vast an educational process might well make men quail. If, however, this is indeed a war into which Britain has entered in order to secure a recovery and an extension of freedom and of justice in human relations, we might well turn some of our best energies to revealing the crucial importance of Britain's adventures within her own Commonwealth to those high aims.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A MEETING of the Association was held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, March 5, 1940, when a paper entitled "World-Wide Reaction to Events in India" was read by Professor Basil Mathews. The Right Hon. R. A. Butler, M.P. (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), was in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN : I have pleasure in introducing to you Professor Basil Mathews, whom we are fortunate enough to have with us here today. As you know, Professor Mathews is probably the most widely travelled man in a room consisting of many who have travelled very far indeed, and that is saying a good deal. In all that travel he has collected much knowledge and wisdom and, incidentally, a great many different points of view about India. We are now fortunate to have a man who can give us an impartial and varied picture of India as seen by world opinion today. Professor Mathews is Professor of World Christian Relations at Boston University, and in that capacity also has acquired a great deal of knowledge and experience. I have now pleasure in introducing him to you and asking him to read his paper.

Professor BASIL MATHEWS then read his paper.

The CHAIRMAN : It is my honour today to thank on your behalf Professor Mathews for his inspiring address. I now propose, if I may, to open the discussion by a few general observations. I would like to thank you, Mr. Mathews, for the comprehensive and scientific manner in which you have examined most carefully world opinion about India at the present time. Propaganda is, we are told, the fifth arm by which we conduct our war. That I believe is definitely so today. I shall have a word or two to say in the course of my remarks on the attitude which we adopt towards propaganda, an attitude of presenting the facts as they are. I believe that attitude has paid this country and our Empire in the past and will pay it in the future. I am convinced that it is on that attitude that our reputation is based. It is very comforting to feel that we and our experts here are devoting a little more scientific attention to propaganda than we used to do. I think you have an example of this in the speech made this afternoon, which has illustrated the manner in which those who are taking a particular interest in this question are examining in detail intelligent world opinion on every hand.

For myself it is a great privilege and indeed a pleasure to be amongst you today; I have recognized many old friends and this meeting recalls some of the happiest days of my life when I have been occupied in serving India. No doubt I helped to produce what we have heard described as the dullest document ever produced in the history of India, the Act of 1935, and I am proud of that fact. I remember, when I first entered politics,

shortly after the Statute of Westminster was passed, an argument with one of my inner friends who disagreed with me a good deal since, and whom I had the honour of fighting over the India Bill. He said that we should live to regret these developments. I am convinced we shall not, and I am thankful, at any rate, that my entry into public life coincided with these new phases in our imperial history. I am convinced that whatever struggles and adventures may lie ahead, the course which we have undertaken will be fully vindicated.

The paper to which we have just listened has been most valuable in that it has recalled the importance which the world attaches to India and to the British attitude towards India. We here do not need to be reminded of the importance of India at the present time. I was glad to hear the words of the lecturer this afternoon when he reminded us of the importance of keeping India in the front of our thoughts, despite the immense and terrible preoccupation with which we are faced at home. I can assure him that for those of us who are engaged in these strenuous tasks India remains in the front of our minds. Professor Mathews says "Obviously India is central in that Empire," and so indeed it is today. To us India is the touchstone of our imperial ideal. For her good or ill we have imparted to India the best in that civilization for which we are now fighting. That this has had a decisive effect upon her history is shown by a quotation from Lord Cromer when he says that upon India "the breath of the West, heavily charged with scientific thought, has left an enduring mark. The new foundations," he says, "must be of the Western, not of the Eastern, type." It is for deep reasons such as those that India's attitude in this war must be, and is, perfectly clear. Hence her remarkable war effort and hence our responsible attitude towards her at the present time before world opinion.

I am confident of one thing, that all those of us here or in India who serve or have served India and who look anxiously to her future are inspired by one aim, and that is to secure the unity of India and to assure her established nationhood. It is easy to say that our policy has been to divide and rule. It is better described as to unify and to encourage. There may have been on our side faults of expression or faults of pose. We may have carried on too sharply our well-established tradition for facing facts; but we have this consolation, that in facing the undoubted difficulties in the Indian situation we have not presented to world opinion any false picture, nor have we indulged in faked propaganda, of which you have heard such striking examples this afternoon. Those who have been responsible for supplying the world at large with information have supplied to the press, to literature, to the wireless and through other channels an indefinite amount of straightforward news and background material. The respect which I believe exists throughout the world for our publicity rests on a strict regard for objectivity and truth, whatever may be the impression created. We have always preferred in our propaganda to hold up a mirror rather than to paint a picture.

Those of us who have had the experience of having our pictures painted (I may say I have not yet succumbed) know that it is preferable to be cast

in oils than to be pictured in a mirror, and we realize that though our friends may say so, we hardly believe them when they say a good likeness is better than a bad portrait. The mirror of the world, however, is not one plain sheet of glass, as you will have observed from listening to Professor Mathews. It is many-sided, with different facets, some of which distort, others of which feature the subject in the throes of contortion. This we cannot help, nor can we complain if critics the world over make fun of the particular reflection in these distorting and contorting mirrors which suits them best. Remember this game can be played, too, by critics in India, or in England. But there is a subconscious feeling in all who play this game, that the genuine reflection, with all its reality, reveals a common sympathy between India and ourselves. I say, with all seriousness and with all hope, that in the struggle before us may we work out our joint destiny in such a manner as may comfort and encourage us both.

M. RENÉ MAHEU (of the Information Department, French Embassy): Before coming to this meeting I have been able to review, though in a very inadequate way, the various pronouncements, news and comments relative to India and British policy in India, which have been expressed since the outbreak of war through the French press and French wireless. In my mind two important impressions remain outstanding.

The first is the expression of a sincere admiration in the French press for the loyalty displayed by the various elements of the Indian community at the outbreak of war towards Britain in general, and also of a deep gratitude for the contribution of India to the common cause.

The second impression is that of a most sympathetic appreciation of the spirit in which the British Government is tackling, in difficult times and under quite exceptional conditions, the constitutional problem of India with a view to satisfying the needs, not easily harmonized, of a struggle for our very existence on the one hand, and a human progress towards self-government on the other.

The loyalty which was displayed at the outbreak of war by India, including the Indian States, has been hailed in France, first, of course, as welcome news of the co-operation of a great country, but also and perhaps chiefly as a splendid testimony to the merits of the work done in India by this country, our ally, which was a testimony to the virtue of the Western civilization which the British and the French race has brought, I think successfully, into contact with that of ancient Asia. This wonderful and spontaneous response gave the lie to the German and Bolshevik propaganda which wanted the world to be persuaded that we were a spent force and that our traditional ideas of tolerance, equality of man, irrespective of race and religion, had fallen out of date. This, at a time when we took up arms to defend this civilization in Europe against a foe who may be of our race, but who most certainly does not belong to our spiritual family, helped us in France to have full confidence in the justice of our cause.

But India's support has not been limited to the moral plane. We know it in France. We know her financial contribution; we know her military contribution as well. We have seen Indian troops on French soil. We

know there are still many more in the Near East, where they cannot have escaped the notice of General Weygand. Just as India helped us in giving recognition to the justice of our cause, she helps us in gathering the strength which makes a certainty of victory.

You certainly do not expect me to make any comment on the policy of His Majesty's Government in India, but I want to say this : as an imperial power, France fully realizes the difficulties with which the British Government is faced. We are quite aware of the magnitude of the task ahead, and there is deep sympathy in France for the spirit in which the various problems involved are being tackled. This task would not be so great if the ideals pursued were not so high.

Above all, we know how little truth there is in German and Soviet propaganda in their references to the situation in India. We have been taught by experience what little faith can be put in such propaganda. I do not think there has been in the last years any country more calumniated, more grossly abused by foreign propaganda than France. We have been calumniated in peace-time, as you British are now in war-time, and this alone would be enough to prevent the French public from believing any anti-British tale from Berlin or Moscow. Believe me, in this matter, as in any other, British and Indians alike will find France, my country, a true friend and a staunch Ally.

The CHAIRMAN : I am much obliged to the representative of our French Ally for coming here today and contributing to the discussion. It is to me typical of the co-operation which I find in my work, and I thank you very much. I am obliged, much to my regret, to leave for another meeting, and Sir Hugh O'Neill, Under-Secretary for India, has kindly consented to take my place.

The Right Hon. Sir Hugh O'Neill then took the chair.

Mr. WARD PERKINS (late I.C.S., Burma) : I have just returned from a four months' tour in North America, and I can from a somewhat different angle endorse the speaker's conclusions. I would particularly congratulate him on their objectivity, for it is too easy to blame America at the moment. In the case of their attitude to India, my experience is summed up by the head of an International Hostel there : "Why do you people in England allow your case in India to go by default in this country?" A Scotch Canadian said : "Whatever happens we must retain our respect for the Americans." It is a hard task, but we have got to do it, and if we make up our minds we can do it. I have come back with much greater respect for them than I had before. We had not put before them our facts; at least, if we did they have not listened to what we said. There is unbelievable ignorance about India in America.

I suggest that it was hardly respectful on our part that for years we have allowed this anti-British and anti-Indian propaganda in America to go on and have taken no effective steps to stop it. For years America has been flooded with lecturers. I met some of them. Let me give you one gem from a lady with whom I spoke from the same platform. She said :

"The wicked British Government refuses to do anything to stop malaria; they have stopped the sale of quinine; last year a hundred million people died of malaria." There was not much difficulty in dealing faithfully with that story, and at the end one of the audience came up and said: "What is this woman doing coming along with these lies and insulting our intelligence?"

I am not quite sure that I would have found my job so easy a year ago. My impression is that September 3, 1939, was a key-day in America. Previous to that and since then these anti-British lecturers have been striving hard for results, and owing to their past immunity they have been getting careless. On September 3 two events happened. First, we took up the challenge in this country, and, secondly, *mirabile dictu*, the Empire did not disintegrate. Americans cannot understand that miracle. I found constant interest in it wherever I went, though I was not lecturing on India, but on the Far East. You see, this fact of September 3, the Empire coming in in a perfectly wonderful manner, went right against all the facts that the Americans had had pumped into them for years. And then on top of all that, owing to the fact that we have come into this war, their sympathies are with us, but they are muddled and worried, and that possibly explains some of their reactions at the present time. We must be patient with them; they will be all right in the end.

Let me tell you two or three of the things I heard. I was told that India has concentration camps, and they believed it. They did not want to believe it, but they believed it. They told me that tenants paid 85 per cent. of their produce in rents to the landlords in India. They said there was no higher education allowed in India. They also told me in my China lecture that we in England cannot blame Japan for what she has done in Nanking. "After all, it is like what you are doing in India." Let me make it quite clear, once for all, that we must not get annoyed with them for saying that sort of thing, because they have had it pumped into them for years. We have allowed our case to go by default. We have a case, and I believe if it is put up we can get away with it. I found when I was talking on Burma, my own province, that I obtained instant response from my audience when I told them how I had served in Burma and was proud of what we had done there. Burma fifty years ago was in a state of chaos, and now, owing to the work in which I had a small part, she has her own Prime Minister, who rode in the Coronation procession, responsible to a legislature, elected by universal suffrage. They did not know this and they wanted to hear more.

I would like to say something about the possibilities of this changed attitude in America. I suggest that these lying tales that have been current about India generally cannot be good for India in the long run. Some time or other, if not indeed in the near future, India is going to be faced with large social and economic problems, and in these she will not be too proud to accept the help and interest of America. Indeed, America has already done an enormous amount in that way—the Rockefeller hospitals, interest in education, and particularly the Jeunes Schools and many other things. On the other hand, India has a contribution to make to Western civiliza-

tion. That co-operation cannot be sincere and you cannot get full value from it unless there is respect on both sides.

Now, it would be quite easy for retired British officials to go round and tell the truth, and it does good, but if we want to get a fair factual statement, a statement of facts, I suggest that the only people who can do it are Indians, responsible Indians, if only because they would not at the present moment be so likely to be suspected of propaganda. If India does wish co-operation with the Western world, then here in the present atmosphere when America wishes to read well of England and the British Empire and all we stand for, here is an opportunity. Surely the responsibility, if she faces up to it, is India's, and she has an opportunity at the moment for making close and friendly contact with all that is best in America.

Mr. BALINSKI-JUNEZILLI (Polish Research Centre in London): I should like to add a few words on behalf of Poland, and to pay a tribute to India's attitude to my country.

India immediately made common cause with the rest of the British Empire when Poland suffered aggression at Germany's hands. We not only had to suffer invasion from Germany, but also from Russia, a fact which must not be forgotten. The Polish people remember the message of Mahatma Gandhi expressing to our nation the profound sympathy felt for us throughout India. We shall also ever be grateful for the help given to the Polish refugees, and especially the relief that is now being organized in Bombay. I take the opportunity of this noteworthy occasion to acknowledge publicly the sympathy and help to which I have referred.

The news reaching us from our distressed land, whether in German or in Russian occupation, gives the very best proof of the blatant falsity of both the Nazi and Soviet propaganda. The ruthlessness and brutality shown by both Germany and Russia gives such proof of their totalitarian and anti-democratic spirit as to show that any attempt to impose their rule on mankind is doomed to failure. Indians may well be proud that they are linked with Great Britain, the other British Dominions and the French Empire in defending the noble cause of justice and freedom.

Sir ALFRED WATSON: I wholly agree with Professor Basil Mathews that the greatest problem we have in the sphere of information today is that of countering the impression created abroad, and especially in America, that the British attitude to Indian demands is a negation of our profession to be fighting for democracy. Unfortunately we have never been good advertisers in our own cause and have neglected to proclaim our deeds and the motives behind them. Our newspapers are today more limited in space, and there is a greater tendency than ever to subordinate the quieter acts of Government to the sensational. What the Indian Government may do in its efforts at conciliation is not news, while the more dramatic mad-house pronouncements of Congress are news.

Some of us believed that the difficulty of presenting the Indian Government case would be got over by the creation of the Ministry of Information. Unfortunately that Ministry by its own early blunders made itself news,

and the newspapers became far more concerned to criticize the internal organization of the department than with the products it offered them.

Now, I believe, a real effort to get things straight is being made along the lines suggested by Professor Basil Mathews. Various organizations are at work and at last the Ministry of Information is playing its part. Some real effort to educate the world regarding our position in India is being made. Much remains to be done; there is a vast leeway to make up; but our case is now being presented and we may put ourselves right with the world. We must do so if the British attitude to Indian demands is not to become a heavy liability in the war and not the enormous asset it should be in vindicating our cause in the democratic and liberty-loving countries.

Mr. H. S. L. POLAK: I just want to say one or two words in regard to the American aspect of Professor Mathew's contribution. It seems to me that there is a good deal of room for better understanding between our two countries, at least in one respect, and that is the question of facts. Most of us are still in touch with India by way of newspapers, and it will be recalled that at the beginning of the war we were deprived of our newspapers from India, and it was a very long time before we could get any information as to reaction occurring in that country. I personally made inquiries as to the cause of the delay in receiving these papers and was informed that probably, owing to difficulties of transport through the Mediterranean, they had in all likelihood been diverted by way of South Africa.

I happened to get information also of two other things in that connection. One was that at the India Office itself it was a very long time before they received any Indian newspapers, and the other that a large number of these papers had been dumped in South Africa and forgotten there. Some weeks later I received an extract from a newspaper in the United States pointing to the fact that there had been no receipt of newspapers in America since the beginning of the war, and attributing this to a closing down by the censorship in India forbidding the export and distribution of Indian newspapers. That kind of thing could quite easily have been tested upon inquiry, and it seems to me a very great pity that it is possible to meet such actual misstatements and that they should be so readily credited. There seems to me a great deal of room for mutual explanation and for the cultivation of public opinion in America by placing some of the real facts before the public.

Miss AGATHA HARRISON: May I ask a question? Would not one of the very best pieces of propaganda and the most disarming propaganda be if this country were able here and now to deal with the root cause of this distorted or otherwise propaganda—that is to say, to make a right and genuine settlement between this country and India? Could anything be more disarming to the whole world?

Professor BASIL MATHEWS: I have been interested all the way through in the way in which again and again we have come back to our sense of need for a real interpretation of the facts of the British relationship with India

both on its good and bad side, conscious that it is these facts, and not merely arguments about them, that will win our case in the long run. I would like, if I may, just to say one word about the remarks on the Ministry of Information, which has been actually the whipping-dog when there were other animals that might much more justly have received castigation. The Ministry was attacked for not giving information when it was working day and night to try to secure information from organizations in other parts of London, nearer ourselves here, which, very likely for good reasons of their own, were withholding the information as likely to do harm and give information to the enemy instead of to our friends.

In relation to America and the work of that Ministry, I think I ought to give a single sentence of explanation. The work of the American division of that Ministry is different from that of any other division. In the countries of Europe the Ministry is able, and rightly able, to carry out vigorous counter-propaganda to the things that are said by Germany or Russia. In relation to America, owing to the extraordinary sensitiveness of the American mind to the very thought of propaganda, they are conscious of it even where it does not exist at all. The American division of the Ministry therefore concentrates itself wholly and entirely and exclusively on the liberation of facts to America through predominantly American channels. There are in this city over 100 American newspaper men, radio commentators, news-reel photographers and others who are in regular contact with that division and who are receiving the facts. Often we can put them into relations with facts otherwise hidden from them.

I believe a large part of the solution of this problem in relation to America will come, not through allowing Indians to lecture in America, but more by the continuous effect on the Americans who are among us and who are friendly here with us. I believe that we ought, as I suggested at the end of my address, to harness some of the best brains in this country, some of its finest writers to give a first-class interpretation on the American scene of a kind that will command the attention of the reading public in the United States. I am not sure whether the India Office would regard this as a dangerous process, but I would like to see groups of American writers encouraged to travel through India, not personally conducted to the things we wanted them to see, but let loose over the whole range of India, and let them examine the things there at first hand and go back to their country and interpret them as they see them. I do believe it is of immense importance that this country and the United States of America should come to a common understanding, so that their backing of the democratic forces of the world may come through triumphantly in the end.

In regard to what Miss Agatha Harrison said, I would only wish to repeat the words I read and interjected into my speech, that at this very difficult time it does seem incumbent upon us, as I hope Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru would feel it incumbent upon them, to get in contact, and make one more effort in the spirit of conciliation and statesmanship to come to an understanding. That would be the best propaganda that could be made in the whole world as to the honesty of our purpose and the unity of America, India and ourselves in a new democratic world-community.

Lord LAMINGTON: Ladies and Gentlemen, Before we leave it is a pleasant duty to pass a vote of thanks to those who have spoken here this afternoon, and especially to Professor Basil Mathews for his excellent address.

I imagine many here have, like myself, considered our rule in India to have been one of the most signal instances of good government that the world has even seen; it was rather a shock, therefore, to hear some of the criticisms read out. However, as the most virulent of these came from a country where cruelty is practised to a degree unsurpassed in history, we need not be unduly exercised in our minds. Again, other bitter criticism comes from the country with whom we are engaged in deadly war, so it may be regarded as pure propaganda.

I think we may take some credit that neutral countries like the United States do recognize to a great extent the marvellous work we have done in India.

We are much indebted to Mr. Mathews for having prepared his lecture and given us this masterly survey of the opinion of the world. We also feel honoured by the fact that the Foreign Office has allowed Mr. Butler to give an afternoon in his busy parliamentary life to come here and take the chair, to the neglect of other duties. He had to leave early, and his place has been taken by Sir Hugh O'Neill from the India Office. We are very grateful to these three gentlemen for coming here and for the very enlightening survey we have had. I ask you to show by acclamation your appreciation of the work of these three gentlemen this afternoon.

Sir HUGH O'NEILL: Perhaps you will allow me on behalf of Mr. Butler and myself, and also on behalf of Professor Basil Mathews, to thank Lord Lamington very much for the kind way in which he has proposed the vote of thanks. It has been an extremely interesting discussion. This is the first occasion on which I have been privileged to be present at these meetings, but I hope to be present at several more in the future, and if they are as interesting as this one has been I shall certainly learn a good deal about India and its problems. Thank you very much.

Dr. PHILIP PANETH (who was in Prague as Press correspondent for the three years prior to the German occupation) writes: Never was the necessity of British propaganda in the press of the world so paramount as at the present moment.

Since the beginning of this century Russian and German imperialistic aspirations have been the inspiration of a rather hostile anti-British propaganda in this press. Out of envy that increased into hatred, this propaganda discovered an affection for the so-called "oppressed peoples of the British Empire." And today again the German and Russian press, these two extremes, have come to an understanding in the struggle against England in spite of their ideological differences, and are leading the anti-British campaign. In their propaganda warfare the problem of India plays a most important part.

The real structure of the Indian problem is in most cases unknown to

those of my American colleagues who deal with it. Although there is a place for political and economic arguments, the evidence is, so far as India and Indians are concerned, in favour of Britain. The reason why these facts are less known than the accusations against the present administration is to be sought in the fact that the press of the world has been either uninformed or mislead on the Indian question. The sources of their information were either German-Russian propagandists or young and impetuous Indian students.

It must, however, be admitted that English official circles neglected to popularize the principles of the administration of India just as they neglected propaganda altogether. England is even today a rather unknown island to the greater part of the world, and the most contradictory opinions are in circulation about her insular mentality.

It should be the task of the Ministry of Information to conduct a propaganda campaign on a large scale, and the presentation of the real facts of India should form an integral part of this campaign. Great Britain's war aims should be made known to the whole of the world, even if the right-minded public are already convinced of the humane aims of the present struggle. In respect to India the positive facts should be the answer to the negative statements and misrepresentations of the hostile propaganda. Nor should Asia's geopolitical situation be lost sight of. It should be pointed out that the alternative to Great Britain's democratic administrative system is stimulation of the expansive appetite of Japan, Russia and Germany—this yellow, red and brown menace. The Indians will thus be convinced that their independence is threatened by Japan and Russia and that Britain's enemies are India's enemies.

It is of vital interest both to Europe and America that India should be preserved for democracy. Outside the British Commonwealth of Nations there is no possibility of a more advantageous development for India; on the contrary, she would be exposed to becoming a victim of the power politics of the aggressive states.

AFGHANISTAN : THE PRESENT POSITION

By BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.
 (Author of *A History of Persia*)

THE advance of Russia towards Afghanistan, the kernel of the problem of Central Asia, may be considered to have commenced in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, at which period she was separated from the British possessions in India by a zone that was some fourteen hundred miles in width. By 1867 she had taken Samarkand and Tashkent, while Bukhara had become a subsidiary ally, and a few years later all the Khanates had been annexed, Khiva being occupied in 1873.

During this period the British had advanced northwards to the borders of Afghanistan, of which country they claimed to be the virtual protectors. This position was recognized by Russia, whose attitude towards her rival was not unfriendly at this period, and in 1873 an Anglo-Russian Agreement was signed which delimitated the northern boundary of Afghanistan as being formed by tributary rivers flowing into the Oxus, and finally by the Oxus itself as far as its great bend to the north. Further west the boundary was only laid down approximately.

Not long after the signing of this treaty the intervention of Great Britain on the side of Turkey in her war with Russia in 1877-78 caused the despatch of a Russian mission to Kabul, which, together with the refusal of the Amir Shir Ali Khan to receive a British mission, precipitated the Second Afghan War. The conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin in July, 1878, however, prevented the advance of a Russian army into Afghanistan, with its inevitable consequences of an Anglo-Russian war.

During this period Russia had established herself at Krasnovodsk on the eastern side of the Caspian Sea, and General Lomakin, who had advanced into the interior in 1879, was

defeated by the Tekke Turkoman at Geok Teppe. This disaster was avenged by General Skobeloff, who in 1881, after the explosion of mines, stormed the fortress of Geok Teppe* and killed the Tekke Turkoman by thousands. The tribe finally submitted, and Merv was occupied in 1884.

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

Meanwhile the British had invaded Afghanistan through the Khaibar Pass, by a second column which marched on Kandahar, while General Roberts, leading a third column up the Kurram Valley, won a notable victory at the Peiwar Kotal, accompanying in person the force that made a successful attack on the Afghan left flank.

Shir Ali, upon hearing of the victory of Roberts, fled northwards to Balkh, intending to seek the Tsar's protection, but was prevented from doing so by his treacherous Russian allies. Sir Alfred Lyall puts the following lines into the mouth of the Amir Abdur Rahman :

"And yet when I think of Shir Ali as he lies in his sepulchre low,
How he died betrayed, heart-broken 'twixt infidel friend and foe,
Driven from his throne by the English, and scorned by the Russian, his
guest,
I am well content with the vengeance, and I see God works for the best."

Shir Ali was succeeded by his son Yakub, who made a treaty with the British at Gandamak in May, 1879. This led to the establishment of a British Mission at Kabul under Sir Louis Cavagnari, who, with the members of his staff and his escort, were massacred by mutinous Afghan soldiers and the Kabul populace in the following July.

Once again three columns invaded Afghanistan. Roberts, who commanded his old force, which was much strengthened, crossed the Peiwar Kotal and marched on the capital. Yakub Khan surrendered, but Roberts found the Afghans occupying a strong position under the Amir's rule at Charasia, where he won a second notable victory. He then entered Kabul and accepted the abdication of Yakub Khan. During the winter Roberts' force

* Some fifty years ago I examined this ruined fort, which was little better than a strongly built caravanserai.

was attacked in the Sherpur Cantonment, which he had occupied, but he beat off the fanatically brave Afghans, inflicting severe losses upon them.

The situation now remained obscure from the political point of view, but the solution to this difficult problem was the re-appearance of Sirdar Abdur Rahman in Afghan Turkestan. This truly great chief, after a remarkable career, in the course of which he had been driven out of the country by Shir Ali, was finally placed on the throne of Afghanistan by the British in 1880. He then set to work and gradually reunited all its provinces under an iron despotism.

The continued advance of Russia towards the frontiers of Afghanistan naturally caused the Amir intense anxiety, and in 1882 he strongly urged on the Viceroy (who at this time was Lord Ripon) the necessity for help to defend his frontiers against an attack by Russia.

Mr. (later Sir Mortimer) Durand, the Foreign Secretary, was strongly in favour of an understanding with Russia by which the boundaries of Afghanistan would be defined. Finally, in 1884, after the occupation of Merv, it was decided by the two Powers to appoint Commissioners, who would seek to lay down a line satisfactory to both parties. The British Commissioner, upon reaching the scene in the autumn, was informed that, owing to the alleged ill-health of the Russian Commissioner, the negotiations would have to be postponed until the spring.

Russia took advantage of this delay to march up the Murghab River to the vicinity of the oasis of Panjdeh, and in the spring of 1885, by attacking the Afghan garrison, created the famous Panjdeh crisis, which nearly precipitated an Anglo-Russian conflict. The speech of Mr. Gladstone, who demanded a war vote of £11,000,000—an enormous sum at that period—is not yet forgotten. Fortunately, however, negotiations were not broken off, and a Boundary Commission finally settled this very difficult question.

Before quitting this subject it is desirable to point out that these negotiations coincided with the failure of the British expedition to relieve General Gordon at Khartum, while Bismarck,

who had concluded a secret treaty with Russia outside the Triple Alliance, approved of a system of persistent annoyance against Great Britain.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 may be described as a most important landmark in the relations between Great Britain and Russia. It dealt with Afghanistan, with Persia, and with Tibet. Here I only deal with it as affecting Anglo-Afghan relations. In 1900 Russian officials attempted to open up direct communication with the Amir Habibulla Khan. Lord Lansdowne objected, but Count Lamsdorff sought to justify such action, which, in 1903, caused serious friction between the two Powers.

In 1902 Great Britain, renouncing definitely her policy of isolation, negotiated a treaty of Japan, by the terms of which, in the event of either party becoming involved in war with a third Power, the other Power was to remain neutral unless any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, when the contracting party should come to its assistance. Three years later a further treaty of alliance was concluded, which bound the contracting parties to come to each other's assistance in case of unprovoked attack on the part of any other Power; this treaty was renewed in 1911.

In 1905 the present Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as British Ambassador, discussed the treaty mentioned with Count Lamsdorff. The Russian Foreign Minister declared that it had created a most unfavourable impression, whereupon Hardinge pointed out that Russia at great cost had constructed a series of strategical railways to the frontiers of Afghanistan and, indeed, to the gates of Herat, although she had frequently declared that that country lay outside the Russian sphere of influence. He added that the apparent object was to create a perpetual menace to India and thereby to exert pressure on Great Britain. Following this discussion pacific assurances were exchanged between the two Powers.

In July 1905, the Russo-German Treaty of Bjorko, by which

the weak Tsar Nicolas was persuaded by the intriguing Kaiser to enter the orbit of German diplomacy, was signed. The triumphant Kaiser thereupon wrote to the Tsar that it was directed against England and that France would be obliged to join it, thus converting it into a Pan-European alliance against Great Britain and Japan. Actually this treaty was not ratified by Russia, but it was clear to Great Britain that continued friction with that country would only play into the hands of the powerful pro-German party at the Russian Court.

The Russo-Japanese war was ended by the peace treaty that was signed in August, 1905. The defeat of Russia produced a genuine readiness on her side to effect a general settlement with Great Britain in Asia, the underlying idea being to remove all possible causes of friction in the present and also, as far as possible, in the future.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION

To turn to Afghanistan. Early in 1907 Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India, informed Lord Minto, the Viceroy, that negotiations for an Anglo-Russian convention were taking place, and sent him an outline. Minto strongly pressed for permission to keep King Habibulla informed confidentially, but Morley tactlessly laid down that the Amir "should not be consulted, but be merely advised of its terms after signature." Minto, when the treaty had been signed, informed the Amir that, for the first time in a formal document, the Russian Government recognized that Afghanistan lay outside their sphere of influence, and that all their political relations with Afghanistan should be conducted through the intermediary of the British Government; that Great Britain concedes to Russia her permission for Russian and Afghan local officials to settle purely local questions; and, finally, the principle of equal treatment for British and Russian trade was laid down.

In his reply the Amir forwarded the views of his Council of State, of which Sirdar Nasrulla Khan, the Amir's brother, who was fanatically anti-British, was the chief member. Their finding was that the Convention destroyed the independence of Afgh-

istan and possessed no advantage. It also, in their opinion, gave the right to both Powers to construct railways in Afghanistan. Minto reported that the Amir himself was favourable to the convention, but could not overcome the opposition of the anti-British party. It had been stipulated that the Treaty would not be valid without the signature of the Amir, but in the autumn of 1908 Iswolsky fortunately declared the convention would, whether the Amir gave his formal adhesion or not, be considered to be a valid instrument. A proof of its importance will be found in the Kaiser's minute on the despatch which informed him of its conclusion. It ran: "Yes, when taken all round, it is aimed at us."

Early in 1907 King Habibulla had visited India, where royal honours were paid him. He also received many tokens of genuine friendship, so much so that he left India determined to base the policy of Afghanistan on friendship with Great Britain. Consequently, although he never signed the convention, King Habibulla, as we shall see, remained firm as a rock to this policy despite the severe strain that was shortly to test him.

THE FOUR YEARS' WAR

Upon the outbreak of the Great War the Amir declared the neutrality of Afghanistan. In January 1916, he stated to the British Agent that he would keep his pledges loyally, but was anxious about Turkey, whose influence on the minds of his subjects was considerable.

Of outstanding importance to the Amir was the despatch from Berlin of a Turkoo-German Mission to Afghanistan. Germans, in the rôle of explorers, archaeologists, and scientists, travelled extensively in Persia during 1913. Among others, Captain Oskar Niedermayer, the future leader of the mission, fell ill at Meshed and was my guest for several weeks in that year, while Zugmayer, a scientist, had received permission to travel in British Baluchistan during the same period.

Upon the outbreak of war, under Enver Pasha's influence, *jihad*, or "holy war," was declared by the Sultan, who was also the Caliph, at Constantinople and at other Muslim centres.

Strengthened by it, the Turko-German Mission, which included Turks and Indian seditionists, started off with instructions to cross Persia to Afghanistan, preaching *jihad* as they passed. To support this mission, various parties, officered by Germans who had travelled in Persia, aided by the Swedish officers of the Persian gendarmerie, were organized to drive out British and Russian colonies from Central and Southern Persia and to seize the treasuries of the Russian and British banks. These parties would act as supports to the Afghan Mission. Nor was this all, since it was intended to strengthen them by German instructors, who would enlist and train troops for the invasion of India. It was the scheme of Napoleon revived under considerably more favourable conditions.*

To return to the Afghan Mission. Kazim Beg, who accompanied it with a staff of Turkish officers, was especially imbued with the idea of the union of Islam, as were his officers, and their incorporation in it was apparently nominal. The mission crossed Persia in midsummer, and, upon reaching Herat, was placed under guard in a garden outside the city. Similarly, upon reaching Kabul towards the end of September, it was again housed in a garden under guard. In both cases explanations were given that the guard was to serve as a protection to the visitors.

Niedermayer was not received by the Amir until about a month after his arrival at Kabul, when, to quote his letter to the German Minister at Tehran, "the Amir's explanations did not give us much hope." Another epistle, which, as in the case of the above letter, was seized and sent to the Amir, was written by Roehr, and contained the following sentence: "Perhaps we shall find it necessary to begin by organizing a *coup d'état*." In the summer of 1916 the mission was strengthened by the arrival of the supporting body under Von Hentig.

KING HABIBULLA'S POLICY

The position of the Amir was one of extreme difficulty. The declaration of *jihad* by the Caliph excited the mullas and the

* For Napoleon's designs *vide* Sykes' *History of Persia*, third edition, pp. 303-305. For German war activities, *vide op. cit.* ii., pp. 542-545.

people generally, who; however, were aware that it was not binding in Afghanistan unless it was also proclaimed by their own ruler. What actually saved the situation was the fact that Great Britain and Russia were now allies and that the declaration of *jihad* might involve attack by both countries and the ruin of Afghanistan.

King Habibulla played his hand with consummate skill. In view of the strong pressure on him of the pro-Turkish party under Nasrulla Khan and his own eldest son Inayatulla Khan, he delayed matters by convening an Assembly and by engaging in interminable consultations with his advisers. To quote Niedermayer: "One day the Amir says he is for us and the next against us." Finally, Niedermayer realized that, without the arrival in Afghanistan of a powerful Turkish force, there was no hope of winning over the astute Amir.

The capture of Erzerum by the Russians in March, 1916, completed the failure of the German Mission. Leaving Kabul in May, owing to the seizure in South Persia of most of the supporting parties of Germans by my force, Niedermayer was fortunate to escape capture, but other members of his staff were taken by the British.

The Indians who had accompanied the mission remained at Kabul and, being joined by some students from the Punjab, wove a conspiracy which had its chief centres at Medina and Kabul. It was designed to unite all Muslim States in a combined effort to overthrow the British Raj. A Provisional Government and an Army of Allah were to be created, with Maulvi Obaydulla, the moving spirit, as Foreign Secretary. If the Amir, who was cognizant of the aims of the conspirators, agreed to join them he would be proclaimed King of India. Sirdar Nasrulla Khan was heart and soul with the conspirators.

In July, 1916, Obaydulla gave the leader of the Indian students three silk handkerchiefs, which contained a full written account of the conspiracy, with instructions to hand them over to a trusted shaykh in Sind, who would forward them to Medina. In due course Abdul Hak, the messenger, who evidently felt some misgivings, and who had been in charge of two sons of a

distinguished old Muslim officer at Multan, paid his respects to his employer. Upon the Khan Bahadur asking why he had returned without his young masters, the reply of Abdul Hak was so unsatisfactory that he was soundly beaten, and thereupon confessed and gave up the letters. The silk handkerchiefs proved to be of the utmost importance as revealing the plot with its wide ramifications, which by their seizure was nipped in the bud.

THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR

Some two months after the Armistice King Habibulla, who had guided the policy of his country with such skill, was assassinated near Jalalabad. The soldiers quite unjustly considered that Ahmad Shah Khan, who was in command of the Amir's body-guard, was responsible. They consequently arrested him, together with other members of the Musahiban family.*

Nasrulla Khan, the brother of the murdered monarch, was favoured by the army and the mullas, and was proclaimed Amir at Jalalabad. Meanwhile Amanulla, the third son of the deceased Amir, who, as Governor of Kabul, had possession of the fort, the arsenal, and the treasury, won over the army by promising the soldiers higher pay than that agreed upon by his uncle. This promise, combined with the influence of the Ulya Hazrat, Amanulla's mother, who was the late Amir's chief wife, was decisive. Amanulla, aged twenty-nine, was acclaimed as Amir by the army, and Nasrulla was sent a prisoner to Kabul, where he was declared to be guilty of instigating the assassination of his brother; he shortly afterwards died in prison.

The action of Amanulla in condemning his uncle, and his reinstatement of the suspected Musahiban family into favour, alienated both the mullas and the army. Discontent spread rapidly, and on April 25 the *Khutba†* was not read in his name at Kandahar. Realizing the seriousness of his position, the im-

* This family, which now occupies the throne of Afghanistan, belongs to the Muhammadzai branch of the Durranis, and Nadir Khan, who became King, through his mother was also descended from the Sadozai family. He thus united both branches of the Durranis. The family had acquired the name of Musahiban-i-Khas, or "Personal Equerries."

† The *Khutba* is the "prayer for the reigning Amir."

petuous young monarch decided to unite the nation by the proclamation of *jihad*. Thus, throwing to the winds the friendship with the British Government on which his grandfather and father had based their policy, he forced an entirely unjustifiable war on the British. This was termed "the Third Afghan War."

Coming at a time when many war-trained units were serving abroad, when demobilization was proceeding, and when large numbers of officers and men had proceeded on leave, this conflict constituted a great strain on the British army in India. On the other hand, that army possessed the advantages of aeroplanes (albeit they were few in number and of an inferior class) and also mechanical transport.

The first clash took place in the area of the historical Khaibar Pass, where the small garrison at Landi Kotal merely consisted of two companies of Indian infantry and five hundred men of the Khyber Rifles, whose loyalty in the face of the declaration of *jihad* could not be depended upon.* The Afghan commander had crossed the frontier on May 3 and had occupied the heights above Landi Kotal with a force consisting of three battalions of infantry and two guns. Had he attacked immediately and overpowered this weak force, the neighbouring tribes would undoubtedly have risen. However, he allowed this golden opportunity to pass, and before long the Afghans were driven from the field by a British column, while Dakka was bombed and subsequently occupied. Later the Afghan position at the Khurd Khaibar was carried, and Jalalabad was also bombed, causing a stampede among the Afghan troops. Again, on May 24 a notable feat was performed by the bombing of Kabul. These operations upset the moral of the Amir, who on May 31 made a formal request for an armistice.

The central front, with its salient of the Kurram Valley supported by Thal, was at this period threatened by Nadir Khan (the future King), who commanded a strong Afghan force in neighbouring Khost. In a position to have attacked Thal, Bannu, or Idak on the Tochi, he decided to attack Thal, and on May 26 he arrived before it with a force of 3,000 infantry and nine

* They were disbanded shortly afterwards.

Krupp guns. He was also supported by a large body of tribesmen. Fortunately, he attempted no serious attack and contented himself with artillery fire, his Krupp howitzers completely outranging the British artillery.

On June 1 General Dyer, despite intense heat, arrived on the scene and, in the first place, dispersed some 4,000 Khostwal and Wazir tribesmen who were holding a deep *nala* to the south of Thal. He then joined hands with the British. On the following day he attacked and captured the Afghan position, pursuing the retreating Afghans with aeroplanes and armoured cars, while the tired infantry were rested. Once again the Afghans had missed a golden opportunity.

On the southern front the situation was simplified by the fact that from the Gumal Pass southwards, with the exception of the Zhob Valley, there was no unadministered territory to be considered. The boundary cantonment was New Chaman, and five miles within Afghan territory was the fort of Spin-Baldak. The British and Afghan forces were numerically equal, although our strength in modern guns and machine-guns was far greater. It was decided to attack the Spin-Baldak fort, and in pursuance of this plan on May 29 it was surrounded and breached in several places and stormed. The Afghans, who displayed great bravery, fought to the death.

To conclude this brief outline of the Third Afghan War: In spite of the extreme heat and the difficulties of the situation, within eight days of the opening of hostilities the Afghan army in the Khaibar area had been defeated and broken up at a distance of some fifty miles from railhead, while on the central and southern fronts the Afghans were also definitely defeated. Coming so soon after the titanic conflict of the World War, this relatively insignificant campaign passed almost unnoticed in Great Britain, but yet, taking all the circumstances into account, it represented no mean achievement.

ARMISTICE AND TREATY

On May 28 a letter was received from the Amir, who, while complaining of "the air bombardment of Kabul and Jalalabad,

was nevertheless "prepared to be magnanimous." The Viceroy in his reply laid down the terms on which an armistice would be granted. It was decided that the treaty for the restoration of peace should be followed by a probationary period of six months, during which the Amir should show signs of friendship, and upon the fulfilment of these conditions a "Treaty of Friendship" was to be concluded.

The Afghan delegates duly appeared at Rawalpindi, but their attitude was so truculent and their claims so preposterous that it was decided that the treaty should be presented to them as an ultimatum. Its terms included the confiscation of the arrears of subsidy due to the late Amir, and laid down that no subsidy would be granted to Amanulla. After interminable discussions it appeared that the delegates, permeated with the spirit of nationalism, were prepared to sign the treaty if the independence of Afghanistan and the freedom of her foreign relations were secured, and, on these terms, the Treaty of Peace was concluded on August 8, 1919.

This treaty was severely criticized by the army, whose leaders held that these peace terms should have been dictated at Kabul, after the capture of that city. Taking, however, into account our experience of events after the Second Afghan War, such a course might well have meant anarchy for a long period. As we know, in 1880 this was only saved by the providential appearance on the scene of Abdur Rahman Khan. Again, it was clearly impossible to continue the old arrangement without giving some form of guarantee to Afghanistan against foreign aggression. As was to be expected, the result was regarded as a triumph by Amanulla, who declared that he had drawn the sword to vindicate the claim of Afghanistan to independence, and had won it.

POST-WAR EVENTS

Before dealing with the next stage in these negotiations, it seems desirable to mention events occurring in other countries which materially influenced Indo-Afghan relations.

To take the case of Turkey. In June, 1919, military action by the Greeks in Anatolia was sanctioned. This policy was de-

nounced throughout the Muslim world. In India the Khalifat movement, in the following year, developed into *hijrat*,* or emigration, some 18,000 Indians leaving their land and homes and emigrating to Afghanistan. The first comers were welcomed, but admission was perforce finally refused. Disillusioned, the emigrants returned to their villages, where their property was restored to them. To continue this survey: In 1919 the Whites were steadily advancing in Russia, but were defeated by the Bolsheviks in the following year. In Persia the Anglo-Persian Agreement signed in 1919 was finally rejected by the Persian Parliament, while in Iraq there was the Arab revolt in 1920. Added to this list there were troubles in Ireland.

To turn to frontier affairs, the Afridis had surrendered Government arms and property and had paid a fine, but the Khyber Rifles were not reconstituted. In Waziristan the decision to occupy Razmak and to construct a circular road produced good results.

In the spring of 1920 the Mussoorie Conference, as it was termed, took place, but, owing to Afghan claims that the frontier tribes should be handed over to them and also on account of various Afghan outrages, merely an *aide-mémoire* containing a summary of the intentions and wishes of the British was given to the delegates.

Later in the year the expulsion by the Bolsheviks of the Amir of Bukhara, who took refuge in Afghanistan, produced a revulsion of feeling and a readiness to negotiate an alliance with the British. Accordingly, in response to the Amir's invitation, Sir Henry Dobbs, who had represented Great Britain at the Mussoorie Conference, reached Kabul in January, 1921. There the position was made difficult by the signature of a Russo-Afghan treaty in February of that year. By its terms Russian consulates were allowed to be established in Afghanistan, while the Russians promised a yearly subsidy of one million gold roubles, together with a supply of munitions.

During this same period an Afghan Mission toured Europe

* *Hijrat* in this sense signifies quitting a country ruled by a ruler who cannot be accepted by Muslims.

signing various agreements. It reached England, where the leader, who had specific instructions to ignore the India Office, was curtly informed by Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office that he had nothing to do with Afghan matters. It was most inopportune that this mission was despatched before the conclusion of the treaty at Kabul. Naturally, relations became strained at that city, but finally, after the mission had decided to withdraw, the Amir, apparently acting under a sudden impulse, signed the treaty.

Of considerable importance at this period was the signature in March, 1921, of a Turko-Afghan treaty. Russo-Turkish, Russo-Persian, and Turko-Persian treaties were also signed at Moscow, thus proving that Russia's policy was to build up a strong entente with these Muslim States and to unite them with one another. Probably a hostile feeling to Great Britain constituted the underlying motive of the contracting Powers.

In March, 1922, the British Legation at Kabul was founded by Sir Francis Humphrys, a distinguished frontier officer who was thoroughly conversant with Afghan mentality. At that time Russia, paying, as she did, a handsome subsidy in money and munitions, occupied a strong position at Kabul, albeit the Amir must have realized that any Russian threat to India could only be made good at the expense of Afghanistan. As regards the tribes of the North-West Frontier, Amanulla fished continually in these troubled waters. He also particularly disliked the construction of the Khaibar railway. The Soviet Minister thus found numerous agents to conduct his sinister intrigues with the turbulent Wazirs, Mahsuds, and other tribes. There were frequent murders of British officers and their wives, and other outrages. The Afghan Government, at first, failed to keep its promises to seize the guilty, but was finally induced to comply with the reasonable demands of the British Government, in spite of the fear of "thinning the prickly hedge," to use the Afghan expression.

In 1922 and the following years France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey founded legations or other establishments at Kabul. The French colony included distinguished archaeologists, who com-

menced their successful excavations at Bamian. The German colony, which was at first represented by a *chargé d'affaires*, and consisted of engineers, doctors, and teachers, rapidly increased, an Afghan-German treaty being signed in 1926. Later Germany played a leading rôle in commercial matters. Finally, Turkey was represented by Fakhri Pasha, a fanatical Anglophobe. He was accompanied by a staff of instructors, whose services were not, however, utilized by the Afghan Government—much to his annoyance. At this period the abolition of the Caliphate by Turkey dumbfounded the leaders of the Khalifat movement in India and improved the British position in that country.

KING AMANULLA'S REFORMS

To turn to Afghan home affairs. The Amir attempted to push through reforms, some of which were excellent, far too rapidly. Especially obnoxious was the new Administrative Code, drafted by a Turkish adviser, which the mullas declared to be unlawful. In 1924 a serious rebellion broke out in Khost, and an Afghan force was cut to pieces by the rebels. However, tribesmen were enlisted by a lavish expenditure of money, and in January, 1925, the rebellion was crushed. Apparently its main cause was opposition to a section in the Code which deprived the husband and the father of his power to treat his wives and daughters as mere chattels!

The cost of the rebellion was very heavy, and, had the army been properly paid and well led, it could never have lasted for nearly a year. Actually the soldiers could barely live on the miserable pittance they received, while their equipment was very bad. The staff and senior regimental officers were recruited from young Afghans who had received a smattering of military education in Europe or at Kabul. They superseded the older and more experienced officers, who bitterly resented the change. Amanulla, except at a crisis, most unwisely grudged money to the army.

In 1928 King Amanulla and Queen Souriya visited Europe. They were welcomed in Egypt by King Fuad, by the King and Pope in Italy, by the President in France, and by President

Hindenburg in Berlin. In England they were welcomed at Victoria Station by King George, Queen Mary, and the Prime Minister. After the usual functions in London, the royal visitors spent busy days in inspecting various branches of the navy, the army, and the air force. They also inspected factories. Nor were sporting events neglected. Generally speaking, the cordiality of their reception, the conferring upon Amanulla the Collar of the Royal Victorian Order, and the friendly attitude of all classes, created the deepest impression upon our Afghan visitors.

In somewhat bleak contrast was the subsequent visit paid to Russia, which was distinctly summed up by the suite, if not by the King himself, as anticlimax. In Muslim Turkey the reception was genuinely warm, as also in Persia, although the successful progress in modernization in these two countries possibly led to the ruin of Amanulla. He celebrated his return to Kabul by a speech which lasted five days, during which he referred with pride to the treaties he had negotiated and the friendships he had made.

THE 1928-29 REBELLION

During the long absence of their King the mullas had excited the people, more especially against the appearance of the Queen unveiled while in Europe, as proved by the Press photographs, and fuel was added to the fire when, after her return to Kabul, she appeared unveiled at a banquet. Amanulla, heedless of the rising storm, increased the length of compulsory service in the army, while a month's pay was taken from every official to cover the purchase of armaments. He next ordered that any Government servant who took a second wife would be called on to resign his appointment. Perhaps his most foolish order was to insist on all Afghans wearing complete European dress, including hats, in Kabul. The result of this truly preposterous edict was the creation of a body of men who set up booths on each highway and hired out clothes for the day to villagers bound for the market!

The storm broke, and that quickly. In the district of Kuhistan a successful brigand, Habibulla by name, but generally

known as Bacha-i-Sakau, or "Child of the Water-Carrier," organized a rebellion. He began by closing the roads to Kabul and by constant sniping. He soon found out that the army was with him, while merchants and shopkeepers, realizing the serious situation, shut their doors and hid their property. Hapless Amanulla thereupon abdicated in favour of Inayatulla, and fled to Kandahar by car. Inayatulla, who was in an impossible position, opened up negotiations with Habibulla, who requested Humphrys to evacuate him by air, which was done.

The situation at the British Legation was serious. Occupying an area of twenty acres to the west of Kabul, it was merely protected by a wall of sun-dried bricks. Habibulla's men wished to take possession of it as being an advantageous military position, but although Humphrys, by his knowledge of *pashtu* and by his personality, was able to avert this danger, the buildings suffered alike from shell and rifle fire throughout this period. The British women were in hourly danger of their lives, but they bravely carried on. Finally, it was decided to evacuate the British women and children without delay, and subsequently members of the foreign community. It is to the usurper's credit that he guarded the aerodrome when necessary.

Habibulla had entered the citadel shortly after the departure of Inayatulla in January, 1929, and proclaimed his assumption of sovereignty under the title of Amir Habibulla, Ghazi. He then issued a proclamation, by the terms of which he abolished the unpopular reforms and also conscription. His treasury was, however, empty, and he set to work to "squeeze" wealthy merchants to obtain money. His position was always insecure. He was of mean birth and merely a peasant, and therefore despised by every Afghan tribesman. Equally the powerful body of Afghan merchants at Peshawar, realizing that they would be ruined under this régime, were bitterly hostile to the usurper and on the lookout for a new Amir.

At this juncture Amanulla, supported by the Durrani tribesmen at Kandahar, again proclaimed himself King. Had he possessed the courage of his ancestors, he might have regained his throne early in 1929, when his troops had defeated the Ghilzais and

were entering Ghazni. However, fearing treachery, he fled to India and later to Europe. Thus passed off the scene King Amanulla, who stands condemned at the bar of history for inflicting on Afghanistan the scourge of "the Son of the Water-Carrier." Yet in his defence it may be pleaded that many of his reforms were sound. Had he treated his army liberally, as it deserved to be treated, and moved slowly, he might still be ruling Afghanistan. But he exemplified the Persian proverb, which runs: "Haste is from the Devil."

In February, 1929, since conditions in Afghanistan had become chaotic, it was decided to evacuate the Legation. Last to leave was Humphrys, who bore with him the British flag, which he had kept flying with such courage. The King congratulated Humphrys, as also the Royal Air Force, which in eighty-two flights, carried out over snow-clad ranges in a country practically devoid of landing-grounds, had evacuated 580 passengers of many nationalities without incurring a single casualty. It was indeed a great feat.

KING NADIR SHAH

Nadir Khan was recovering from an illness at Nice when he heard of the capture of Kabul by the brigand Bacha-i-Sakau. Carried on board the P. and O. steamer on a stretcher, he reached Peshawar on February 28, 1929. He decided to proceed to Khost, where, as we have seen, he had commanded the troops during the Third Afghan War, but, owing to tribal jealousies, his reception was most disappointing. Although the general feeling was anger that a mere peasant should usurp the throne, the tribesmen revelled in looting and reviving ancient feuds, and were not keen on the re-establishment of law and order.

Nadir Khan, with the men he could muster, attacked the Kabul forces at Baraki, but was defeated by the treachery of Ghaus-ud-Din, a Ghilzai chief, who fell on his rear. Again and again the gallant Afghan leader had no luck and was driven back. Finally, however, his appeals, published in a weekly paper aptly termed *Islah*, or "Peace," won over sections of the Wazirs and Mohmands, who joined him in force. Although a Kabul

army at this period defeated Hashim Khan, the brother of Nadir who was driven to take refuge in British territory, Nadir himself, supported by the Wazirs, reached the historical battlefield of Charasia. There, by a feigned retreat, the usurper's troops were drawn out of their entrenchments and decisively beaten. Nadir Khan thereupon entered Kabul and was proclaimed King. Habibulla, who had fled, surrendered and was shot, each tribesman firing a bullet into his corpse so as to be able to boast: "I helped kill the Bacha-i-Sakau."

The position of King Nadir Shah was one of very great difficulty. There was no money in the treasury; there were risings of the Shinwaris and of the followers of the late usurper; these were promptly suppressed. More difficult was the rebellion in the northern provinces, which was only broken after much hard fighting. Finally, however, peace was restored to blood-stained Afghanistan, and in 1930 the British Legation was re-opened by Mr. (now Sir Richard) Maconachie.

The declared policy of Nadir Shah was the gradual introduction of law and order, of education, and the development of commerce; but the foundation was to be built on the tenets of Islam. He realized that "hasten slowly" was the best policy in conservative Afghanistan.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

At this point a reference to the sinister activities of some Muslim inhabitants of the North-West Frontier Province, who are termed Red Shirts, is desirable. Its moving spirits are Abdul Ghaffar and his brother Khan Sahib, sons of a landowner on the Peshawar border. Both brothers were educated at the Church Missionary Society school at Peshawar, and Khan Sahib later took a medical degree at Edinburgh. Their sister married the Haji of Turangzai, a notable firebrand.

Abdul Ghaffar in 1919 started a violent agitation against the Rowlatt Act, and, but for the defeat of the Afghans in the Khaibar Pass, the trouble would have been more serious.

Later the brothers joined the Congress party and organized an unscrupulous campaign of hatred and vituperation against the

British Raj. The result was a serious attack on Peshawar by tribal *lashkars* in 1930.

Winning the votes of the unsophisticated tribesmen by the promise of free land without taxation, Khan Sahib defeated the Ministry of the late Sir Abdul Qaiyum in September, 1937, by a narrow majority, and was Chief Minister until the Congress Government resigned towards the close of 1939 under orders of the Congress Working Committee. The difficulties of the British officials who were called upon to co-operate with men who had been avowed enemies of Great Britain in India merit our deep sympathy. It is obvious that the disturbances caused by the mischievous activities of the Red Shirts must have reacted unfavourably on our position in Afghanistan. It is, however, satisfactory to know that the Afghan Government discouraged the movement, while the Afghans, generally speaking, disapproved of the alliance between Muslim Red Shirts and "the idolators," as they termed the Hindus.

ASSASSINATION OF KING NADIR SHAH

The new order in Afghanistan was not destined to be established without three tragedies. The first was the murder at Berlin in July, 1933, of Aziz Khan, an elder brother of the King, who was Afghan Minister. The assassin was a member of a body of Afghan students who were drug addicts. Upon his arrest he declared that his action constituted a protest against the British being permitted to take control of the tribes of the North-West Frontier. In the same year another member of the same body, after failing to reach the British Minister, murdered the Mir Munshi and an English chauffeur.

The culminating tragedy occurred on November 8, 1933, when Nadir Shah, who had summarily executed a certain Gholam Nabi Khan for high treason, was assassinated by one of his retainers. Thus fell King Nadir Shah, who ranks among the greatest of Afghan rulers. Without money or following, and suffering from permanent bad health, by sheer valour and force of personality he had rescued his country from a cruel usurper and had probably saved it from a long period of anarchy.

Thanks to the stability of the Government and the affection felt for the murdered monarch, his son was immediately proclaimed as King Zahir Shah. The youthful monarch, who ascended the throne under such tragical circumstances, was born in 1914, and at the age of ten accompanied his father to France, where he studied for some six years. He married a cousin in 1931 and is the father of two sons. He takes a keen interest in his army, and more especially in the air force.

THE PRESENT RÉGIME

The Government of Afghanistan is now a constitutional monarchy. The Premier is Sirdar Hashim Khan, a brother of Nadir Shah, and there are the usual Departments for War, Foreign Affairs, and so forth. The questions of finance and trade have been extremely difficult, since Nadir Shah was faced with an empty treasury and impoverished subjects. Consequently the Afghani rupee (worth about one-quarter of the Indian rupee), which had been supported for many years by the British subsidies to the Amirs, began to fall sharply, and it became a vital matter to correct the adverse balance of trade which existed. To effect this, in 1933 a National Bank was founded to deal with exchange, of which it was granted a monopoly, while commerce was handled by the formation of the Ashami (or Joint-Stock) Company. To it monopolies were granted which covered (*a*) the import of sugar and petroleum products, (*b*) purchases and sales on behalf of Government, and (*c*) exploitation of mines, establishment of factories, etc.

Afghanistan is a poor country, and its chief export is that of Karakuli lambskins, averaging, perhaps, one million sterling per annum. The second important export, which is valued at one-half of the former, is the fruit crop. The fact that the chief export is distinctly a luxury commodity, depending alike on prosperity and fashion, constitutes a distinct economic weakness.

The sound policy has been followed by reducing imports by growing cotton and sugar beet. Factories for cloth and sugar were also established by the Ashami Company, but are now being sold to private capitalists. To conclude this brief outline: The

existence of oil was proved in the Herat province, but the field was not of sufficient importance to justify the very heavy cost of constructing a pipe-line to the Arabian Sea. No other minerals of any commercial value have been found, and a German prospecting company, from lack of results, surrendered its concession.

To turn to the position on the North-West Frontier. For the first time the Afghan Government has ceased to encourage the warlike, fanatical tribesmen to give trouble to the British. On our side, British policy, which includes roads, hospitals, and schools, is slowly creating a new and a better feeling; it also improves the economic position of the tribesmen, who were extremely poor, but who now have access to markets. In view of the fact that Kabul has become a centre of law and order and of civilizing influences, is it not reasonable to hope that the tribesmen, who are now living between two areas of civilization, may gradually give up their passion for feuds and raiding and become law-abiding citizens?

THE FOUR-POWER TREATY

Afghanistan did not join the League of Nations upon its foundation in 1920, but held aloof, as also did Turkey and Russia. Persia had joined the League before negotiating her treaty with Russia in 1921; Turkey followed in the same year; while Russia and Afghanistan both became members in 1934. Of much greater importance is the treaty of the four Muslim Powers—Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. To give some account of its formation in 1934, there was a dispute between Iraq and Persia as to the rights of each Power on the Shatt-al-Arab, which came before the League Council in January, 1935, without any result. However, in that year the two Powers agreed to come to terms. Furthermore, on the initiative of Persia, with the strong support of Turkey, negotiations were undertaken for the formation of a Middle Eastern Pact, in which Afghanistan would be included. As a preliminary, on July 4, 1937, an Iranian-Iraq Agreement, which settled on reasonable terms the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, was signed, and a few days later the Treaty of Saadabad was also

signed at Tehran. This pact may be described as one of friendship, non-aggression, and consultation with one another.

RUSSIA AND INDIA

Before concluding this lecture it seems desirable to make a few remarks on the strategical situation of Afghanistan. The army is recruited by a mixture of compulsory service for two years and voluntary service for life. Officers are recruited for life. The peace strength of the army is 60,000, but its armed tribesmen, who may be half a million strong, constitute a formidable second line. Mechanized transport has been introduced to some extent, and a small air force has been established.

It is clear that Russia alone is her potential enemy, and will be treated as such. Kabul, the capital, is protected from invasion by the U.S.S.R. owing to the lofty and rugged double range of the Hindu Kush. But Badakhshan and her other districts in the Oxus Valley could not be effectually held against large Russian forces that the railway could transport to Termez, more especially as no reinforcements could be sent from Kabul during the winter months. Again, Russia, from the Trans-Caspian Railway (which runs from that sea to the main northern line), constructed a strategical branch line from Merv to New Kushk, which is situated only some eighty miles from Herat, with no intervening physical barrier, and Herat could offer little resistance to Russian heavy artillery. From Herat to Kandahar is some 200 miles by the caravan route via Sabzawar and Farah. The country to be crossed presents few physical difficulties and is suitable for tanks, whippets, and lorries. If Persia were allied to Afghanistan, she might be able to attack the Russian lines of communication to some small extent.

We now take the other side of the situation. From the days of the Moghul Empire, Kabul and Kandahar have been held to be the Keys of India, and I should not envy the position of a Russian army which could only be supplied by a single-track railway from an immense distance, whether we reckon from Moscow via Orenburg and Bukhara or via the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea; the distance in both cases is about 2,200 miles. I

have travelled along both these routes on more than one occasion, and was struck by the lack of towns of any importance and of commercial activity throughout. The recently constructed town of Magnitogorodsk in the Ural Mountains, with its rich iron mines, will, however, have improved the Russians' position to some extent. There is also the recently badly constructed Turk-Sib railway, which runs from the Trans-Siberian railway at Novo-Sibirsk to a junction between Pishpok (Frunze) and the Sir Daria, not far from Tashkent. But the whole province of Russian Turkestan is now devoted to growing cotton, and food supplies for a large force would be unobtainable.

It would, then, seem to be unwise for Russia to attempt to invade India across Afghanistan, as she would presumably be met on the Kabul-Kandahar line by Afghan troops, strongly supported by British troops holding a strong position. Moreover, her lines of communication would be repeatedly attacked by the tribes on her flanks. On the other hand, Russia might be tempted to occupy Afghan-Turkestan in the Oxus Valley or even the Herat province. Yet to hold these conquests would need large forces, which it would be difficult to keep in the field. Stalin, however, might conceivably undertake a venture in which he would be doomed to failure.

Dr. Johnson laid down that the greatest of virtues was courage, since without it there is no security for any other. I know no race braver than the Afghans, and I sincerely wish them the prosperous future that they surely merit.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

At a meeting of the Association and the Royal Central Asian Society held at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on Wednesday, March 13, 1940, at 3 p.m., Sir Percy Sykes read a paper on "Afghanistan : the Present Position." The Marquess of Zetland was in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN : There is clearly on this occasion no need to give the audience a little margin of time to arrive. They have already arrived in such large numbers that I feel justified in starting the proceedings on the tick of time.

We are, as you know, to have a lecture on the present position in Afghanistan, and there is perhaps no one amongst living men who is better qualified to speak upon such a subject than our lecturer this afternoon, Sir Percy Sykes. (Applause.)

I think it would be true to say that it must be very nearly half a century since Sir Percy first went to Central Asia. It was actually, I think, in 1892, and very shortly thereafter he was attracted more particularly by Persia. It so happened that I myself spent the Christmas of the year 1900 at a distant spot where Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan meet—namely, Sistan—and it was when I was in Sistan that I first heard of the activities of Sir Percy Sykes.

In those days, as many of you will remember, there was acute rivalry—shall we say, commercial rivalry and to some extent political rivalry—between Great Britain and Russia in that part of the world, and Sir Percy Sykes, realizing the importance of establishing British interests in southern Persia, by sheer force of character and determination compelled—I do not think I am saying too much in using that word—the Government of India to establish a consulate at Kerman in south-eastern Persia, and the obvious person to become Consul was naturally Sir Percy Sykes himself.

His interest in Persia was only briefly interrupted during a period of leave, I think in 1902, when he went in command of a body of Yeomanry to South Africa, was wounded, and needless to say was mentioned in despatches. (Applause.)

But, as soon as might be, he returned to his first love and was soon in Persia once more. He became Consul-General in Khurasan with his headquarters at Mashed, and during the Great War he raised the Southern Persia Rifles and commanded the forces in the southern parts of that country. In addition to that, he has also served His Majesty as his representative in Chinese Turkestan.

He possesses what I should think is a quite unusual number of gold medals—the gold medal of the Royal Geographical Society, the gold medal of the Royal Empire Society and a special MacGregor gold medal for explorations of military value.

Finally, at a time when you would have thought that he might have looked for some leisure after a life of strenuous labour, he has been devoting his energies and his interests to the writing of a history of Afghanistan. It is no doubt the cream of the work, which will in due course be published as the History of Afghanistan, that he is going to lay before us this afternoon.

I have pleasure in calling upon him to do so. (Applause.)

(Sir PERCY SYKES then read his paper.)

The CHAIRMAN: Not even in the Mother of Parliaments, where in the course of a fairly long experience I have sometimes suffered from the necessity of listening to long speeches, would our most vocal legislators venture, I think, into competition with the ex-Amir Amanulla, who, we have been told this afternoon, on one historic occasion made a speech lasting for five days. I am certainly not going to enter into any such competition, but since it is customary at these meetings to hold some discussion at the end of the lecture, I may perhaps be permitted to occupy not five days but some five minutes in making one or two observations on the subject matter of the really most valuable and informative lecture to which we have listened this afternoon. (Applause.)

Our lecturer has told us of the attraction which Western inventions and Western customs had for the ex-Amir Amanulla. I remember being present at an interesting and somewhat amusing display of this characteristic on the part of Amanulla. We were at Hatfield, Lord Salisbury's famous house and garden, where a reception had been organized in honour of our distinguished guest. I shall never forget the delight which spread over Amanulla's face, when he insisted upon one of his staff entering the famous maze there without a guide, and found his unfortunate official quite incapable of finding his way out of the maze. He declared that this was a thing which he must institute at Kabul, since it would provide a more merciful means than was sometimes customary in that country of getting rid of an inconvenient rival!

Then I feel that I must say a word in favour of Dr. Khan Sahib, who has been painted in somewhat lurid colours by our distinguished lecturer. I have only been brought into contact with Dr. Khan Sahib in very recent times. He was at one time the medical officer of that famous frontier regiment the Guides, but more recently he has been the Prime Minister of the North-West Frontier Province, and I do not think that the Governor of that province would dissent if I were to say that Dr. Khan Sahib proved to be a most charming man to work with. He provides us indeed with a very striking illustration of the universal experience of mankind, I think; that when a man is once charged with real responsibility his outlook upon the affairs of men is apt to undergo a very marked change.

In the course of his lecture Sir Percy Sykes has given us a very graphic picture of the vicissitudes which have accompanied the evolution of Afghanistan since it became a sovereign independent State at the end of the third Afghan War in 1919. A strong, stable and friendly Afghan administration has always been a British interest, and never more so perhaps than it is

today; and if in the past we sought to secure our interests by a measure of control over and by granting subsidies to the Government of that country, we have now recognized the advantages of securing them through the agency of a stable, friendly and independent kingdom; for we are satisfied that the friendship of an independent State is a surer foundation on which to rest our common interests than a State subject to an uneasy subserviency, irksome to the freedom-loving spirit of the Afghan people. That there is a powerful bond of common interest between India and Afghanistan must be apparent to anyone who considers the geographical, the political and the economic circumstances of the two countries.

Hence the satisfaction and the sympathy with which we have watched the internal progress of the country during the past ten years under the wise policy of orderly development inaugurated by Nadir Shah and continued under the present King with the powerful aid of his uncles, Muhammad Hashim, the Prime Minister, Shah Mahmoud, the Defence Minister, who visited us here in London in 1937 and 1936 respectively, and Shah Wali, who was King Nadir's first representative at the Court of St. James's. Neither has our sympathy lacked practical expression, for we have been able to render the present Afghan Government assistance from time to time in various ways, as, for example, by the provision of facilities for them in India to train the cadets of their young but growing Air Force. The two countries have likewise a common interest in the maintenance of peace in the tribal areas which lie between their respective boundaries, and when, as unhappily sometimes occurs, we are driven by the lawlessness of the tribes to embark upon military action against them, we always bear closely in mind the possible repercussions of any action which we may have in mind upon the tribes upon the Afghan side of the border and upon the interests, consequently, of the Afghan régime.

But there is today, when whole nations are ranged against one another in battle array, a bond of sympathy between us which derives from more general circumstances. Not to mention the powerful Turkish State, with which we have recently contracted an agreement indicative of our friendship and of our common interests, it is not too much to say, I think, that in this war the sympathies of the whole world of Islam are ranged on the side of the Western Allies. ("Hear, hear.") Egypt and Iraq are in alliance with us. With the ruler of Saudi-Arabia our relations could not be more friendly than in fact they are. In India the Muslims of that country, through the mouthpiece of the Muslim Prime Minister of the Punjab, have offered unconditionally their support to the Allies in this great contest. (Applause.)

This solidarity has been brought about partly by a common fear of the aggressive megalomania of the Dictators of Munich and Moscow, and partly by abhorrence of the contemptuous treatment meted out by them to the religious beliefs of other peoples; for in large parts of Asia religion is still the *summum bonum* of existence for which men are prepared cheerfully to lay down their lives. (Applause.)

I have occupied more than my five minutes. Let me therefore now ask Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who requires no introduction to an audience of this

kind, whether he would make some contribution to the discussion which I have inaugurated.

Sir MICHAEL O'Dwyer : I am sure I am expressing the feelings of this great audience when I say how much indebted we are to our lecturer. He has with wonderful skill and clearness and impartiality unravelled the tangled skein of Afghan relations with Great Britain and other parts of the world. We are glad to hear from our Chairman that the history of Afghanistan is about to appear from the pen of a man who combines distinction as an historian with unique local knowledge of Central Asia. (Applause.)

I think we are chiefly interested in Afghanistan here from the point of view of its relations with India, and those relations are determined by three factors—geography, race and religion.

In Afghanistan we find warlike races, often fiercely fanatical and living in arid surroundings. From their mountain areas they look down on the rich cities and the well-watered plains of India, inhabited by what they used to consider a soft, unwarlike race, and a race chiefly of non-believers. What would be the feelings of an Afghan of the old type, and one of a comparatively recent type, when he surveyed that position? They are crystallized in four lines :

"The mountain sheep is sweeter,
But the valley sheep is fatter.
We therefore think it meet
To carry off the latter."

That is what the Afghans had been doing for hundreds of years, from the eleventh century.

Later on, when another Afghan invader carried off the Koh-i-noor, it found its way back to the British Crown : and in the middle of the eighteenth century when Nadir Shah looted Delhi and carried away the peacock throne, twenty years later he was followed by another great Afghan conqueror who extended the boundaries of Afghanistan over practically all the Punjab and Kashmir, and in his time his followers established principalities in British India, like Cawnpore, Bhopal and others. You see, therefore, what a large part the Afghans played, in Northern India especially.

It is a trite fact that these invasions came to a halt at the end of the eighteenth century. Why? The British power arrived on the scene. Up till then no invader from Afghanistan into India ever failed. After the rise of British power, no invasion from Afghanistan ever succeeded. One only was attempted, and that was the mad enterprise of the King Amanulla to which our lecturer referred.

I was in the Punjab at the time of that invasion, and I would like to supplement what the lecturer said by a few words. In March, 1918, a great agitation, fomented by wicked propaganda, was carried on against the Government. It was headed by Mr. Gandhi, who led the civil disobedience movement. That agitation gave rise to serious outrages in Northern India. At the end of March there were serious collisions between the police and the revolutionaries at Delhi. A week later we in the Punjab found a storm had broken over us. By April 10 the tribes were in a state of open revolution,

and the revolutionaries had sent emissaries to Amanulla, asking him to come as their deliverer. He was only too ready to proclaim a *jihad*, and at once began to mass his armies against the Indian frontier.

We in the Punjab knew what was coming. We knew that if, as was intended, the Afghan invasion synchronized with our troubles in the Punjab, the trouble would be more serious. We had to act promptly and drastically. By April 25 we had the rebellion under control, and fortunately the invasion did not materialize on our frontier till a week later. Amanulla had been told that he would be welcomed in India as the liberator; instead of that he found twenty thousand men barring his approach. The Afghan armies were overwhelmed in a few weeks and driven back, and we carried war into the enemy's territory. The Amir sued for peace, and the result was the Treaty of Rawalpindi. Many people thought, and perhaps with some justice, that though we had won the war, we had lost the peace. Anyhow, Amanulla was able to claim the victory, and to erect a war memorial in which he showed a British soldier at the feet of a triumphant Afghan soldier. That triumph enabled Amanulla, in spite of his foolish and mad policy, to carry on with his mad rule for seven or eight years longer, until his own people got tired of his follies and turned him out.

After a short interregnum Nadir Shah came to the throne. After his murder he was succeeded by his son, King Zahir Shah, and today our relations with Afghanistan are most friendly and cordial. It is most important that this should be so. I do not think we realize how essential it is to have a friendly Afghanistan. We had two great crises in the last century in India, one in the Mutiny and one in the Great War. In both these crises the Afghans, in spite of many temptations to take advantage of our difficulties, were invaluable to us, and I am pretty sure that will last under the present régime. Of course, the tribal follies will still go on. The tribal leaders will still sing the old song,

"The mountain sheep is sweeter,
But the valley sheep is fatter;"

but we will be able to deal with those.

As regards the future, in this war—as our Chairman has told us—we are in a much stronger position in India than we were in the last war. Then we had a hostile Turkey, and Iran and the Arab races in a state of flux. Today we have a friendly Turkey. Every Muslim country from Istanbul to Peshawar is for us or a friendly neutral. They all know that our cause is a right one, and they are all equally determined, as we are, to resist the godless forces of aggression.

We have been told today that we have much in common with the Afghans. We have. They are delightful people to make friends with. They have a great sense of humour. Here is one instance. When the Amir was returning to Afghanistan in 1907 the Chief Commissioner gave a dinner party to him and his party. I happened to be at the party and was sitting beside the King. The Afghans love the pipes, and to do him honour we asked the pipes of the Black Watch to come and play during the dinner. They came in full strength, sixteen of them, headed by a magnificent drum

major. They went round and round the table, bursting their diaphragms almost and raising the roof. Finally, when the royal toasts were about to be proposed, they massed up behind the Amir's chair. Then to our intense relief they gradually filed out. We said, "We hope Your Majesty enjoyed the pipes. We are very proud of them." He replied, "Yes, they were splendid," and then with a twinkle in his eye he went on, "One would have been sufficient." (Laughter.) It took the Black Watch a long time to get over that. (Applause.)

Mrs. EDWARD MALAN (formerly Miss Audrey Harris): In his very interesting observations in connection with the possible invasion of Afghanistan by Russia across the Oxus, our speaker made reference to the wonderful natural protection that Kabul has in the Hindu Kush range. I cannot help just wondering whether there is not a certain amount of natural protection in the northern plain, in the great sand dunes and marshes that follow the river. It seemed to me that they would be quite impossible for any heavy transport. Of course, aircraft could fly over them, but for any big campaign it would be really impossible for wheeled traffic to pass.

We rode across about twelve miles of these sand dunes, and the horses were sinking into the soft sand at every step. I was told that the only wheeled traffic that had ever crossed the plain was a Baby Austin. The wonderful tracks that seemed to run between these extraordinary sand dunes were continually being obliterated by blowing sand. Even my military escort entirely lost the road, and we rode in the opposite direction for about three hours. Then we got on to marshy land, in which it was impossible for the horses to go more than a few feet. In the dark even the local military officer and his soldier could not find a single little track that crossed this marsh. After two or three hours we discovered a shepherd, who knew it well enough to find it in the dark. It was a single track pathway. According to the map this sand dune seems to stretch right along the river to the westward of the Afghan frontier.

Then from the Turkestan side, I do not know what facilities there are for bringing across great military necessities now. I was there at the end of 1936, and they were attempting to build a very small quay, but then there was no landing stage and only about three ferry steamers, paddle boats. The river there is full of sand shallows.

I could not help thinking, when we heard these encouraging remarks of the very friendly relations between Afghanistan and the British, that it is a pity we allow the Germans to have practically the entire monopoly of supplying the Afghans with machinery and technical experts as advisers in all their new modern concerns, which they are developing with great activity. An Afghan friend said to me, "We should like to buy our machinery from England and to have British experts here to help us, but Afghanistan is a very poor country and we simply cannot afford it." The Germans can meet them because they have their Government subsidy. In the cotton mills they were getting quotations and good samples from Germany at 12s. 6d.; similar samples from the British cost £3. They wanted to have British managers for the cotton mills they were starting. He said:

"I can get very good men from Germany for £30, whereas I should have to pay an Englishman £80."

It seems a pity not to cement these very happy relationships with Afghanistan in the way of mutual trading backwards and forwards. (Applause.)

Sir LOUIS DANE : I suppose the reason for my being asked to speak is that I was responsible for making the treaty with Amir Habibulla on March 21, 1905. It is a much disputed treaty, and it was only very painfully acquired. I was there from December till March, and at times we rejoiced in a temperature of 52 degrees of frost with a howling blizzard through the gorges of the western hills. It was almost colder than anything we have had in Europe this winter. The Amir was overcome by the cold and gout, and took to his bed. Several of our meetings were held round his bed, and it was very uncertain that he would survive. The question was, what would happen to the Mission if he did not survive. Some suggestions were made that we should depart with a suitable excuse, but I had vividly in mind the débâcle of 1842, when the people retired from Kabul in the winter, and I decided to remain where I was, because we could not get down to India, and we were far too valuable as hostages not to be well looked after, whatever happened to the Amir. Eventually the treaty was signed.

The Government of India and Lord Curzon desired that it should be a purely military treaty to arrange for the co-operation of Afghanistan and India in military matters. Lord Curzon desired that the Amir should come down to India and make a treaty there with him personally, which would be a sign to all the world of the relations between Afghanistan and the British Government. H.M. Government thought it would be quite sufficient if we renewed the arrangements we had made with Amanulla, his father. Habibulla himself said that Japan had cut off the legs of Russia, and now I was being sent by His Majesty the King to cut off the head of Russia. So altogether I think you will agree that the lot of the unfortunate envoy was not a happy one. Whatever he did, he was bound to irritate somebody. I am not sure that I did not succeed in irritating all of them.

It was quite possible I could have broken off the arrangements, or even forced Habibulla to go down to India; but, if I had, the very first time there was any trouble he would have gone against us. And so it happened.

Habibulla about that time married a lady who was a very charming person and had been educated in Dehra Dun. All went well. The father and uncle were in high favour and pressed the Indian alliance on Habibulla, and Habibulla said he would like to go down and see Lord Minto, but there was to be no business talked. If that lady had only produced an heir the whole history of Afghanistan might have been changed, but unfortunately she only had a daughter.

The fourth wife of the Amir was not of royal family. She was a very clever woman. She had a son. I am afraid I am a male Cassandra. I can always prophesy evil with the greatest success. I expressed the opinion that if Habibulla lived for another ten or twelve years an attempt would certainly be made by this lady to have her son put upon the throne in preference to the others.

One of the three men who were present just about the time that Habibulla was murdered in 1919 gave me a most graphic account of the whole proceedings. Amanulla and his mother were in Kabul, and Amanulla became Amir, and that really led to all the troubles that we have had ever since. He had to justify his position, and he did that by declaring a *jihad*.

The only thing I feel is that for nearly a hundred and fifty years we have always regarded the advance of Russia to India with feelings of considerable apprehension. It has led us to more than one war, and certainly Russia has made the most extraordinary and gigantic strides. There is no question about it, and with the railways from the Caspian to Kush, and with two broad gauge lines from the centre of Russia and Siberia, Russia is in a very much more promising position to attack India, if she wanted to do so, than she ever has been before.

It is true she is slow to move and her troops are not of the highest quality, but she has the most extraordinary capacity of persistence. You have just seen what has happened in Finland. She has waited her time. She has got back the whole of Poland that she had, and the Baltic States that she had, and I can only say I hope Sir Percy Sykes is right, but at the same time we shall do well to follow Cromwell's advice and, while trusting in Providence, to keep our powder dry.

It is quite true that at present we have this Islamic bloc of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and certain support from Arabia. As long as we can retain that we shall do well; but unfortunately sometimes, quite recently, in fact, there was a tendency to decry the Muslims and find comfort, in India at any rate, with the more numerous bodies of other religions. Some time ago I ventured to suggest that, if we could only assure the Oslo block of Scandinavian Powers and the Balkan bloc, if they would form a definite, strong offensive and defensive alliance, we would be prepared to support them; but that if they would not do so, we were not going to pull other people's chestnuts out of the fire for them. I think something ought to be done for the Islamic bloc. They ought to have a definite assurance that if they would co-operate we would support them, and then I believe we would be perfectly safe against Russia.

Lord LAMINGTON : The Secretary of State for India has mentioned various distinctions which have been gained by our lecturer this afternoon. He did not mention one—that Sir Percy Sykes has filled this hall today as I have never seen it filled before.

Our lecturer gave us a very interesting recent account of the history of Afghanistan. He said Kabul was a centre of trade. Also he said it was rather comforting that the security of Afghanistan is fairly assured, however desirous Russia may be to acquire control over that country.

Altogether we have had a very interesting afternoon, and we are very grateful to Sir Percy Sykes and also to Lord Zetland for having done so much to give us information on that very remarkable country. I now ask you to show by acclamation your appreciation of what these two gentlemen have done for us. (Applause.)

THE CAXTON HALL TRAGEDY

At a Special Meeting of the Council, held at the rooms of the East India Association on March 18, with Sir Atul Chatterjee in the Chair, the following Resolution was passed unanimously by a standing vote:

The Council hereby conveys to Lady O'Dwyer and the members of her family its profound grief at the loss they and the country sustained under such tragic circumstances on March 13. It recalls Sir Michael's long service and affection for the people of India, and in particular his signal part as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in developing India's contribution of military man-power in the last war. The Council takes pride in his long membership of the Association, and his frequent and welcome share in its discussions of current Indian problems.

Resolutions of sympathy with Lord Zetland, Lord Lamington and Sir Louis Dane, the other sufferers from the outrage perpetrated at the Meeting at the Caxton Hall on March 13, were passed. Lady Zetland, Lady Lamington and Lady Dane were included in the expressions of sympathy.

THE INDIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WAR AIMS OF THE ALLIES

By SIR ALBION BANEJI, C.S.I., C.I.E.

AFTER seven months of the war it may be that no clear conception of the Indian attitude towards the war aims of the Allies prevails not only in England and France, but also amongst the neutral countries, including the United States of America. The reason is not far to seek. We all know to what extent news was controlled and censored by the Ministry of Information during the first weeks of the war. Today the Press of the Allied countries gives little space for news from India. A good deal of attention was paid to the response from the Indian Princes and the offer of their personal services as well as the whole resources of their State for the vigorous prosecution of the war. The National Congress, through its leaders, from Mahatma Gandhi as the dictator behind the scenes, and passing on to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the lesser satellites, made important declarations and pronouncements which, owing to the great political influence of the Congress, put in the background the opinions of other parties or groups in the Indian political field.

In the first place be it remembered that the Congress, being the most highly organized political party, has the best means of propaganda. The withdrawal of the Congress Ministries in eight of the eleven British Provinces where they had majorities was a result of the inability of the Viceroy, on behalf of H.M. Government, to accede to the demands of the Congress for a specific declaration of war aims with special reference to the future of India. In respect of the latter, the Congress demanded full independence and the right to frame India's Constitution, with the aid of a Constitutional Assembly. In the end seven Provinces were left without Ministries. The Congress attitude has been expressed by its most brilliant exponent, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Soon after the outbreak of the war he sent a contribution to the *News Chronicle*, in which he wrote :

" . . . India has reacted strongly against the philosophy and methods of Fascism and Nazi aggression and brutality, and has seen in them the negation of all she stands for. World peace for India means Freedom and Democracy and the ending of the domination of one nation over another."

The *New Statesman and Nation*, in a powerful article on "India and the Test Question," soon after the Congress declaration was made, interpreted it thus :

"If the present war is for defending the *status quo*, Imperialist possessions, colonies and vested interests, then India can have nothing to do with it. If the issue, however, is democracy and a new world order, then Indian is intensely interested.

The test for Indians is simple. 'Freedom,' as they see it, is 'indivisible,' and 'India is the crux of the problem as she is the outstanding example of modern imperialism.' There follows the logical challenge :

If Britain fights for democracy then also she must necessarily end imperialism, and establish full democracy in India."

It is unnecessary to go back to the stage from which commenced the negotiations between the Viceroy on the one hand and Mr. Gandhi and the leader of the Muslims, Mr. Jinnah, on the other. It suffices to say that these negotiations have ended in a deadlock, but it is important to note that at that stage even the National Liberal Federation and the Muslim League declared the Viceroy's attitude to be unsatisfactory, as it indicated the desire to postpone the consideration of any modifications in the Constitution Act of India till after the war. Since it may be the opinion of many, especially in neutral countries as well as in Germany itself, that the Congress holds the field and represents the majority opinion in India about this matter, it will serve a very useful purpose if the attitude of other political parties and groups in India is also specifically stated.

In the Bengal Legislative Assembly early in December last a resolution was carried to the following effect :

"This Assembly associates itself with the world-wide abhorrence of the aggressive and ruthless methods pursued by the Totalitarian Governments in Europe, and declares its complete sympathy with the British Government for taking up arms against Nazi Germany in defence of democracy, and of the right of self-determination of the smaller and weaker nations. . . ."

This Assembly, therefore, authorizes the Government to assure the Government of India of its full co-operation in the successful prosecution of the war. . . ."

They added a rider that the British Government, in consonance with the aims of the present war, should grant India full Dominion Status as defined in the Statute of Westminster. It should be remembered, however, that in this Province the Muslims were in the majority.

In the same month, at the annual All-India Women's Conference, the President moved a resolution from the Chair in the following terms :

"The women of India, while dissociating themselves from the present war and unequivocally and emphatically recording their protest against all kinds of wars, should pledge their fullest co-operation to all those forces engaged in safeguarding liberty.

It was stated by Britain that the present war was being waged in the name of democracy and for the preservation of the independence of free nations. So long as there was domination and exploitation of one nation by another, there could be no enduring peace."

The next pronouncement was made later in December by the All-India Hindu Mahasabha at its twenty-first session in Calcutta. The resolution of this body on the war declared that there was ample room for whole-hearted co-operation between India and England. In order to make such co-operation effective, the British Government should, *inter alia*, introduce responsible government at the Centre, redress the grievous wrong done to Hindus by the communal award, completely Indianize the Army as early as possible, and make adequate arrangements for the training of the people in branches of the military force.

The next responsible declaration comes from the National Liberal Federation of India, and its resolution was couched in the following terms:

The Federation appealed to all Indians to give their support to the cause for which the democracies were fighting, but expressed the opinion that in order to enable India to put forth whole-hearted support, the imagination of the people should be captured by a change of attitude on the part of the British Government regarding the future of India.

In passing, I may state that the Muslim League and the Liberal Federation are groups against and outside the Congress respectively.

The All-India Muslim League, while considering the Viceroy's attitude regarding the future Constitutional advance in India as unsatisfactory, withheld co-operation in the war unless the grievances of the Muslims in the Congress-administered Provinces were investigated through a Royal Commission. The Depressed Classes as a body have whole-heartedly supported the Allied cause unconditionally.

In these past months India has been flooded with political speeches regarding the British war aims, to which the Indian publicists and politicians have linked the problem of India's future Constitutional advance within the British Empire. Only recently the Secretary of State for India, the Marquess of Zetland, made a reference to "the tyranny of phrases." A similar view was expressed by the Independent Labour M.P., Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking at Allahabad at a students' meeting on December 10. He said that talk of democracy became a mere catch phrase, and its significance differed in the mouths of different people, and added that, "to make democracy really assert itself, planned economy should be coupled with *essential freedom and liberty for the common people of the world*. There should be no personal or sectional interests." Here again, one may ask whether Sir Stafford, while condemning catch phrases, was not himself indulging in them when he talked of "planned economy." What is "planned economy" in one country may be just the opposite in another, for economic conditions in advanced countries are totally different.

from those prevailing in backward and undeveloped parts of the world. Pandit Nehru early this year in the same centre, Allahabad, from which emanates many of India's best brains, said that this war will see the end of Capitalism, and he foreshadowed some form of State control of production, transport and distribution, and he indulged in catch phrases when he concluded by saying that "there is no way out except a socialist economy."

It is refreshing, amidst the repetition of catch phrases about war aims and India, to find Dr. C. R. Reddi, Vice-Chancellor of Andhra University, discussing India's part in the war in a different way. Referring to Imperialism, as he saw it in Germany, in Russia, Britain, France, and Japan, he said, "What about India?" and asked, "Was not there Imperialism of caste over different caste? Were there not also many varieties of exploitation and exploited—the essence of Imperialism? Could real order be evolved out of so much confusion?" and concluded that "India seemed to be full of *chota* Imperialism; Muslims were afraid of Hindus and *vice versa*."

The brief survey that I have attempted to make of the reactions of India as a whole to the war situation in Europe does not help to clarify the issues plainly, and, truth to tell, all the discussions that have been going on during the past seven months in England have not, even up to this day, clarified this issue. For instance, the *Daily Herald* on February 26 published an article with the title, "What are we fighting for?" and quoted from another which said that "We were not fighting for democracy or for liberty or for any nonsense of that sort; we were fighting for England."

I say all this to show that India is not altogether to be blamed for her criticisms of the war aims of the Allies, or for demanding a more precise declaration, especially with reference to India and her future relationship with England. One thing, however, is clear, and that is, the underlying unity amongst all classes and sections in India, irrespective of race or religion, in condemning strongly the philosophy and methods of Fascism and Nazism, and India's determination to throw in all her resources for a new order. The misgivings, if any, lurking in the minds of all the groups and which are not being exploited for any political purpose, except the Congress group, are, in fact, founded on British policy pursued in the past, according to which British pledges, solemnly given, still remain to be fulfilled. The situation, therefore, can be vastly improved if, besides over and above all that the Viceroy has been able to announce on behalf of H.M. Government, that Parliament will authorize the establishment of a War Cabinet at the Centre, consisting of the representatives, firstly, of the British Administration; secondly, of the Princes; and, thirdly,

of all the political parties, including Minorities. The third group can easily be chosen by a panel from the legislatures of the different Provinces. It should be definitely stated that India will be granted full Dominion Status in a settlement of differences and after consulting all interests concerned. Such a gesture may induce Congress Ministers to resume their responsibilities and thus end the present deadlock, and also bring about unity of action and full co-operation in the present emergency. Later, further elaboration of the Constitution of India on a federal democratic basis may be carried out, but this surely cannot be done during the war.

Truth to tell, there is no working basis of unity so far as the Constitutional problem is concerned between the Hindus and Muslims. Perhaps I should qualify that statement by saying that differences are acute between the Congress Party and the Muslims, as both are bent upon laying greater emphasis on the political issues and not on the emergent situation created by the war. If undivided attention is to be paid to the vigorous prosecution of the war, all controversies about the future Constitution will have to be laid aside, and these can be brought up for final discussion at the Peace Conference. If England, therefore, declares that Indian opinion will be adequately represented at the Peace Conference, perhaps the mingling of the two issues—namely, the vigorous prosecution of the war and the Constitutional problem—may be avoided. In the other alternative, the two being linked together will, I fear, create a situation which the well-wishers of both England and India should make every endeavour to guard against.

There is, moreover, a greater chance of co-operation if the present acute economic problems of India are dealt with as a part of the war effort. India, which is prospering from Allied demands on her products and her industries, should not hesitate to employ the best foreign and Indian experts in the representative fields of war and economic activities. We have a vast number of theoretical experts in India, but practical work has yet to be developed for the increase of agricultural production, distribution of produce through shipping and railway and other transport facilities, and the organization of industries on a large scale, to give employment to the half-starved millions. If the war today is partly an economic war, without full co-operation with Great Britain, India surely will have to face within its own borders economic war between province and province, state and state. This will weaken her present economic solidarity and bring about complications with other European Powers.

INDIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE
CONFERENCE AT BIRMINGHAM UNIVERSITY
BY SIR ALFRED WATSON

[In the course of a two days' conference on "India's Place in World Affairs" at Birmingham University, Sir Alfred Watson spoke on "The Future of Indian Rule." The following article is a somewhat abbreviated report of his address.]

The subject chosen for today's conference is "The Future of Indian Rule." But before passing to it I cannot leave unchallenged the statements made by the previous speaker in defending the Congress position. What he has described as "India's enforced participation in the war is," he tells us, "totally rejected by the Indian people." It is certainly not rejected by the three Ministries in Bengal, the Punjab and in Sind. These are giving the Indian effort their full support. Without exception the Indian Princes, ruling over a quarter of India's peoples and under no obligation to proffer their services, have placed their resources at the disposal of the Government. The great Muslim community, numbering between eighty and ninety millions, has through its leaders declared its adherence to the Allied cause. Most significant of all, Sikander Hyat Khan, Premier in the Punjab and describing the Punjab as "the sword-arm of India," was first in pledging the Indians for whom he speaks to full support of Great Britain. That does not look as if India were unanimous in its opposition.

The Congress speaker has asked you to believe that at the very beginning of the war the Provincial Ministries were deprived of their powers. I answer that in the Provinces of Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, where there are Coalition Ministries, these have felt no difficulty in carrying on and no derogation of the authority they exercise. That a Central Government should assume increased control is an inescapable consequence of war. In this country not one but something like 140 Bills have been rushed through Parliament depriving the citizen of liberties he enjoys in peace, and our people have accepted that situation without complaint.

Again, we have been told that if left free the Provincial Ministries might have decided not to participate in the war. Provincial Ministries have, in fact, no voice in questions of defence, which are solely reserved to the Viceroy and will continue to be so until Dominion Status has been achieved. A contrast has been made between the submission of the issue of peace or war to the Dominion Parliaments and what is called "the arbitrary act of the Viceroy." The real difference is that the Dominions have accepted full responsibility for their own defence by land and sea. India has not. Without the British Army, which cannot be placed under Indian control, her defence by land would be inadequate; without the British Navy her five thousand miles of coast would be vulnerable to any invader.

From these matters I pass to the general indictment of British rule to which we have listened. India's systems of land tenure have been held up to scorn and it has been asserted that the one remedy is "for the people to have control." That they already have. Nobody would gather from what has been said that land and its revenue are provincial matters and have been under the control of Indian Ministers for twenty years past. In the last two years Congress Ministers have embarked on much land legislation. If things are still wrong the responsibility must rest elsewhere than upon British rule, which inherited the land systems from its Indian predecessors.

Irrigation has been described as inadequate because "the foreign investor must have his pound of flesh" and railways as unprofitable because the capitalist exacts his 5 per cent. It is true that capital for irrigation and for the railways was raised abroad when India was unable or unwilling to find the money herself. But in view of what has been said you will be surprised to know that capital for irrigation raised at 3½ per cent. has yielded about 8 per cent., and India has had the advantage of that difference. Indian railways, however financed, are not unprofitable. After the investor has taken his interest there remains a large sum for the relief of Indian taxation. And let it be remembered when there is this talk of exploitation in commercial matters that last year India, while importing thirty-five million pounds' worth of goods from us, sold to us forty-one millions pounds' value of her own products—the balance of the exchange was heavily in her favour.

Nobody disputes the serious nature of rural indebtedness in India, but when that is laid at the door of British rule the reply can only be that most rural indebtedness, sometimes passing from generation to generation, arises out of social and religious customs with which the British have been unwilling to interfere. The indebtedness is not to the Government, as might be supposed from the manner in which it has been described, but to the Indian moneylender.

I am not sure what conclusion we were expected to draw from the statistics quoted of the high birth-rates and high death-rates in India, but if increase of population be an advantage it is not easy to understand the slighting reference to an increase "of only 10 per cent. in ten years." No population of a Western country is growing at anything like that speed. Since the first census was taken India's population has increased by about eighty million people, and not the least achievement of British rule is that with that swift growth the standard of life has been maintained.

As to the complaint that defence absorbs a large proportion of the central revenues of India and keeps the country in poverty, the simple fact is that in proportion to its population and its area India spends less upon its defences than any great country in the world. Whenever India assumes responsibility for its own safety by land and sea, as it must under Independence or even Dominion Status, the military and naval budgets will become very much larger than they are today.

Turning to the real purpose of this discussion, which is the form that government is to take in India in the future, we have been told this afternoon that in spite of the emphasis laid by the British upon differences of view, there is in India a "fundamental unity at the base." That is to avoid the whole issue; it is a repetition of the claim that the voice of the Indian National Congress should be accepted as the voice of India, that the Princes do not count, and that Congress is more representative of Muslim opinion than the Muslim League itself.

Any such assertion can scarcely survive the recent correspondence between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah, for in that it is abandoned altogether. In his letter of December 19, Pandit Nehru says: "You have rightly pointed out that Congress does not represent everybody in India. Of course not. It does not represent those who disagree with it, whether they are Muslims or Hindus. In an ultimate analysis it represents its members and sympathizers. There are many, as you know, in Hindu Mahasabha, Hindus who oppose the idea of Congress representing Hindus as such. Then there are Sikhs and others who claim that they should be heard when communal matters are considered."

Pandit Nehru speaks in the same letter of "the vastness of the Congress organization." The number of its members has been claimed today as six million, and it has been stated that it has more Muslims than are en-

rolled in the Muslim League. In controversies of this nature figures of political organizations in India are apt to take on astronomical proportions which have very little relation to facts. During my own time in Bengal the number of paying members of Congress never exceeded 50,000, which is one in a thousand of the population, and I do not imagine there has been much growth since. It is sufficient to admit that Congress is the largest of the political organizations and that it holds the field in seven out of the eleven provinces. Pandit Nehru has given final quietus to the claim that it can speak for all India or is competent of itself to determine the future form of Indian government.

In the average Englishman the deadlock in Indian constitutional advance provokes a sense of bewilderment and some soreness. To those of us who have given years of our lives in an effort to reconcile the Indian and the British points of view, the situation is a deep disappointment. We believed, and not without warrant, that by the Act of 1935 India had been set fairly on the way to attain, in her own time and at her own pace, that full form of self-government within the Empire which is known as Dominion Status. Nothing that has happened in the intervening years reduces our confidence that with Indian co-operation that goal can be attained within the lifetime of the present generation.

What, then, has gone wrong? The fault is not in the Act itself. That contains every needed provision for first the setting up of a Federal Constitution which would make of India one nation, and through Federation for the ultimate surrender of all those powers of control which the British Government has hitherto exercised. Today there is no organized opinion in this country which does not look with goodwill upon political advance in India.

Where, then, are the obstacles to the smooth working of the Constitution? India is on the threshold of such complete freedom as is enjoyed by Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and she can cross that threshold whenever she settles her internal differences.

In that phrase, "whenever she can settle her internal differences," lies the whole Indian problem. Events since the passing of the 1935 Act have brought into clear outline the two main difficulties. On the one hand is the question of the terms upon which the Indian States are to come into the Federation. On the other hand is the demand by the minorities, which are not minorities in the ordinary European acceptance of the term—for the Muslims alone number more than double the inhabitants of Great Britain—that they shall have an unbreakable assurance of full equality of rights under forms of government that must be predominantly Hindu in sentiment. It serves no purpose to assert, as Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders have done, that the settlement of communal differences is not a necessary preliminary to any agreed constitution for India.

Speaking generally, the larger political parties in India have found some common ground in their objection to a Federation in which the States would be represented, not by elected delegates of their own people, but by nominees of the Princes. The point is perhaps well taken, but if India is to wait until all the States have as fully representative institutions as have been accorded to British India, then Federation will be postponed to the Greek Kalends, and the welding of India into a nation will probably not be seen in the lifetime of any statesman now living.

Meanwhile the doubts of the Princes have been quickened by the efforts of Congress to promote agitation in the Indian States. If the approach of Federation is to be heralded by convulsive political activities against the Indian rulers it is not surprising that their desire for union with the remainder of the country should become lukewarm, and that they should seriously ask themselves whether in entering a Federation which Congress

aims to dominate they will not be exchanging King Log for King Stork. This much is certain. The Princes cling resolutely to their treaties with the Crown. They are not prepared to exchange these for treaties with any Indian Government. That difficulty has to be faced and dealt with before full self-government is possible in India.

It has been asked why, if the attitude of the Princes and British obligations to them under their treaties constitute a formidable difficulty, there should not be a Federation of British India, leaving the Indian States to join it, if they so will, at some future date. There one comes to the second of the obstacles and by far the more serious. For the moment I may leave out of account the fears of the smaller minorities, and fix attention upon the resolute determination of the eighty or ninety million Muslims not to come under the rule of a Hindu Raj unless upon their own terms. To the convinced democrat it may appear right that the majority should rule and that power should be determined by a counting of votes. In that sense the Muslim is far from being democrat. That is what Mr. Jinnah means when he says that democracy is unsuited to Indian conditions, although at the same time he and all other leaders of the community are as zealous as Mr. Gandhi himself for self-government for India.

Nor can we ignore the background of the Muslim contention. For centuries they ruled India, although a minority, and ruled it by the strength of their own arms. For even more centuries the Hindu had not ruled in his own country until he was given power by the introduction of Western political institutions, including the ballot-box. And the Muslim stoutly affirms that in the brief period of Hindu, or should I say Congress, rule he has not been given a square deal.

Congress, if the truth is to be told, has not wielded power in a manner that could convince the minorities of its impartiality. In the provinces of Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, where the Muslims have a majority, the Ministries were from the beginning and have continued to be coalitions, in which the minorities had their representatives. In the eight Congress provinces, although here and there Ministers have been chosen who were not Hindus, no man was given office who was not a pledged member of Congress. "To the victor the spoils" is never likely to be a good working compromise in Indian conditions.

What, then, do the Muhammadans demand? I think it would be fair to say that the prevailing idea in the Muhammadan mind is that governments everywhere in India should be coalitions. That applies in particular to any form of Central Government that the future may bring, that Muhammadans as such should be assured of their due proportion of power. The claim extends further to holding that in every branch of administration, from the highest to the lowest, Muhammadans should have their due proportion of places.

One cannot say that the Muhammadan conviction that the triumph of the Indian Congress would mean subjection to Hindu rule is without warrant. Mr. Subhas Bose, until recently President of the Congress, has outlined what he holds should be the future form of government in India in *The Indian Struggle*. His programme involves "a strong Central Government with dictatorial powers for some years to come, government by a strong party bound together by military discipline as the only means of holding India together and preventing chaos when Indians are free and are thrown entirely on their own resources." Mr. Jinnah's answer is plain and emphatic. "We will not submit," he says.

Such in very simple outline is the Indian background to the constitutional position. Anybody who considers it will understand why the British Government was compelled to say "No" at the commencement of the war to the Congress demand that Indians in a constituent assembly should

frame their own constitution to be endorsed without question by the British Parliament. That was to take the honest course, to say, in the words of Lord Zetland, that the British connection with India has left us with obligations impossible for us to shed—obligations to the Princes, to the minorities, in particular to the depressed classes, who for centuries have been held down and denied the most elementary rights of men by their Hindu fellows.

No constituent assembly has ever evolved a constitution that has stood the test of practical working. In nearly every case such constitutions have been drowned in blood and followed by dictatorship. In India such an assembly could not be gathered together. The Princes would never submit the form of their rule to the votes of such a body. The Muhammadans have said with emphasis that if the form of the constitution is to be decided by votes in a gathering in which they would be outnumbered on every division then they will have nothing to do with the business. They would rather create their own kingdom in Northern India.

Even to talk of a constituent assembly is absurd enough when every effort of the Viceroy has failed to bring about preliminary discussions between the communal leaders. Not only is there an absence of the first point of agreement; every approach to discussion serves only to intensify the bitterness of the differences.

In the correspondence already quoted Pandit Nehru writes to Mr. Jinnah, "Now the gulf appears wider than ever. Under these circumstances I wonder what purpose can be served by our discussing with each other the problem confronting us. There must be some common ground for discussions to yield fruit." That admission gives the lie to the repeated assertion that Hindu-Muslim political differences are a figment of the imagination of the Indian Government, and would disappear if India were left to its own devices.

The stumbling-block to the acceptance of the Viceroy's offer of an immediate part in the Central Government and to the return of the Congress Ministries to the power that they have abandoned is the word "independence." It has become a shibboleth of political discussion. If by independence is meant that India should walk out of the British Empire, that the British Army should retire, that the protection of the British Navy should be withdrawn, and that the small British elements in the Services should go, then its true and inescapable meaning is that India should die a slow death, in which the elements that are now only quarrelling in words would resort to arms against each other. If independence means no more than that India should shape her own government within the British Commonwealth of Nations, then that is what every Englishman desires.

I am asked what is my own specific for the present situation. I have none that is not fully shared by the Viceroy, by the Central Indian Government and by the British Parliament. It is that Indians should resume the work of rule that they have wantonly laid aside, that they should take the proffered opportunity of sharing in the work of the Central Government, and that they should utilize the interval provided by the war for discussions, not at long range and in public, but in private conferences, for settling the differences between themselves and coming to some agreed conclusion about the wants of India as a whole. In that work they can be assured of all reasonable co-operation from the British. Aid has been proffered again and again without result.

In the meantime the Act of 1935 holds the field. It gives to Indians the largest measure of control over rule in the provinces, which deals with 90 per cent. of the things that affect the day-to-day life of the people. It provides the machinery for a Federation of all India whenever India is ready. It prepares the way for Dominion Status when India adopts the

prerequisites of that status which have been accepted without question by the other Dominions. The speed of advance and the time at which full self-government will be reached are alike in the hands of India. They can only be lessened and delayed by the efforts at this time to sand the machine.

A main purpose of this conference is to ask and answer the question whether the Indian demand for self-determination is a challenge to our war aims. I suggest that self-determination for the weaker nations has lost something of its savour with the fate of Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. It has proved a snare for those unable to defend themselves. Self-determination in the true sense of the words is given to the great Dominions of the British Empire. Any or all of them may, if they so will, contract themselves out of the Empire under the terms of the Statute of Westminster. That they do not do so, that on the contrary they freely and willingly devote the whole of their resources to what they believe to be the cause of freedom, is the surest evidence that they feel no irksome tie.

India is offered the same status when she has prepared herself for its acceptance. She may go from the British Commonwealth of Nations if her people so will. There is not the smallest danger that she will make that choice. Bereft of the sure shield of all the forces of the British Empire, charged with her own defence by sea and land, she would again fall a prey either to internal struggles or to the ambitious Powers that wait upon any evidence of the weakening of British power. Whether the virile races of the north, calling the Muhammadan peoples on their borders to their aid, again asserted dominion over the whole of India; whether Russia saw in India, as in Finland, a promising field for the spread of Communist doctrine; or whether Japan, whose publicists have for years marked out India as destined to become a Japanese sphere of influence, would seek another victim of Imperial expansion would matter little. The substantial result would be the same. India would pass out of the category of the nations that can determine their own fate. For her there is the alternate possibility of arranging by agreement among her own peoples the forms under which she will be governed. If Great Britain wins the war the pledge to India stands embodied in the Act of 1935. Should she fail to win, then the fate of India, as of all else in the Empire, will rest in other hands.

THE SOLDIERS OF INDIA ON DUTY

BY FIELD-MARSHAL LORD BIRDWOOD, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.,
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.I.E., D.S.O.

IN attempting to say something about the part now being played by the Army in India in this latest war, I know that I shall find many who from personal knowledge can underline my sentiments and endorse my appreciation. Australian contacts with India are close. Has not the "waler" been the medium of introduction of Australian horse lovers to the officers and men of the cavalry in India? Australian officers have long been seconded for service with the Indian Army. Above all, my old comrades of Anzac have no need to be told of the valour of the Indian soldier. The never-to-be-forgotten heroism of the men of the Indian Mountain Batteries, the Gurkhas and the 14th Sikhs is honoured by all who fought alongside of them on the Gallipoli peninsula. Today the Indian Army is profoundly gratified by the knowledge that, in this war, the gallant foe of those Gallipoli days is our staunch friend.

When I read of the Russian invasion of Finland and could see how strongly the Imperial ambitions of the Czars were rising in the breast of Stalin, my mind was thrown back to the years just before I entered the Indian Army, nearly fifty-five years ago, when Russia's advance to within measurable distance of the Indian border created disquietude in England and disturbed the sleep of Foreign Secretaries in Simla for several decades.

The Army in India, which embraces the British units serving in that country and the Indian Army, with strengths respectively of about 50,000 and 150,000 in peacetime, has for its main function the defence of India against outside aggression. Misunderstanding on this point leads me to the map. Of the four Army Commands in India, only one—the Southern Command at Poona—lies south of the Ganges. The other three—the Northern at Murree, the Western at Quetta, and the Eastern at Naini Tal—all have their headquarters to the north of that river. This obviously shows that the chief duty of the Army is to keep itself in readiness to repel attack on the North-West Frontier. If protection of India against internal trouble were primarily required, such an arrangement would be irrelevant.

The North-West Frontier is India's vulnerable spot. Her 3,000-mile coast line is protected by the Royal Navy, with the young Royal Indian Navy's special duties in Indian waters. Of her land frontiers of 3,000 miles the stretch from the Pamirs eastward and

south-eastward is mainly guarded by the gigantic snow curtains of the Himalayan Mountains. Directly to the east is Burma, now responsible for her own affairs. There remains the North-West Frontier, where the boundary between India and Afghanistan partly coinciding with the administrative border of British India and forming with that border, between the Zhob Valley and the Pamirs, a strip of independent tribal territory, gives continual cause for vigilance. Before the British came, the story of India was one of a succession of invasions by the Khyber Pass or its vicinity, on to the rich plains of the Punjab and beyond. Three times in her history has India's fate been determined in pitched battle near the little village of Panipat—sixty miles north of Delhi—and each time the invader won.

The British "shuttered up the north." Now, long experience of the Army in India in holding the rugged fastnesses of that difficult terrain has given India a sure shield against the aggressor. So successful has this watch and ward been, that I often think that India herself—peacefully working out her political salvation over the expanse of a vast sub-continent—does not realize its vital importance. Such vigilance is not lightly purchased. Even when the Empire is at peace British and Indian soldiers are on active service in the north-west, whether in the torrid fierce heat of the Frontier summer or in the bitter cold of its snow-capped hills in the winter.

In the problem of Frontier defence, prime preoccupation arises over the situation in that independent tribal territory—a "no man's land" where there are 500,000 fighting men, half of whom at least are armed with modern rifles. Bound together loosely by a common Pathan blood, these tribesmen are split up into clans, which owe no allegiance to any one accepted leader. Their problem is mainly economic. The country breeds faster than it can feed them. Fine warriors, they have their rough-and-ready codes of honour, but they lack nothing in resolution or ruthlessness. The maxim that to be a man one must have "begot a man and shot a man" is characteristic of their outlook.


In handling these unruly tribes the Government has a twofold policy. It establishes military posts linked up with roads in certain dominating points in the territory, and gives the tribesmen the opportunity of sharing in the policing of the country by a system of recruitment as road guardians with allowances. Order is thus maintained on lines which do not weigh too heavily upon tribal turbulency. By thus allowing the tribesmen to conduct their own affairs in their own way it is hoped to discourage them from adventures into administrative territory. The inevitable firebrand crops up, of course, for religion can quickly fan the flame of fanaticism, and then pacification has to be strengthened by puni-

TYPES OF THE INDIAN ARMY




PUNJABI (CAVALRY).

TYPES OF THE INDIAN ARMY



BALUCHI.


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DOGRA.

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TYPES OF THE INDIAN ARMY



GURKHA.


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
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LIVES OF FIVE INDIAN PRINCE



RAJPUT.

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tive action. Yet the Government recognizes the need for devising economic relief over and above subventions to the guardians of law and order. So plans for improving irrigation facilities in this mountainous country are among the measures designed to bring real peace in no man's land. The ultimate goal is to make the administrative border coincide everywhere with the true Frontier, but so long as the tribesmen feel they must always carry rifles on their backs for immediate defence and accept the obligations of the blood feud this is impracticable. The forcible disarmament of them and advance to the Durand Line, as the Frontier is called, would be an operation unjustified financially as well as morally.

Meanwhile, especially when the Empire is at war, the watch on the Frontier must be a heavy responsibility for the Army in India. Today Afghanistan, independent and a member of the League of Nations, is a true friend of Great Britain, but beyond Afghanistan lies Soviet Russia, and Russian intrigue on the Frontier, and indeed in Afghanistan itself, is a plant of long and persistent growth. In the last war Germany made pertinacious attempts to shake the then Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan from his sage policy of friendship with India. Those attempts ignominiously failed. The story cannot be too faithfully remembered.

In this task of defending India, British and Indian officers and men have a wonderful comradeship. It strikes the keynote of service in the Indian Army, and I account myself fortunate in having enjoyed its privilege ever since as a subaltern from a British Cavalry Regiment, I entered the 11th Bengal Lancers, now the 5th King Edward's Own Probyn's Horse, well over 50 years ago. My family's close association with India for nearly 150 years is a matter of great pride to me, covering as it does service in the Army as well as in the Civil Service. In writing about the Army I do not discuss politics—a soldier has no politics—but I have never permitted my military life to cut me off from study of the Indian administration. My old colleagues in the Indian Legislature will, I think, bear me out in the assertion that I have been a whole-hearted champion of India's advance toward self-government within the Empire which the Indian Army has served so gallantly—997 decorations were won by that Army in the Great War—and which has greatly benefited the moral and material progress of India. The co-operation of British and Indians in the Civil Services has been as splendid as that in the Army itself and has made notable contributions to the consolidation of Indian policy, for the good of the many peoples of that country.

The Army side of Indian life is naturally most, indeed I may say very, familiar to me. In some ways the British officer in that Army sees India at her best. He enjoys the companionship in war, in sport, in the countryside of Indian comrades, who, by

tradition, temperament, and family ties are bound whole-heartedly to the service of the King-Emperor under the Commander-in-Chief. As Commander-in-Chief myself I knew how much that meant. Drawn from martial classes, mostly of peasant stock, the men of the Indian Army are of the finest type which India produces. For them the duty of defending the community with the sword is paramount. They are no mere swashbucklers. Underlying their martial spirit is the thrift and domesticity of the yeoman or peasant. When the Indian soldier goes on service, whether in wartime or on garrison duty overseas, the manner in which he remits substantial sums of money to his people at home is an object-lesson in conjugal or filial piety. It explains, too, the traditions which bring recruits to the Army to the third and fourth generation.

The relations between the officer of the Indian Army and his men are intimate and really healthy. In themselves they greatly strengthen the ties which bind the people to the Government. They create friendships which persist throughout a lifetime and even for many generations. Today I have the honour to be Colonel of the regiment which I first joined as a subaltern. My son is a serving officer of that regiment. So the tale proceeds. Somehow I feel that it will continue to proceed; for whatever changes occur, the virility, sense of fair play and chivalrous honour of the Indian soldier must play their full part in the development of India's nationhood. They are alert today when India hears the call to defend mankind against oppression and arrogant dominance.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE AND THE WAR

By J. L. GHEERBRANDT

(Director of the Institut Colonial Français)

THE building of the French Colonial Empire was for many years much more the result of individual initiative than of a united and well-defined desire of the nation. French "Colonial Policy" in its early stages often ignored those who were setting out to plant the flag in new territory, or only gave them meagre support. It sometimes came about that their deeds of prowess were admired abroad before they were recognized or rewarded by their own countrymen. French colonial conquests date mainly from after our defeat in 1870, and the Third Republic, therefore, had less than fifty years in which to acquire some of the most beautiful areas in the world, and from them to create a France twenty-two times greater than before.

After 1815 only a million square kilometres remained in our possession. If it was the Monarchy which in 1830 first gained a footing in Algeria, it was the Republic which, no sooner than it had freed the territory occupied in 1870-71, took Tunis under her protection, as well as Annam and Tonkin, then Laos and Cambodia. As early as 1887 it established the Union of Indo-China. Dahomey became French in 1893, Madagascar in 1894-98, West Africa in 1904. In 1910 Brazza gave us Equatorial Africa. Lyautey with Morocco, in 1912, completed our North African trinity. Lastly, the war of 1914 gave us the mandates of the Cameroons, Togoland, and Syria.

The conquest of these lands was succeeded by a policy of social and administrative organization which was to pave the way for our first efforts at economic development. As in the case of the conquests of the early period, the efforts made in this new field were once again the result of individual initiative. A comparatively small number of pioneers took part in them, and during this phase of "clearing," so to speak, private interests sometimes took first place before national interests. French capital was not invested on a large scale in overseas undertakings. France, however, put approximately 50 to 60 milliards of francs into her colonies—perhaps more, as it is difficult to arrive at an exact figure. We feel that we are not lessening the importance of this sum by comparing it with the total investments made by Great Britain in her overseas possessions, which may be estimated at some 3 or

4 hundred milliards, allowance being made for the difference in wealth, territorial strength, and the period of time.

Apart from the old colonies which have formed part of our Empire for over three hundred years—the West Indies, Guiana, and Réunion—and from Algeria, which has been French for 110 years, our present Colonial Empire really dates from the last fifty years, thirty in the case of Morocco, twenty for the Cameroons and Togoland. This explains, to a certain extent, the lack of any defined doctrine for the use of those who worked or wanted to work in the colonies. Our first Imperial Conference was held only a few years ago, and 1938 found us still in the midst of preparing that co-ordination of the effort of the Metropolis and the possessions overseas, that integration of home and colonial economy which, together with the political solidarity of nations, goes to make up what we call an "Empire."

This very youth, however, is a source of undoubted dynamism. It explains the rapidly achieved progress, for example, in Morocco, for which the German author Sieburg, before the war, publicly expressed his sincere admiration; or the results obtained from our management of the African mandates, which won the favourable opinion of the League of Nations. Thus, in spite of its youth, our Colonial Empire already brings an important and ever-growing contribution to our national capital equipment and commercial balance. To this must be added the human potential of the population which is continuously developing, and which constitutes the most reliable factor of material prosperity.

In referring to the share that this young Empire was able twenty years ago to take in the war of 1914-1918, Marshal Lyautey declared: "Our colonial campaigns have tempered the steel of victory." The phrase should not be taken in its strictly military sense; it refers to the total contribution of the Empire during the four years of the war, from the leaders whose experience had been derived from the colonial wars, and their Imperial troops of soldiers, sailors, and airmen, to the great volume of produce and monetary gifts which came to us from the four corners of the earth.

Let us gauge, with the aid of some figures, the scale of economic resources that our Empire brings to our war effort. Raw materials were sent to France by her overseas possessions in 1937-38 to the value of nearly 9 milliards and a half francs. Of the 46 milliards of francs' worth of goods which the Mother Country had to acquire in 1938 to meet the requirements of the nation, about 22 milliards and a half were supplied by the Empire. Three million tons of textiles, iron, and coal, and 900,000 tons of oil-producing products were supplied to our



MADAGASCAR.

TYPES OF FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY.

By courtesy of the *Monde Colonial Illustré*.



SENEGAL.

TYPES OF FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY.

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SAHARA.

TYPES OF FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY.



INDOCHINA.

TYPES OF FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY.

By courtesy of the *Monde Colonial Illustré*.

industry. The present proportion of these products to our total imports is as follows:

	<i>Per Cent.</i>
Bananas, rum, and brandy	... 100
Vanilla	... 99
Pepper	... 98
Wine	... 97
Rice and phosphates	... 93
Sugar	... 89
Cocoa and cereals	... 84
Oils	... 70
Meat and tinned meats	... 68
Tartaric acid	... 62
Oil-producing seeds and fruits	... 54
Tea and coffee	... 20
Rubber	... 19

(As regards rubber, our total overseas production will exceed in 1939 the tonnage consumed by the Metropolis.)

The share of our Colonial Empire in our foreign trade amounts to nearly 2 milliard francs in exports abroad. It contributes 12 to 13 million tons of freight to our armaments in imports and exports, and the local tourist industry, salaries, pensions, interest, and liquidation of the compulsory loans recovered or distributed in the Metropolis bring in milliards to the credit of the franc.

It may be recalled here that, following on the recent friendly monetary agreement concluded between Great Britain and France, the franc is now an Imperial currency. The fate of the franc is linked with the future of the Empire to such an extent that the Indo-Chinese piastre, for example, has been called "the crutch of the franc." The financial contribution of our possessions overseas in 1914-1918, mentioned above, shows how deeply the inhabitants of the colonies were aware of this reality. Recently they gave their money beyond the demands put forward by our Minister for the Colonies, at the time of the issue of local loans instituted to meet the expenses of the material equipment and armament of our Colonial Empire. Thus, invited to subscribe 33 million piastres—330 million francs—Indo-China subscribed 44 millions in a few weeks—440 million francs.

This contribution by our overseas possessions will, during the present war, considerably exceed the records of the past, which are as yet far from corresponding to the potentialities of our colonies.

Money, food products and raw materials, certain manufactured articles also—for some of our overseas provinces are becoming

industrialized—will be placed by our colonial populations in ever-increasing quantities at the disposal of the Mother Country. They are not only confident in the stability of the currency and Imperial economy, but they also feel themselves a part of the nation of the "Rights of Man." They call themselves, in the words of the old Gaelic expression of the Highlanders of Scotland, "*les enfants du baudrier.*" Proof of this is furnished by the innumerable volunteers who join up to serve with the Colours. We cannot even in the present emergency accept them all, for some must be kept for work in their own country, in tilling the soil and work underground. But these voluntary enlistments are the best reply to the lying charges brought against us and against Great Britain.

Montchrétien wrote: "*Il n'est de richesses que d'hommes.*" France has realized this truth, and has left nothing undone which might increase the wealth which in this respect she owes to her Colonial Empire.

The population of our overseas possessions actually numbers 72,000,000; it will soon reach 80,000,000, thus raising the total population of France to 120,000,000. Seven million today live in Algeria, which only supported a million in 1830; the population of Tunis has doubled. Everywhere the numbers of births increase from year to year in such a way that the colonial contingents which came in 1914-1918 to fight at our side could be doubled tomorrow.

The value of these troops, which have grown up under our care, whether they be the soldiers trained in our discipline and our schools, or the officers to whom we have entrusted well-deserved commands, proves them every day more worthy of our respect and our affection. They are fully conscious of the greatness of the struggle which has to be faced by the Imperial front of France and Great Britain. There is nothing that they do not realize of what would be the fate reserved for them under German domination and the cruelty of German exploiters and oppressors. Their will to win and their willingness to sacrifice everything they possess in the common cause spring from the fact that they feel themselves today the champions of the freedom and peace of the world. Such men, with all the moral and material energy of such an Empire, allied to that of the British Empire, are destined, as Paul Reynaud has said, to give us the victory of the strongest as well as the triumph of Right.

THE EASTERN QUESTION

BY BURHAN BELGE

(Chief Counsellor, The Press Department, Ministry of the
Interior, Ankara)

THERE have been at least two causes of discord among nations: their desire to control the sources of the world's riches, and the continual raising of the question of colonies in the hope of discovering a new formula for their distribution. If these elements have tended to mar agreement between certain European States, then a factor which has intensified these disagreements, and at times provoked those States even to resort to arms, has been, for over a century and a half, the famous Eastern Question.

The Eastern Question has two characteristics. The first is that that part of the world referred to by the term "the Near East," or, better, "Near Asia," consists of countries rich enough to arouse the economic ambitions of certain European Powers, and weak enough to arouse their political ambitions.

The second characteristic is that the countries situated in the area termed Near East are situated on both the sea and land routes leading to Europe's "World of Colonies."

Both these characteristics were features of the old Ottoman Empire, which suffered on account of them.

The ideal of national independence, so much to the fore in the first half of the nineteenth century, paved the way for the conditions which led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as, indeed, they have done in every other mixed community. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and of Tsarist Russia saw the danger earlier than did the Ottoman rulers. At a time when the Eastern Question was just coming to the fore, Metternich, in particular, took the stage as the greatest and most bitter antagonist of a French Revolution which appeared to sow the seeds of nationalistic ideas, and devoted his life to stamping out the claims of nationalism.

But neither Metternich nor those who followed him were successful. The Ottoman Empire, crumbling bit by bit, finally disappeared after the Great War. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was fortunate enough to meet a quicker and less painful end.

The fate of the Ottoman Empire, however, did not in itself suffice to remove the geo-political peculiarities mentioned above. It is true that several independent States appeared in the Balkans,

and it is also true that Arabia witnessed the birth of Arab States of various forms. Turkey herself, deprived of her foreign minorities in Arabia as well as in Roumelia, became a national State inhabited by Turks alone. But Near Asia, the cradle of all these States, continued, as though nothing had happened and nothing were changed, to attract the economic and political ambition of the same European Powers, and to contain the same land and sea routes leading to the same World of Colonies.

It is evident, therefore, that while the fall of the Ottoman Empire helped the several national sections of which it was composed to attain the status of independent nations, it failed to put an end to the ambitions of the Great States which surrounded it, nor did it alter or efface the routes leading to the World of Colonies. This is why the eyes of such among these Great States as cannot secure other communications and achieve other non-European interests are continually attracted by the geography of Near Asia, which is so placed as to afford them a right of way. Their one desire is to travel along these routes and, in order to do so, to seize, one by one, the gates which bar the passage.

In order to accomplish this, pretexts must be found for treading underfoot independent nations situated on the southern bank of the Danube or on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, even as far as the Red Sea. Moreover, denial must first be made of the very principle of Nationalism, which was one of the most powerful forces of the nineteenth century. In the light of these facts, recent events in Central Europe and the pressure which has, for years past, been brought to bear on the Balkans clearly prove that those who are without apprehensions can be conspicuous only by their absence.

The whole Eastern Question originated in the failing power of the Ottoman Empire and continued until its demise, leaving no unchallenged heir to its political and economic heritage. The collapse of the Empire led to the formation of a well-defined area in Near Asia which its neighbours chose to consider ownerless, and political currents originating in Europe have sometimes taken the form of veritable torrents threatening to engulf this ownerless area.

The hub of Near Asia is Turkey, and it is surprising to note that neither the appearance of men of the calibre of Atatürk and İnönü, nor countless steps forward in the fields of culture during fifteen years of active progress and achievement, have sufficed to convince certain European statesmen that this area is no longer so "ownerless" as they believed it to be. Similarly, it was not so much the apparent reluctance of the Balkans to unite as the efforts of Great Powers to draw one or other of the Balkan States into their own orbit which delayed the birth of a Balkan Entente

and all that it stands for. It is on this account that the new Ankara Pact is especially important, and it is from this point of view that it should be examined.

Ever since the birth of an Eastern Question there has been need of a strong political combination in Near Asia. The real and obvious reason why European States have never succeeded in bringing about inter-continental understanding and unity has been the continued weakness of Near Asia, lying as it does across the road to colonial conquests. Just as negligence and failure to adopt proper precautionary measures encourage every sort of aggressive design, so a weak Near Asia and the roads which lead to conquest might be taken by force.

It is obvious that, should Near Asia become the nucleus of a strong political combination of nations, the dream of marching across this part of the globe in order to seek new worlds to conquer will fade away of itself. All European States, big or small, including those of Northern Europe and Scandinavia, will then accustom themselves to thinking in terms of inter-continental relationship.

In our opinion, the main cause of the disasters from which Europe has suffered during the past century lies in the state of affairs known as the Eastern Question—that is, the general economic and political weakness of Near Asia.

From this point of view a powerful Turkey is an essential condition of an harmonious Near Asiatic system. Because of the Straits and of Turkey's frontiers in the east, south-east, and south, Anatolia has been from time immemorial the corner-stone of the Near Asiatic problem. The signing of the Ankara Pact was merely the strengthening of this corner-stone and a first step towards the powerful Near Asiatic combination of tomorrow.

If a full understanding of the reasons which drew both the Balkans and the Saadabad States (Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan) into association with Turkey, which lies between them, can be borne in upon the minds of the intelligentsia and the statesmen of the countries concerned, so as gradually to affect their actions appreciably, then the whole of Near Asia will become a contented and prosperous community, inhabited by nations on terms of friendship, trust, and collaboration with one another. The very existence in the world of such a community will bring peace and quiet to at least three continents, and will prove a sure obstacle to the recurrence of the disease from which Darius and Alexander suffered.

SOME ASPECTS OF CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

By DR. W. W. YEN

This authoritative record of Sino-Soviet relations by the late Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. is based on an address delivered by him recently to the Foreign Policy Association in Philadelphia.

CHINA and Russia, with a boundary coterminous for over four thousand miles, have had a colourful and eventful history in their dealings with one another. The two countries were first brought into contact by the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century. Some of the effects of this Asiatic domination can still be seen today in the life and habits of the Russian people, as well as in the historical relics existent in Russia. The Mongolian conquest was short-lived. It was followed by the extension of Russia's influence and domination across northern Asia, from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific, in search of an ice-free port in the Far East. In this process the Russians came into conflict with our people, and on September 9, 1689, was concluded the Treaty of Nertchinsk, the first international engagement entered into by the Celestial Empire with a foreign Power, on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

After the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Russia increased her influence in northern Manchuria, and in 1896 in the Li-Lobanoff treaty she secured from China the right to build a railway (the Chinese Eastern Railway) across that province from west to east, as well as entering into a definite military alliance with China which was to operate in case of an aggression directed by Japan against Russian territory in eastern Asia, or against the territory of China or of Korea. This treaty, however, died almost as soon as it was born.

In the lease by Russia in 1898 of the Liaotung Peninsula, with the avowed objects of "still further strengthening the friendly relations between the two Empires and mutually wishing to ensure the means whereby to show reciprocal support," Russia was on the verge of realizing her dream of an Asiatic Empire with an unfrozen port on the Pacific coast. But the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 frustrated Russia's ambition in this direction, and by the Treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the war, Russia was obliged to transfer the lease of Port Arthur and adjacent territory to Japan.

At that moment two courses seemed open to Russia in shaping her Far Eastern policy. She might align herself with China

against Japan, or she might ally with Japan for the division of Chinese spoils. Of the two alternatives she chose the latter, and from 1907 to 1916 Russia and Japan entered into four secret treaties, the earlier ones providing for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in China, and the last treaty, that of 1916, providing for a military alliance between Russia and Japan, to the effect that it was vital to the interests of the two Parties that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan, and that should this threaten, the two Parties would agree upon the measures to be taken to prevent such a situation from being brought about. Thus forgetting the war which ended in the Portsmouth Treaty, Russia and Japan, in view of their supposedly common interests, thought it feasible to set aside their old enmities and become fast friends, working hand in glove for their share in the division of China into spheres of influence. Destiny, however, frustrated their malevolent schemes, and the 1917 revolution in Russia tore the secret treaties to pieces and nullified a decade's work of unholy diplomacy.

With the advent of the Soviet régime, it would seem that a new chapter in the relations between China and Russia began. Contrary to all expectations, and breaking well-nigh half a century-old diplomacy, the Russian Soviets in their first and second declarations of 1919 and 1920 announced:

"The Government of Workers and Peasants declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China, and restores to China without any compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie."

This opened the way for formal negotiations, which resulted in the conclusion, on May 31, 1924, of the Agreement of General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This Agreement has been and remains the basis upon which the new and present relations between China and the Soviet Union rest.

Notwithstanding the agreement reached in 1924, disputes arose between China and Soviet Russia with regard to their respective rights and interests in the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The matter came to a head in July, 1929, and diplomatic relations were severed. Failure to bring about a peaceful settlement brought the two countries to the brink of war. Hostilities on a comparatively limited scale took place in North Manchuria and continued for a time. Peace was restored on December 3, 1929, and an honourable settlement was reached in the signature of the Harbarovsk Protocol by which the management of the railway returned to the *status quo ante*, and the outstanding

questions were to be settled at the forthcoming Sino-Soviet Conference to be convened.

This Conference never met. Meanwhile, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria completely altered the character of the usefulness of the railway as a commercial enterprise, for which it was intended. With the extension of Japanese military activities to northern Manchuria, thus drawing Soviet interests directly into the orbit of war, disputes arose between the two regarding abuses of railway employees, forced use of the railway for military purposes, seizure of the rolling stock, etc.—disputes which threatened to lead Soviet Russia into an armed conflict with Japan. As a solution of this problem, the Soviet Government in May, 1933, proposed to Japan the sale of the railway. After some negotiations the deal was completed in March, 1935, and for a paltry sum of 170,000,000 yen the railway was sold to the Japanese puppets, the Manchurian authorities.

As the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway affected China's interests in the line, the Chinese Government, when negotiations were in progress as well as after their conclusion, was constrained to protest in the most solemn terms that the sale was in complete contravention of the provisions of the agreement reached in 1924, and that, as it was contracted without China's consent, it would not be regarded by the Chinese Government as valid.

Aside from Manchuria, Outer Mongolia has had a long history of special relations with the Russians. These relations have been greatly accentuated by the incursion of Japanese military forces into North China. Economic considerations apart, Outer Mongolia holds an important strategic position in the event of hostilities between the Soviet Union and Japan. A glance at the map shows that if the Japanese had control of Urga, now Ulan-Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, they would have at their mercy the Lake Baikal region, the occupation of which would minimize the importance of the formidable Soviet military concentrations in the Maritime Provinces. It is very likely the intention to forestall a possible Japanese attack against this vulnerable point and upon this the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in respect of Outer Mongolia has been based. From the Russian standpoint, Outer Mongolia must, under present circumstances, be kept intact as a buffer State. Soviet Russia is determined, therefore, to render assistance to Outer Mongolia in the event of an attack upon its territory by Japan, hence the Soviet-Outer Mongolian Protocol of Mutual Assistance which was signed on March 12, 1936, at Ulan-Bator.

China naturally objected to the signing of this pact, inasmuch as Soviet Russia, in the agreement of 1924, recognized Outer Mongolia as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, and undertook

to respect the sovereignty of China over it. The Chinese Government protested against the conclusion of the Protocol accordingly, and averred that it would consider the act as illegal and could under no circumstances recognize such a Protocol, or be bound in any way by it.

The Soviet Government, on the other hand, maintained that neither the fact of the signing of the protocol, nor the individual articles in it, in the slightest degree violated the sovereignty of China, and that in signing the instrument the Soviet Union proceeded on the basis that the Soviet-Chinese agreement signed in Peking in 1924 had suffered no change and retained its force. Thus, juridically speaking, Outer Mongolia is still an integral part of China and recognized as such by the Soviet Government.

Another of China's frontier territories to be considered is Sinkiang. Owing to its proximity to Soviet territory, Sinkiang naturally gravitates towards Russia. Soviet geographical advantage is enhanced by the many facilities for motor access, and by the completion of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway in 1930, which has brought the Russians to within a few score miles of the western frontier of Sinkiang, as against some 1,600 miles to rail-head in China. However, with the Sino-Japanese War receding more and more into the interior, and with the development of better and improved means of communication, Sinkiang has been brought closer to the Chinese political centre of gravity. It serves as a link between Soviet Russia and China. Supplies of arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union have been transported on the highway from Sinkiang to Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, and from thence to all points in the north and south-west of China. An airway extending from Urumtsi in Sinkiang to China and the Soviet Union has been in operation. It is also said that parallel to the Sinkiang highway is a railway roadbed, awaiting only the placing of rails and sleepers to make it complete. Sinkiang is destined, therefore, to play a vital part in the relations between China and the Soviet Union.

The relations between China and the Soviet Union before the outbreak of the present hostilities with Japan might and could have been strengthened. There has been a certain amount of misunderstanding, suspicions and misgiving on the part of one toward the other. But the Japanese invasion of China has brought out the fact that the two countries have many interests in common, and that it is to their advantage that the menace of Japan should be curbed. Soviet-Chinese relations have definitely improved because of the war.

According to the press, shortly before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, M. Bogomoloff, the Soviet Ambassador in China, when he returned to his post from home leave on April 1,

1937, brought with him three proposals from Moscow to the effect that (1) China should take the initiative in proposing a Pacific Peace Conference; (2) China and Soviet Russia should enter into a non-aggression pact; and (3) China and Russia should sign a Mutual Assistance Pact.

The first proposal, it has been reported, was not regarded as practical by the Chinese Government, owing to the probable refusal of Japan to participate. With regard to the Non-Aggression Pact, the proposals which had been made in 1933, when I was Ambassador in Moscow, were re-studied and its conclusion was expedited, due to the outbreak of hostilities in North China. Negotiations for a pact of Mutual Assistance did not materialize in an agreement, if they were begun at all. In view of the tenseness of Sino-Japanese relations at the time, responsible Chinese political circles did not regard, perhaps, such a military understanding as expedient, in view of the desire on the part of China to maintain peaceful relations as long as possible with Japan. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility, however, to suppose that the Japanese must have got wind of the Soviet offer, and that hostilities were precipitated by them—not appreciating China's determination to maintain friendly relations.

Nevertheless, as has been indicated, a Treaty of Non-Aggression was concluded on August 21, 1937, between China and the Soviet Union, by which, among other things, the two parties undertook to refrain from any aggression against each other, either individually or jointly with one or more other Powers. It also provided that in the event of one of the contracting parties being subjected to aggression on the part of one or more third Powers, the other contracting party obligated itself not to render assistance of any kind, either directly or indirectly, to such third Power or Powers at any time during the conflict, and also to refrain from taking any action, or entering into any agreement, which might be used by the aggressor or aggressors to the disadvantage of the party subject to aggression.

Soviet Russia has rendered, perhaps more than any other Power, material aid to China, in the form of arms, ammunition and planes in the latter's resistance against Japanese aggression. At the same time, Soviet trade with Japan has fallen off considerably. Statistics show that in 1936 the Soviet Union was the source of 2·2 per cent. of Japan's imports essential for war purposes, largely pig iron, and in the years following no imports of war materials are recorded in the customs returns.

The latest manifestation of Soviet assistance to China is the new commercial agreement which was signed on June 25, 1939. Although its terms were not made public, it is generally supposed that it includes provision of Soviet credits to China to facilitate

expansion of Chinese purchases of war materials through credit or barter. Soviet Russia's assistance to China will continue, therefore, notwithstanding speculation to the contrary.

It is safe to say that so long as Japan pursues her aggressive military policies in eastern Asia, China and Russia will have a common interest in opposing them.

This leads me to the subject of Communism, which requires examination and elucidation, if anything like an adequate picture is to be drawn of the relations between China and the Soviet Union.

What in China is termed Communism exists on a comparatively small scale. That the growth of this Communism has been partly due to Russian influence is certain, but Chinese Communism, in its economic and social philosophy as well as in its political implications, is by no means the same as Soviet Communism.

The Russian Communistic influence in China can be traced back to the time of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the movement which led to the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Dr. Sun was not a Marxist. Indeed, he strongly attacked the theories of Marx. He did not accept Marx's doctrines of historical materialism or his theory of class-war which furnished the foundation of his social philosophy. However, in the third of Dr. Sun's "Three Principles," which, he declared, stated the aims of revolutionary effort, there was presented a basis for a certain amount of co-operation between the Communists of Russia and Dr. Sun's own followers. Dr. Sun's three great principles, it will be remembered, relate to "Nationalism," that is, to the securing and maintaining of the sovereignty of China and the political unity of her people; to "Democracy," that is, the establishment of a Government which should be by the people; and, thirdly, to "General Welfare," or, as Dr. Sun termed it, to the people's livelihood. Under this third principle, Dr. Sun had in mind the same economic and cultural welfare of the people or proletariat which the Soviet Communists were also seeking to realize. In this common effort Dr. Sun welcomed the advice and aid of the Russian Communists.

However, both he and the Russian leaders with whom he came into contact recognized that it was not feasible or desirable that the Russian and Chinese Communists should proceed along the same lines and by identical methods. This was shown in a formal statement jointly made on January 20, 1923, by Dr. Sun and Mr. Joffe, the Soviet Representative in China. The most important paragraph of the statement reads:

"Dr. Sun Yat Sen holds that the Communist order, or even the Soviet system, cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the

opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence; and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia."

I have not the time to trace the interplay in China of the Russian and Chinese political and economic views, and, therefore, shall have to content myself with simply referring to the fact that, while for a time there was union and co-operation between the right and left wings of the Nationalist Party in China which had come into existence under the leadership of General Chiang Kai Shek, the left wing representing the more Radical and Communistic elements, friction later developed between the two wings which led to open conflict and finally to the expulsion of the so-called Communists from the Nationalist Party. Consequent upon this, a warfare developed between the Communists and the Nationalists, which was carried on for a number of years and on a very considerable scale, and finally resulted in the Communist forces consolidating themselves in the north-west and leaving the Nationalist forces in possession and control of all other parts of China.

In 1931 Japan began her military invasion of China, first in Manchuria then in North China south of the Great Wall, then at Shanghai, and finally south of the Yellow and Yangtse rivers. This invasion aroused the intense indignation of the Communists as much as it did that of the Nationalists under General Chiang Kai Shek, with the result that since the end of 1937 the Nationalists and Communists have united their efforts to expel the Japanese forces from their common country. To make this union possible, the Chinese Communists have agreed to abandon certain of their more extreme practices and policies, and in return have been received into the Nationalist Party, and their troops incorporated integrally into the armies of the National Government of China.

As may be gathered from what I have already said, though terming themselves Communists, the Chinese Communists by no means have accepted all the ideological doctrines and practices of the Russian Communists. In fact, they constitute what, in America, would be termed a radical social reform party or agrarian reform party. The Lytton Report, speaking of the programme of the Chinese Communists, says that it consists "in the cancellation of debts, the distribution among the landless proletarians and small farmers of lands forcibly seized, either from large private owners or from religious institutions and churches. Taxation is simplified; the peasants have to contribute a certain part of the produce of their lands. With a view to the improvement of agriculture, steps are taken to develop irrigation, rural

credit systems and co-operatives. Public schools, hospitals and dispensaries may also be established."

When, in 1937, these Communists reunited with the Nationalists of China under the leadership of General Chiang Kai Shek, they pledged themselves to abandon the practice of expropriating lands, to abolish certain types of Soviet organization which had vested the political power in the poorest classes, and to establish a "capitalist-democratic" Government, with equal opportunities open to all classes of the people.

Lastly, a few words in respect to recent reports, the sources of which are obvious, of serious dissensions existent between the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist Party. That these are malicious fabrications aimed at disrupting China's united front and undermining the relations between China and the friendly nations, has now been proved by a statement made public by the Chinese Communist Party, itself, to that effect. The united front will remain as long as the war. Of this there is no doubt. What will be the final amalgam of the Chinese Nationalist and Communist ideologies after the war cannot now be predicted. But one thing is sure—namely, that after the termination of hostilities, public opinion in China will be so strong against recrudescence of internal strife that some working arrangement will be reached between the ruling Kuomintang and the minor parties.

NEW ROUTES INTO OLD CHINA

By W. A. FARMER

(An Australian war correspondent who travelled some 14,000 miles in China, covering the Sino-Japanese War onwards from the first shot in Shanghai to last autumn)

IN Bombay recently I met a couple of friends savouring the spices of life east of Suez at that tremendous rate peculiar to people born in Australia and other young countries. They fired questions at me like bullets, and in a Morse code manner of speech told me they had hoped to do China and India in a month, making up for time lost in the cities by using the skyways of travel which now link all big cities in the East. They told me their only sorrow was that they had seen no more of China than Hong-Kong because of the Sino-Japanese War.

Before I regained my breath they were on their way. I tried to shout to them that China was still an open book for tourists and business people, but they were moving like greyhounds through the crowded street, their minds on the impending aerial dash to Calcutta.

I asked Bombay friends about China and received much the same answer. They thought that since the Japanese had blockaded the whole coastline it was now impossible to get into the country. They had forgotten that highly developed French Indo-China flanks the south-western boundaries of China, and were unaware of the immense development in those Chinese areas over the past three years.

Actually I was well able to disillusion them, because within the previous few months I had made one perfectly delightful trip out of China via French Indo-China and a not so pleasant return journey into China by running the Japanese blockade into one of the little ports near Shanghai and then sneaking through the guerilla lines. But the second trip is not recommended unless the traveller has the same zest for excitement as the late Richard Haliburton.

There are still four perfectly simple ways of journeying to the huge and vivid area of Western China, where the flag of the Chinese Republic flies unruffled save for the draught from an occasional bomb. Nearest to England is, of course, the famous "Road above the Clouds," as the Chinese are wont to call the Burma highway. It is not, by-the-by, generally known how thoroughly international is that famous road. From Kunming

(or Yunnanfu), the main roadhead in South-Western China, it continues its mountainous way 750 miles to Chungking, China's war-time capital; runs through the marvellously fertile Szechuan plains for another 400 miles to Chengtu, dubbed the Peiping of West China because of its antiquity and beauty; and then wanders off almost 3,000 miles to Russia via Lanchow, the old Mongol capital, and that amazing place Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang), which is more frequently known as China's ethnological museum. If ever universal peace returns to this world, it will be possible for a London motorist to drive clean around Europe and Asia, thanks to the building of the Road above the Clouds and the Route Rouge to Russia. What an adventure!

For the motoring enthusiast who would like to see the immortal Angkor ruins and get in some big-game hunting, the ideal route to China is by boat to Saigon and then the 2,500-kilometre Route Mandarin up to French Indo-China. The way into China for the man in an awful hurry is by aeroplane. I wonder if it is generally known that far-away Chungking, which is much closer to Thibet than to Shanghai, is still connected by direct air routes to America, Europe, and Australia. The air trip from Hong-Kong is a most vivid experience. A hotel boy wakes the traveller at 2 a.m. with early morning tea. An hour later a big Douglas plane operated by an American pilot lifts him from Kai Tek aerodrome in Kowloon, and shortly after 9 a.m. he is having breakfast in Chungking, which is nearly a thousand miles away. The early morning flight is due to the fact that the first part of the trip is made over territory now patrolled by an air force which once made the unfortunate error of shooting down a commercial plane in mistake for a rival bomber. Though passenger planes have now been removed from the aerial big-game list in the Far East, travellers have been known to jump nearly out of the cabin as their sleep-bemused eyes suddenly spotted a dead fly stuck on a window in almost perfect imitation of a distant pursuit plane. It is much more costly to get into China by aeroplane than to get out. For, owing to the collapse of the Chinese dollar, which has dropped from about 16.2 to the pound sterling to about 50, it costs about £20 or thereabouts to fly to Chungking, and only about £8 (Ch.N.C. 400) to return.

There still remains the most picturesque and pleasant route into China, via the French Indo-China Railway, or, to be correct, Compagnie Française des Chemins de Fer de l'Indochine et du Yunnan. This is the route for opening one's eyes to the remarkable colonizing abilities of the French. The southern railhead of the line is at Haiphong, the little port that became one of the busiest trading centres in the Far East when Canton was barred to international shipping in October, 1938. It is two and a half

days' voyage from Hong-Kong, and is a short and pleasant trip from Singapore. It is the main port of a French colonial possession considerably larger than its mother country. Its old, yellow buildings hold unquestionably the best bronze work in the Far East, and its pavement artists are beyond compare in the skilful fashioning of tortoise-shell. The streets are thronged with Annamites. The men are inordinately lazy and the young women are unquestionably lovely. They have the Paris pout and the real carriage of the Chinese dancing-girl combined with the gracious walk of the Indian. When they laugh their beauty vanishes. They chew the betel-nut; opened lips disclose mouths like black caverns. This, of course, does not apply to the better-class Annamites, who are most highly cultured and artistic. But let us not tarry in Haiphong, for the main interest lies ahead.

From Haiphong to Hanoi, the capital of French Indo-China, is two hours by train, one hour by high-powered car over that section of the colony's 12,000 miles of fine all-weather roads. Hanoi is the real gem of the Far East, the one place where the foreigner has reduced the tropics to an abode of coolness and comfort. Manila, Shanghai, and Hong-Kong crowd upwards from narrow streets; Hanoi has stretched her city outward and breathes freely. The streets could take six lanes of cars, and growing from the wide, grass-planted pavements great trees throw cool shade over gardens and roadway.

There is never an ungracious house in this city. They are big and square and coloured in soothing pastel shades of green, brown, yellow, blue, and red. Their shutters are as gay as their flower gardens. In such surroundings their owners could never feel exiles from home, as do so many inhabitants of other big Far Eastern cities. Women who know have told me that the shops in Hanoi are the best in the Far East, and the first evening that I sat at one of the little green tables in the Taverne Royale I believed them. The Taverne Royale is an institution. It is where the people of Hanoi take their *apéritif* as the sun begins to throw long shadows over the hot buildings. The tables of the café extend far out into the pavement, and people shout to their friends as they fly past in underslung cars imported from France.

Life here is the prelude to gay diners with the best wine served east of Suez. French officials, army officers, and business men wear only shorts, shirts, and stockings in the hot months. That is almost a regulation uniform. The Frenchwomen of Hanoi do not wear formal clothes by day. In bright-coloured shorts, shirts, and bare legs they come from the flying club or the swimming club for their *apéritif* at the Taverne Royale, and their concessions to the climate undoubtedly account for their good looks.

To the left of the café is a little mid-city lake, where the blood-

red petals of the Flame of the Forest tree drip into water that mirrors an encirclement of beautiful buildings. One of these fine edifices is the Banque d'Indochine, in whose main hall I once took the trouble to count 300 giant ceiling fans. There is no doubt about it, the French know how to be happy when far from home. Hanoi showed every evidence of tremendous prosperity and of tolerant but good administration over the 23,000,000 people who form the population of the five countries comprising the Indo-Chinese Union.

Hanoi is only twenty-three hours by rail from Kunming, capital of the huge Chinese province of Yunnan, which is now the main commercial, industrial, and transportation centre of China at war. As the Burma highway is the wonder of today, the Hanoi-Kunming narrow-gauge railway is the Far Eastern wonder of yesteryear. Coney Island's miniature railway is unexciting by comparison with this little line which brilliant French engineers laid across some of the wildest country on the face of the earth. The survey was made about 1898, and construction began with the turn of the century. The engineers had to conquer both nature and disease. Malaria was a fierce enemy. It is said that every metre of line cost a human life, but engineers who actually worked on this marvel of railway engineering have told me that the mortality was even higher during the ten years of construction.

In its 863 kil. (398 in French Indo-China and 465 in Yunnan) the railway winds through tropic jungles, hugs wild torrents, skirts vast precipices, skims over tiny bridges with a sheer drop of a thousand feet or more, passes 107 viaducts of not less than 65-feet span, plunges through 172 tunnels whose total length is over fifteen miles, and, after running alongside the Tang Tche Lake 6,600 feet above sea-level, it reaches Kunming.

This journey can be done in a day by the stream-lined Diesel-engined Michelin, or in two days of sighing over scenery in the ordinary train. The trains are excellently appointed, with fans and very good restaurant cars. Owing to the fear of landslides along this tortuous line, passenger trains do not run at night, and stop-overs are made in commodious rest-houses. This is a matter of keen appreciation by all travellers, as it provides an opportunity to see far more of the native life and industries than would be possible in the ordinary manner of train travel. The French railway authorities actually own the rail-bed and one metre on either side of the track in Chinese territory. They have concession areas as well at all stations, and in those compounds they have performed wonders. I doubt if any other railway concern in a tropic zone looks after its staff so well. Staff quarters are invariably well-constructed, gaily coloured buildings, whose surroundings are bright with gardens and flowering trees. In each

there is a well-appointed club and tennis courts. There are hospitals and schools for the children of the foreign and native staffs. Nowhere else in the Far East did I see such precision and efficiency in the administration of a great undertaking. When West China reaches full development this line will be a gold-mine, and that will be a very just reward for the far-seeing company.

Kunming, the northern railhead, is old China at its unspoilt best. Whereas buildings in all other parts of China have been painted black to minimize danger from night air raids, those in Kunming are still yellow and mellow. The climate of the Yunnan plateau is wellnigh perfect, varying only from about 55 degrees to 85 degrees. Its beauty spots are the city itself, scores of wonderful pagodas, and a huge lake, beyond which temples have been cut into a rock wall towering 3,000 feet from the water. French influence is very strong in this old Chinese city ornamented with giant eucalyptus trees that have outstripped their brothers in Australia's forests. When I was in Kunming late last year a very sad decision had just been reached by the city fathers. Once the Chinese bought all their railway sleepers from Australia. The war has interrupted that traffic, but sleepers are urgently wanted for the new railway gradually creeping from Kunming towards the Burma border. Australia will still provide the sleepers, but it will be a sort of godfather's gift, for all the lovely eucalypts that now flank Kunming's waterways, lakes, and highways are to be felled.

Kunming is the great holiday centre of South-West China and attracts many tourists from Hanoi. It is filled with first-class hotels run by Frenchmen, whose culinary art makes them a paradise for foreigners returning from long spells in the interior. Now most of the hotels are filled with men from the four corners of the earth, who have been attracted by the business boom created since the Chinese Government established its headquarters in West China. With the slump in Chinese national currency, these people, who are being paid from overseas, are almost dollar millionaires. Kunming, practically an unknown city three years ago, has now become a centre of cultural activity as the home of three great universities forced to move westward by the war. One of the city's most interesting features is a huge motor school, where 3,000 young Chinese are being taught to handle the trucks now being brought into China in great quantities from overseas. Kunming may very well be the heart of the new China now in the making.

MALACOLOGY: SCIENCE OF MOLLUSKS AND ITS RELATION TO HUMAN WELFARE

BY TENG-CHIEN YEN

" Each shell, each crawling insect, holds a rank
Important in the plan of Him who fram'd
This scale of being; holds a rank, which lost
Would break the chain, and leave behind a gap
Which Nature's self would rue."

THE SPECIES OF MOLLUSKS

ONE of the most interesting objects with which every student of Nature is brought face to face is the uncreasing search for a system—a way of living—for the most primitive organism or unicellular *Amœba proteus* as well as for the highest advanced human being. It is true that Nature is full of conflicts; we like to think of her beauties, to admire her outward appearance of peacefulness, and yet under her seeming calm there is going on everywhere, in every pool, in every meadow, and in every forest, murder, pillage, starvation, and suffering. But, nevertheless, it is also true that for millions of millions of years, under such conditions of conflict, various types of organic beings have remained in existence, and it is no less interesting to notice that such survivals are not necessarily the strongest nor the most gigantic!

For years naturalists have been trying to wrest these secrets from Nature, and to find in what way these types of survival exist. Botanists as well as zoologists are engaged in the work in their respective spheres, entomologists as well as ichthyologists, are entitled to this privilege in their own branch, with but one end in common. Malacologists—*i.e.*, those who devote themselves to the study of mollusks—likewise take their part in this co-operative scheme; they are but specializing in the group that also "holds a rank important in the plan."

Let us first direct our attention to defining what is a mollusk. The usual confusion of this kind of animal with other shell-bearing organisms needs here to be clearly defined. In fact, not all mollusks, at least externally, bear shells, and some animals other than mollusks, for instance Foraminifera, also possess shell parts, however different its morphological significance might be. The mollusks, so familiarly exemplified by slugs and snails, oysters and cuttlefish, form a well-marked phylum in the animal kingdom, the study of which, named malacology, is now recognized as an important branch of zoological science.

According to morphological categories, the phylum of mollusks is classified into the following five main groups or classes: The *Amphineura*, which includes chitons and its relative forms, is a primitive group of the existing mollusks, most of them possessing an oval, creeping body with a joint armour of a few transversal plates. They have a certain serial repetition of body-parts and breathe by means of a double row of plume-like gills.

The *Pelicycypoda*, which includes oysters, mussels, clams, and other bivalves, is so named because the foot or anterior muscular projection of the body often has the shape of a hatchet. They are variously classed as *Lamellibranchiata* because of their leaf-like gills or breathing organs. The shell always consists of two parts, mostly equal in size and convexity, but in a few inequality prevails.

The *Scaphopoda*, which includes only tusk-shells, comprises comparatively fewer species. The animal is symmetrical with a rudimentary head, and a long cylindrical foot used for burrowing in the mud. The shell resembles an elephant tusk in shape, open at both ends.

The *Gastropoda*, which includes snails, slugs, limpets, and all other forms that crawl in a similar manner, is the most important group in the number of species, distribution, and the extent of diversification. The animal consists of a head furnished with one or two pairs of contractile sense organs, and a pair of eyes situated on these tentacles. The ventral foot forms a creeping disc, and surmounting it the visceral organs within the covering mantle are borne as a twisted hump, generally covered by a shell formed in a single piece. This shell is attached to the body by a powerful muscle. But not in all gastropods is the shell part prominent and external; in some forms it has become reduced, and in others has disappeared entirely.

The *Cephalopoda*, which includes cuttlefish, octopus, nautilus, and numerous fossil forms known as ammonites. The animal has a more or less distinct head, on either side of which there is a large, well-developed eye, around which the feet, or more properly the arms, are so attached as to form a circle round the mouth. The shell is well developed in the nautilus, but shows progressive degeneration in most of the cuttlefish, where it becomes internal, and is practically absent in the octopus.

THEIR GEOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE

Since mollusks are known as one of the oldest groups, representatives being abundant among the fossils of the lower Cambrian epoch, laid down more than 600,000,000 years ago, the shell remains may thus claim an important part in geological records.

It is, of course, the hard part of the animal that is suitable for preservation, and it here furnishes decisive evidence that mollusk shells are the most advantageous for the study of palaeontology. In general, the shell of mollusks is composed of calcareous salts, either carbonate of lime or mixed carbonate and phosphate of lime, penetrated and bound together by an organic network of *conchiolin*. When it exhibits a crystalline formation the carbonate of lime may take the form of calcite or aragonite. The calcite crystals are rhombohedral, optically uniaxal, and cleave easily; while the aragonite cleave badly, belong to the rhombic system, and are harder and denser, and optically biaxal. The structure of the shell usually consists of three layers: (1) the periostracum or the outer layer, which is a horny integument without lime; (2) the middle prismatic or porcellaneous layer, which consists of slender prisms, perpendicular to the surface and closely crowded together; and (3) the nacreous or inner layer, which has a finely lamellate structure parallel to the shell surface.

The first process of alternation in shell fossilization is the removal by decay of the horny periostracum covering the shell and of the conchiolin which penetrates the calcareous mass. As a result the shell is rendered porous, and this can be proved by applying it to the tongue, when it will be found to be adhesive. Frequently shells composed of aragonite are entirely destroyed, while in those in which both calcite and aragonite occur the latter becomes dissolved and the calcite remains unimpaired. Water carrying salts in solution enters the pores and there deposits its mineral matter until they are filled. If the matter in solution is carbonate of lime, this process of infiltration will result in the complete calcification of the shell, whereby the finest structural details of the shell become fully preserved. If the infiltrating substance is silica, the process of fossilization does not stop with the filling of the pores, but, owing to the marked insolubility of silica, the latter becomes the dominating substance and gradually replaces the more soluble lime.

These fossilized mollusks, being found in various geological horizons, are sometimes the typical representatives of that particular formation, so that geological strata may be identified by fossils, and this has been found by geologists to be one of the most useful methods, and likewise a good indication of the presence of mineral sources contained in the strata. Geology was at first a science of minerals and rocks, and it was not until the significance of fossils as determinants of age was first worked out in England by William Smith at the end of the seventeenth century, that the stratigraphy and geological chronology began. However, these remains indicate not only the kinds of animals which lived, but a great deal about the nature of their home surroundings as well.

For example, the remains of marine mollusks, such as ammonites, now found naturally entombed in strata anywhere on the present land indicate that where the relics now occur the sea existed at the time when the organisms were living. Moreover, an abundance of *Bulimus* (= *Bithynia*) may indicate that where formerly a freshwater body existed, possibly many aquatic plants were also growing. It is true that from the composition and structure of the stratified rocks themselves we may learn about the geographical conditions in which they are formed, and of the subsequent geographical changes of the region in which they occur. But fossils supplement this information regarding the depth of water in which the rocks lay, whether fresh or salt, deep or shallow, near or far from land, in an open sea or a closed basin, and whether such a closed basin had occasional or constant communication with the ocean. It is in this way that our knowledge is progressively advanced by studying the fossil remains. Mollusk shells thus play an important and prominent part in the intellectual field.

THEIR IMPORTANCE IN PARASITOLOGY

On the other hand, the soft parts of mollusk animals also claim our attention in the field of parasitology, and its study has acquired considerable importance from the medical and veterinary point of view through the discovery that certain freshwater snails act as intermediate hosts of parasites.

First of all let me cite an example from the life-history of a liver fluke, for which *Fasciola hepatica* may be taken as a classic illustration. In this case the adult parasite lives in the bile passages and liver tissue of sheep, goats, and other ruminants; its eggs leave the uterus before the beginning of embryonic development and pass to the outer world by way of the bile ducts and intestines. After a period of embryonal development which only occurs providing the eggs have reached water and under suitable conditions of temperature, the larva escapes by the lifting of the operculum of the shell. It is then in the stage of *miracidium*. During its free swimming period it must meet with a suitable host within a few hours or it will perish. This host is an aquatic snail, *Lymnaea truncatula* (Mueller), which commonly occurs in Europe and also in southern Asia. If it arrives at a suitable location within the snail, usually the pulmonary chamber, the larva loses its cilia and digestive tube and transforms into sporocyst. The cyst now becomes filled with the germ-cells which are disposed in masses and reach the stage of *rediae*. When they have attained a certain stage of development the rediae become actively motile, finally rupturing the maternal cyst and passing to another organ of the snail, usually the liver. Within the body of rediae

are germ-cells formed into six to ten cellular masses which are in turn transformed into so many daughter rediae, or directly into fifteen to twenty cercariae. The cercariae leave the body of the snail and swim about in the water, eventually finding their way to an aquatic plant or grass stalk. Here the cercariae encyst themselves with some mucoid substance and attach themselves on the grass. When the plants bearing these cysts are eaten by grazing animals, the cysts, upon reaching the stomach, are dissolved, setting free the parasites which, passing into the intestine, enter the bile ducts and there become mature.

However, much the most important species of liver flukes from the standpoint of human disease is *Clonorchis sinensis*, which is widely distributed in the Far East from Korea, Japan, through China to Indo-China. It is also a common parasite in cats, dogs, pigs, and various wild carnivores as well as man. This parasite migrates through three hosts: the adult is found in vertebrates; the encysted cercariae occur in freshwater fish; while the host in which the miracidia develop into cercariae is a freshwater snail, usually *Parafossarulus striatulus*. This snail is very common in a great part of Asia, hence human infections are also very common in many local areas in Japan, South China and Indo-China where the people are very fond of fish eaten raw or insufficiently cooked. The parasites are thus introduced into the stomach together with the fish-meat, and they find their way into the bile duct, migrate to the biliary passages of the liver, and there grow to maturity.

The lung fluke, *Paragonimus westermanni*, which also affects freshwater snails as intermediate hosts, causes a serious disease in man and animal in many parts of the Far East, including Korea, Japan, Formosa, Indo-China, Siam, Philippines, Malayan States, and parts of India. But there is no authentic record of its occurrence in China. The adult worms live normally in the lungs of a vertebrate host, and they rupture the eggs into the bronchial tubes. The eggs are excreted with sputum, and slowly develop miracidia within themselves when immersed in water. In the stage of miracidia they are found to take some species of semi-sulcospira as intermediate hosts, in which they transform into round or ellipsoidal sporocysts, and a first generation of rediae are produced. The latter, on becoming free, produce a second generation of rediae, and these in turn produce cercariae. After escaping from the snail, the cercariae attack some freshwater crabs or crayfish, penetrate into their gills or other soft parts, and encyst. Human infection is therefore limited to certain localities where these second intermediate hosts are eaten without being cooked.

Another parasite which man shares with domestic animals is a kind of intestinal fluke, *Fasciolopsis buski*, which affects millions of people, reducing their efficiency and is the cause of great loss

of life. It is widely distributed in the Far East, and cases also occur in some parts of India. Its life-cycle in some ways is similar to *Fasciola hepatica* mentioned above, and its intermediate hosts, in China, are found to be *Hippeutis schmackeri*, *Segmentina hemisphaerula*, and their relative forms, which occur quite commonly in the Yangtze valley as well as in the south part of the country. Human infection is traced mainly to the eating of the nuts of a water plant known as red caltrop, *Trapa natans*, or "Hung-ling," which is extensively cultivated in the ponds in the endemic areas, where the infected snails live, and the escaped cercariae frequently encyst on the plants and nuts.

The most important flukes parasitic in man are a species of *Schistosoma* or blood flukes, which produce a disease known as schistosomiasis. In the Far East the endemic worm is *S. japonicum*. In this parasite the two sexes are separate, the adult male carrying the adult female in a ventral groove. They live in the mesenteric veins of a vertebrate, feeding primarily on blood corpuscles. The eggs contain fully developed miracidia by the time they escape from the host through the body. Dilution of these discharges causes the eggs to split open within a few minutes and the miracidium emerges. The miracidia live for only a few hours, and therefore must find an intermediate host, which is also a freshwater snail, for example, *Oncomelania hupensis*, in China. After they have attacked a snail, they make their way into the liver of their intermediate host, where they transform into tubular sporocysts and produce, out of germ-cells in their body, a second generation of similar sporocysts instead of rediae. These sporocysts in turn produce fork-tailed cercariae. The latter burst the walls of the parent sporocyst and finally escape from the snail. The cercariae alternately swim and rest in the water for from two to three days, during which time they must reach a final host, otherwise they die. If successful, they burrow through the skin until they reach a blood-vessel, whence they are carried to their final destination in the mesenteric veins.

These examples are sufficient to illustrate the important connection of some freshwater mollusks with the control and prevention of the diseases that are caused by these parasites. It is clear that to understand the distribution of the parasites requires a knowledge of distribution of their intermediate hosts. However, such a knowledge of mollusks may also furnish useful information from the industrial or economic standpoint.

INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC USES

Of cephalopods, *Sepia* or cuttlefish, and *Loligo* or squids, are eaten quite extensively by inhabitants of various countries both in

the West and the East. In China they are preserved in the dry state, so that they can be transported further into the interior, where they are also prized as favourite dishes. A special kind of boat is taken for catching them and is used both by day and in the night-time. At night a fire is lighted on the deck, so that the glare may attract the "fish" to the surface. They are quite common along our south-eastern coast, but the method of catching them needs improvement, if this industry is to be further developed. The present production does not meet the demand, and considerable quantities are annually imported from neighbouring countries.

Of gastropods, some *Patella* or limpets are used for food in certain parts of Europe; for instance, at Naples the people make them into a soup, which is greatly relished. *Haliotis* or sea-ears are more commonly eaten in the East than in the West. The species that occurs in Chinese water is the *Haliotis gigantea discus*, and its distribution is practically confined to the northern coast, but the demand is at present met mainly from abroad. *Helix pomatia*, or vine snails, living on the land, are quite commonly eaten on the Continent in Europe, but in the Far East land form so far has not been taken for food. Other groups in this class of mollusks that are consumed as food include some *Rapana*, *Thais*, *Strombus*, *Trochus*, *Buccinum*, *Viviparus*, etc., but they are limited to some people who inhabit the coast lands and a few local areas.

Pelcypods occupy a large place in our food. *Ostrea*, *Pecten*, *Mytilus*, *Modiolus*, *Arca*, *Solen*, *Sinonovacula*, *Pholas*, *Mya*, *Tellina*, *Mactra*, *Tapes*, etc., are all considered to be commonly edible. A few of them are cultivated on a large scale as a commercial undertaking. In China the common edible forms are *Ostrea* or "Shih-hao" and "Hu-tzu-hao," *Modiolus* or "Tantsai," *Sinonovacula* or "Sheng-tzu," *Pecten* or "Kanpei," and *Arca* or "Han-tzu," and they are to be found along our coast quite abundantly, although, here again, our methods of collecting and cultivating them need improvement to meet the demand for them.

Besides providing food, mollusks afford also many ornamental and other practical uses. The most important industry in this connection is the "pearl-oyster," although the forms that produce pearls or such silvery secretion are not necessarily all "oysters." The "mother-of-pearl" which is extensively employed for the manufacture of buttons, studs, knife-handles, fans, boxes, and every kind of inlaid work, is the internal nacreous laminae of the shell. As a result of a disease in the animal, the valuable natural pearls are produced. When the shell is large, well formed, and with ample space for individual development, pearls scarcely occur at all, but when the shells are crowded together, and become

humped and distorted, and afford cover for all kinds of marine worms and parasitic creatures, then pearls are sure to be found. The marine forms, such as *Pteria*, *Placenta*, *Pinna*, *Tridacna*, and freshwater forms like *Unio* and *Anodonta*, all produce pearls, although the qualities vary a great deal in different species.

There are also numerous other incidental uses for mollusk shells. Thus in Southern Asia many houses in villages are provided with skylights and windows made of shells, usually the semi-transparent valves of *Placenta placenta*. In early history and among the uncivilized peoples of today in many parts of the world, shells are employed as a medium of exchange. Among the Chinese characters many signs indicating treasures or valuables are partly composed by "Pci," which means shells. Numerous such examples can be easily referred to in our dictionary. Clearly the mollusk shells played an important part in ancient civilization as well as in modern life.

Malacology is one of the largest branches of zoology; it comprises nearly 80,000 forms in the phylum, a number which is only inferior to the insects in the animal kingdom. It indeed "holds a rank," an important rank, in the study of natural history, and our knowledge in this vast field has to be advanced through continuous co-operation among our naturalists, and such co-operation in fact has laid a solid foundation on which the edifice of science has since many years been under construction.

Man often considers himself as possessing a larger volume of grey matter in his brain, and it is true that such superior intelligence has given him an insuperable advantage over the wild beasts which might otherwise prey upon him; his inventive genius defies the attacks of the climate and the elements; his eminent sagacity inspires him to make full use of all the sources of nature; his altruism protects the weak and defective individuals from quick elimination.

NOTES ON MINERAL RESEARCH IN NORTH BORNEO

By W. J. WORTH

THE State of North Borneo, with its charming landscapes, unsophisticated native peoples, and fascinating fauna and flora, may justly be accounted one of the most attractive corners of the Empire. Roughly the size of Scotland, it occupies less than a tenth part of the huge island of Borneo, of which it nevertheless possesses the only good harbours and the loftiest mountain—the majestic Kinabalu, 13,455 feet high. Governed by the British North Borneo Company, whose charter was granted in 1881, and enjoying the protection of Great Britain, this beautiful and favoured country has made steady progress, its trade turnover having grown from £75,600 in 1882 to £1,835,000 in 1938.

The early hopes that minerals would prove a source of wealth to the State have so far not been realized. Writing in 1878, Sir Alfred Dent, by whose enterprise North Borneo was won for the Empire, pointed out that the island of Borneo had "long been famous for its mineral wealth," and that, "as the same mountain ranges which in the south of the island carry the metalliferous deposits extend to the northern part into the Company's territory, there is sufficient reason to assume that the latter may prove equally rich in minerals as soon as it can be properly explored." Sir Alfred's opinion was shared by Mr. W. C. Cowie, the other towering personality to whose enterprise and foresight so much of North Borneo's present-day prosperity is due. With an intimate first-hand knowledge of the country, Mr. Cowie never lost faith in its mineral possibilities; he was responsible for the formation in 1900 of the British Borneo Syndicate and later, in 1905, of its successor, the British Borneo Exploration Company, two companies whose activities resulted in the acquisition of a wealth of knowledge relative to the mineral deposits of the State. His death in 1910, before his work in this sphere had been by any means completed, was a severe setback, but he had accomplished sufficient to show that the investigation was well worth continuing. The Chartered Company, whom he served as managing director from 1897 to 1910, intended to follow up the research after the War, and with that object bought out the British Borneo Exploration Company in 1916, but circumstances have prevented them so far from carrying this design into execution. Private

prospectors are, however, encouraged by the Company to seek for minerals, and an Ordinance passed in 1927 regulates the terms and conditions upon which prospecting facilities and leases for working minerals (other than oil, coal, and precious stones) are obtainable from the local Government.

The notes which follow summarize the information which has accumulated in the course of years on the subject of minerals in various parts of the State. For reasons of space, the notes exclude geological data, but a list of the authorities which may be consulted in this connection is given at the end of the article.

Gold.—In the eighteenth century gold appears to have been a staple product of the Darvel Bay region, then known as Mangidora. Alexander Dalrymple asserted in 1769 that Mangidora yielded "plenty of fine gold" (which in 1785 he described as being "soft like wax"), "particularly at Talassam within Giong"; the location of this place is today unknown.

The Tampassuk district on the west coast was also mentioned by Dalrymple in connection with gold. He reported that the town of Tampassuk "consists of about 100 houses, though there are many people up the river, near to which, inland, there is a gold-mine"; also that about 500 Illanuns, the dreaded pirates from Mindanao, had "lately settled here."

In 1812, J. Hunt compiled for Sir Stamford Raffles a detailed "Sketch of Borneo," wherein he alluded to the existence at Tampassuk of "a very valuable gold-mine," but added that "the working of the mines has been discontinued," as Tampassuk had become "the principal pirate port on the coast." Hunt further stated that a "very rich gold-mine" existed at "Maday in the province of Mangidora"; Madai, twenty-five miles south-west of Lahad Datu across Darvel Bay, is well-known for its limestone caves, where edible birds' nests are collected.

A subsequent essay by Hunt bore the title "Particulars relating to Sulu," and was written at some unspecified date subsequent to 1814, when he spent six months as British Agent in the Sulu Islands, of which North Borneo was then a dependency. In this later review Hunt referred to Mangidora as yielding "great quantities of the purest gold in lumps and dust of a very pliable texture like wax"; he also stated that in the Kinabatangan region edible birds' nests were obtained and gold was "plentiful if searched after—at present the Idan (natives) procure no more than 10 catties (173 oz.) annually." Parenthetically it may be remarked that in other parts of Borneo gold seems to be associated in some way with the limestone of the birds'-nest caves; thus in an old report dated 1831 on the exports of Coti in Dutch Borneo the author, J. Dalton, observed that the people of Coti "conceive that where gold is sought after, the birds invariably disappear;

therefore as birds' nests are a much more profitable article than gold-dust, the Sultan has prohibited the searching for it under severe penalties."

Despite the paralyzing effects of piracy and lawlessness, gold was still being produced in Mangidora province as late as 1849. In that year the *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie* referred to Mangidora as yielding "an exceptionally large number of commodities," including "a large quantity of the finest gold, which is found in nuggets and dust and is very soft and malleable." In another issue, published in the same year, of the *Tijdschrift* it was asserted that "there are gold-mines in Unsang which were opened in previous years by Chinese colonists, who disappeared as a result of murders, robberies, etc., committed by the Sulus; the mines have not since been worked. Small quantities of gold which appeared to be on the surface of the ground were also found in other places and sold to Sulu dealers for small sums." Unsang was the former name of that part of North Borneo now known as the Dent Peninsula.

Since the establishment of British rule in North Borneo much effort and considerable sums of money have been expended in the quest for gold. The Chartered Company's officers soon discovered that alluvial gold occurs in the bed of the Segama River and some of its tributaries, notably the Bole. Further research disclosed that the metal also exists in many of the smaller rivers in the south-east of the territory—the Sapagaya, Tungku, Telokbukan, Tengahnipah, Tabanac, Timbadan, Diwata, Subahan, Tingkayu, Dagowoa, and Kalumpong Rivers; of this group the Subahan and its affluents seemed to offer the most promise. On the Subahan and Bole Rivers gold was profitably worked by Chinese for several years up to 1905, and in 1893 over 100 were occupied in the neighbourhood of these rivers. A nugget of 17 dwt. was washed in the Subahan; and from the Bole River Captain Beeston—an experienced miner from Queensland, who explored the river on two occasions in the eighties—brought back 7 oz. after the first visit and 11 oz. after the second, both quantities being the result of about seven days' work by ten men panning, the largest piece got being 18½ dwt.

The lower Segama has at one time or another been the scene of much activity, particularly the section between its confluences with the Kawag and Bilang tributaries; but the quantity of gold recovered has been relatively small. At one period a dredger was operated; unfortunately, the mistake appears to have been made of employing the "grab" or "clamp" type, which allowed all fine sand and gold to escape. A "bucket" dredger should have been used.

The upper Segama has been explored on two occasions only.

In 1887 Captain Beeston, accompanied by Robert Sefton (who subsequently opened up the Raub gold-mine in Pahang, F.M.S.) and two other experienced gold-miners from Australia, made an adventurous journey of 200 miles up the river to its head waters, where gold of a much less water-worn character than that occurring in the lower river was found in all the creeks as well as in the main stream. The explorers formed the unanimous opinion that a large gold-field existed in this region, Mr. Sefton declaring that "there has never been any country yet known where gold exists so generally as it does in the Segama without a payable gold-field being found." A year later S. B. Skertchly, an English geologist of some distinction, reached the head waters of the Segama by a shorter route, travelling up the Tingkayu River from Darvel Bay, and found gold "everywhere" in the *karangans* (beaches). His able report on this journey is one of the most valuable contributions to the literature of gold prospecting in North Borneo.

In 1905 J. C. Robertson found an area of weathered greenstone on Mount Tambayukong, twenty miles north-east of Kinabalu, which he described as being "in some respects similar to . . . Labuk blue ground" (see below under "Diamonds"); one of the samples sent home by him for analysis gave 17 dwts. 12 grains of gold per ton, and 2 dwts. 12 grains of silver.

A German geologist, Dr. R. R. Pilz, who was for four years engaged on geological research in North Borneo, examined the Darvel Bay area in 1911 for gold, but without obtaining any important result. In the Kinabalu region, however, he discovered that the arsenical pyrites which he located in small quantities on Mount Nungkok, five miles north-west of Kinabalu, contained gold. A concentrated sample of this ore which he sent to the Royal School of Mines at Clausthal for analysis yielded 22 dwts. per ton. The discovery is of interest because the Tampassuk River, in the vicinity of which the gold-mine referred to by Dalrymple and Hunt existed, flows at the base of Mount Nungkok. Gold-bearing arsenious pyrites similar in composition to the Nungkok ore is worked at Palaleh in the Celebes and at Bidi and Bau in Sarawak.

The theory was advanced by Skertchly in 1888 that gold was "disseminated in infinite small quantities through the rocks" of the Darvel Bay region, and was "soluble in water and precipitated in the presence of organic matter." Dr. Pilz came to the same conclusion, but he pointed out that "the geological constitution of the Darvel district is similar to that of the Kinabalu massif and its surroundings," and that, "as ore deposits have been found in the latter massif, it would be over-hasty to assume on the strength of the negative results which prospectors have obtained

as yet that the Darvel massif is, speaking from the commercial point of view, completely devoid of metalliferous zones."

Diamonds.—Alluvial diamonds have for centuries past been produced in the south and west (including Sarawak) of Borneo. According to Dalrymple, there was at one time a diamond-mine on the west coast of North Borneo near Mengkabong, "at a hill adjoining the sea," but no trace of its existence has been found since the British occupation in 1878. The Chartered Company's Handbook of 1886 referred to two diamonds having been found in the Kuamut River, a tributary of the Kinabatangan, one of which weighed a carat and a half; it also mentioned that "a stone, presumably a ruby, was said to have been found in the Sugut some years ago."

The region principally associated, however, with the search for diamonds is that of the Labuk River. In 1879 a native chief, Sheriff Shea, informed Mr. Pretyman, the British Resident, that a few diamonds had been found in this river. A few years later, in 1888, L. O. Jurgens—who had formerly been employed as a mining engineer in the Kimberley Diamond Fields—was surveying land along the Labuk River in the neighbourhood of the Bidu-Bidu Hills when he came across "real diamondiferous ground . . . identical with the Kimberley blue clay, with all the pieces of carbon and burnt garnet in it." Jurgens did not divulge his discovery until 1904, when he wrote to the Chartered Company giving details. A sample of the rock was obtained from North Borneo and examined in London; at the Chartered Company's meeting on December 13, 1904, the Chairman, Sir Charles Jessel, reported that it was "at once pronounced to be true blue ground." The assayers were unable to find a diamond in 4 tons of the rock subsequently sent home, but Sir Charles informed the shareholders at their next meeting that "it is quite possible to treat 4 tons of blue ground of even a payable mine and not find a diamond."

Colour was lent to the belief that diamonds exist in the neighbourhood of the Labuk River when J. Saxton discovered in 1904 zircons—with which diamonds are said to be generally associated—in a stream at Meliao, higher up the river, where another deposit of what appeared to be blue ground existed. No further discoveries have, however, been reported from this region, which is very thinly populated.

Silver and Lead.—Three finds of silver ore have at different times been reported from the south-west of the territory, in each case in association with galena (lead sulphide). In the latter part of 1884 a sample of ore was picked up by a native near Mempakul and yielded on assay 115 oz. of silver to the ton. Three years later a piece of grey mineral obtained in Province Dent was found to contain galena and silver; the proportion of silver per ton was,

according to A. H. Everett, a reliable investigator, "not less than 500 oz. to the ton of ore, this extraordinary richness being due to the presence of native silver in the vein-stone." In 1891, B. T. Knight, a mining engineer who was engaged in examining the oil-bearing strata in the Klias Peninsula, came across a mineral which he judged from its appearance to contain silver and lead. The discovery was made in the Mumpilak River; the formation up to the source of this river at Bukit Nouri was sandstone, and Mr. Knight was "at a loss to discover whence these water-worn samples had come."

Samples of galena from the Apas River brought in by natives to the District Officer at Tawau in 1905 were found to contain about 30 per cent. of lead, besides antimony, sulphur, and copper, but a European prospector who visited the locality shortly after could not find the mineral.

Mercury.—Cinnabar, the ore from which mercury is derived, occurs in several parts of the island of Borneo, including Sarawak. "It is noteworthy," writes Posewitz, "that [in Borneo] cinnabar and gold are associated nearly everywhere in the drifts."

Shortly after Mr. Pretzman took up his abode as Resident at Tampassuk in 1878 a native chief described to him a piece of quicksilver ore which had been found about a year previously in the bed of the Tampassuk River up in the hills.

In 1886 Hadji Bakar, an experienced Sarawak gold-washer, returned from the Segama River with samples of cinnabar which he had found while washing for gold "a short distance from the entrance to the small Bole River and near Pulo Ituk Batu." He reported that over a kati (21 oz.) a day could be washed at the spot where the cinnabar was discovered. Two of the samples were assayed in London, with highly satisfactory results, one yielding as much as 75 per cent. of mercury. A prominent local Chinese who had previously led an expedition to the Bole River recognized the samples as identical with stones which he had got in that river, but which he had thrown away, not realizing their value.

The Chartered Company's Handbook of 1886 mentioned that traces of quicksilver had been reported from the Kuamut River. In 1903 G. H. Hone received information from native sources that stone resembling cinnabar had been found near the hot-springs of the Mount Madai district. As cinnabar is in some countries deposited by hot-springs in volcanic areas, it may be mentioned that such springs exist not only at Madai, but also on the Apas River in the volcanic region adjacent to Cowie Harbour.

Chromium and Platinum.—In view of the importance which chromium has of late years assumed in industry, special interest attaches to North Borneo's chromite resources. The widespread

occurrence of serpentine with particles of chromite results in the formation of placers of this ore at many places. The existence of these "black-sands" has been known for many years, but interest in them seems to have ceased since 1911. Dr. Pilz, who examined them in 1909, found that the most promising deposits occur on the beach of the north-west part of Banguey Island; he estimated that at the time of his visit there were 9,000 tons of sand, which would yield on concentration 1,500 tons of ore and 6,400 tons of "middlings." Black-sand placers also exist on Balambangan Island, at Ganda Head on the western peninsula of Marudu Bay, and at Marasimsing River, Pingan Pingan, and Tanjung Batu on the eastern peninsula. A sample from Marasimsing assayed in London yielded 47·5 per cent. of chromic oxide; gold and silver were also present in small quantities.

Massive chromite was located by Dr. Pilz near Paranchangan on the upper Sugut River, where he found boulders of the mineral disseminated over a large area. The yield of chromic oxide given by an average sample was 53·60 per cent.

Platinum has been proved to be present in the black sand of Banguey Island, but only in traces—6 grains per cubic yard.

Manganese.—Early in the present century extensive deposits of manganese ore were located in the neighbourhood of Taritipan on the eastern side of Marudu Bay. The ore was mostly psilomelane, but in one or two localities it took the form of pyrolusite, in which oxide of barium replaces the silica to a considerable extent; a valuable report containing particulars of several analyses made in North Borneo by C. J. Head, F.C.S., was printed in 1904. Expert advice having been obtained that these deposits, which occur in lenses of irregular form embedded in manganiferous quartzite, could be profitably worked, in 1905 the British Borneo Exploration Company decided to exploit them. A considerable sum was sunk in the venture, which, however, encountered misfortune, the Company being sued in 1907 for damages by an English firm with whom it had contracted to supply manganese ore of a specified standard, which was not reached by the consignment of 2,771 tons sent home. The claim, which was settled out of court, would probably not have arisen had the cargo been properly sorted before it left the territory. In 1910 Dr. Pilz advised against continuing operations, largely on the ground that, although on the outcrop a fairly good quality ore is met with, at a greater depth the percentage of silica increases.

Manganese ore also occurs in the region of Mount Madai, Darvel Bay. In 1903, G. H. Hone found numerous boulders of fairly rich ore about half a mile south of the mountain; samples assayed 60·2 per cent. of manganese. He also came across a deposit near the entrance to one of the Madai birds'-nest caves;

this, he reported, "forms the cement of a brecciated limestone, and is no doubt connected with a richer deposit in close proximity."

Copper.—Native copper and copper pyrites were among the first minerals to be discovered after the advent of the Chartered Company. Frank Hatton, a young mineralogist who lost his life in an accident on the Segama in 1883, obtained "an excellent specimen of native copper from the Kinoram River near Kias." Another sample, got by F. Witti, an intrepid explorer who was murdered by natives in 1882, was sent to London.

Copper pyrites has been located at a number of places, in particular in the region of the Karang, a stream flowing into the Karamauk, one of the left-bank tributaries of the Kinabatangan, where a lode of cupriferous iron pyrites exists. A sample from this locality gave, on assay in London, over 5 per cent. of copper. Prospecting operations of some magnitude were carried on by Dr. Pilz on behalf of the British Borneo Exploration Company from 1909 to 1912. It was proved by several small shafts that the ore zone extended for a distance of at least 1,000 ft., and that its average thickness was between 6½ ft. and 10 ft.; the zone was examined only above the level of the Karang, but, considering its length, Dr. Pilz was of opinion that it probably existed at a greater depth. Small lenses of massive pyrites, with high yields of copper—up to 17 per cent.—also occur here. The development works completed in this neighbourhood included the construction of a road nine miles long, with twenty-three bridges, to Telupid on the Labuk River, and the laying of rails for trammimg the ore. The further capital needed to exploit the Karang copper resources was, however, not forthcoming, and operations ceased in 1912.

Quartz veins with copper pyrites and iron pyrites occur on the Meliao River, a tributary of the Labuk; at Pingan Pingan on Marudu Bay; on the Sualog River (Labuk delta); and on Mounts Tambayukong and Nungkok.

Iron.—There are extensive deposits of iron ore in two or three localities. One at Tagaho, south of Marudu Bay, covers an area of 4½ square miles; a sample analyzed in London in 1906 was described as limonite (brown hematite), and was found to contain 52·24 per cent. of metallic iron, the sulphur content being 0·211 per cent.

On the Purog River, a tributary of the lower Labuk, another very large deposit occurs. G. H. Hone estimated in 1904 that fully 1,500,000 tons were exposed on the surface. In London an analysis of an equal mixture of eight bags of the ore yielded 63·50 per cent. of metallic iron, with only 0·052 per cent. of sulphur. The analyst reported that the ore was "of very good quality, the



physical condition very good, the only objectionable feature being a little copper" (copper oxide, 0·203 per cent.).

Iron ore similar to that on the Tagaho and Purog Rivers also exists in considerable quantity on the Karang River.

The occurrence of iron pyrites in association with copper pyrites at a number of places has already been mentioned under the heading "Copper." An extensive deposit of clay containing iron pyrites was located in 1905 in the Apas River near the hot-springs.

Tin.—As long ago as 1852 mention of the reported existence of tin in a river emptying into Marudu Bay was made by J. Motley, a mining engineer who had investigated geological conditions in Borneo, mainly Labuan. Spencer St. John, British Consul-General at Brunei from 1855 to 1861, who travelled extensively in the Kinabalu region, recorded in his book *Life in the Forests of the Far East* that tin had been discovered "in some stream of the Kinabalu range," and added: "I saw specimens . . . but no one has ventured to work it yet—the insecurity would prevent the Chinese succeeding." In 1884 the Government Officer in charge of the Putatan district on the west coast reported that tin had formerly been washed by a Chinese at Bantaian, north-east of Bukit Malintod; and in the same year one of the samples brought back by H. Walker from the Bilang River, which he had been prospecting for gold, was examined by the Australian geologist, J. Tennison Woods, who reported that it "seemed to contain a fair proportion of tin ore" and recommended a trial smelting.

Dr. Pilz, however, failed to discover tin during the course of his numerous journeys in 1909 to 1911, and it is a fact that black magnetite sand has often been mistaken by both natives and Europeans for tin sand. Great importance, therefore, attaches to the discovery made at Tawau—a region which Dr. Pilz was unable to investigate—by a mining engineer, Gaston Thomé, in the employ of a leading tin-mining company in Malaya, the Société des Étains de Kinta. Thomé discovered the mineral cassiterite (SnO_3) in a valley about a mile from Tawau; here he found a silicious conglomerate cemented by a red quartzish clay in which cassiterite was present in the proportion of from 20 to 40 grams per cubic decimetre. In his opinion, these deposits probably covered an older bed of alluvial in which the mineral was present, and which he recommended should be examined by boring. It is remarkable that Gaston Thomé's discovery, which was made in 1903, remained a secret until 1937, when the Chartered Company succeeded in obtaining from him a report based on his notes made at the time; he died a month later at his home in Toulouse.

Antimony.—Although antimony is widely distributed in the neighbouring territory of Sarawak, and also occurs in other parts of Borneo, it has not yet been discovered by European prospectors

in North Borneo, despite Posewitz' belief, to which he gave expression in 1892, that antimony ores would be found there "in the course of years . . . as the geological relations are suitable for their occurrence." In 1881 the first Governor, Sir William Treacher, obtained authority from the Court of Directors in London to grant Hadji Brahim of Banjermassim (the capital of South Borneo and chief port of a large mining district) a licence to work antimony on the Labuk River; the document was prepared but not issued, as it was decided to send Frank Hatton, the Government mineralogist, to look for the mineral. Hatton had previously examined four samples said to have come from the Labuk, and found two of these to be "remarkably pure sulphide of antimony." He proceeded to the Labuk in March, 1882; his adventurous journey up the river and thence overland to Kudat was a great feat of courage and endurance, but he failed to locate antimony, though a "capital specimen of sulphide of antimony" weighing about 50 grams was brought to him by a native, who said he got it in a river at the "back" of Silam in Darvel Bay. In 1904, J. Robertson, manager of the British Borneo Exploration Company, received specimens of antimony ore from three different natives, but was "unable to make the thorough search necessary to locate the ore."

Asbestos and Talc.—As might be expected in a country where serpentine is met with so frequently, talc and asbestos (which are, like serpentine, silicates of magnesium) have been reported from several localities. In 1882 Frank Hatton came across "a solid hill of the purest talc" on the left bank of the Labuk River a little below Telupid, and much steatite (or soapstone, a massive variety of talc) in the country round Paranchangan. Soapstone also exists at the head waters of the Tiku River near Tawau in the south-east. Asbestos was discovered in 1903 on the Munyed River, which flows into the Labuk estuary, and higher up the Labuk at the Bidu Bidu Hills.

Zinc, Wolframite, Rutile, Zircon.—Zinc blende and magnetite are often found in association with copper and iron pyrites. Traces of wolframite were discovered in 1905 in two streams near the extremity of the eastern Marudu Peninsula. The loose quartz sands of many of the rivers carry rutile (titanium dioxide) and zircon.

Coal.—The numerous coal discoveries in the early days of the Chartered Company's existence tempted a high authority of those days to declare that North Borneo was "one vast coalfield." While it must be admitted that the claim was fanciful, there is no doubt of the widespread occurrence of the mineral in North Borneo. On the west coast outcrops occur at Noloyan (near the port of Weston), Bukau, and Linkungan, where there are two

seams—believed to be identical with the two upper seams of the Labuan coalfield. Along the State railway coal exists in small pockets at Montenior, about five miles east of Beaufort, and small "pipes" of coal with shales and sandstones have from time to time been observed at Membakut and other places between Jesselton and Beaufort.

In the region of the Bengkoka River, Marudu Bay, there is an extensive area of coal; of the eight seams, one has a thickness of over 13 ft. Unfortunately, the coal contains too much iron pyrites and—owing to its comparatively recent geological age—too small a percentage of fixed carbon. Older coal has been found at Melobang, north of the Bengkoka River, but the outcrops dip so steeply that working would probably be unprofitable.

On the north-east coast there are coal outcrops near the mouth of the Sugut River and in the vicinity of the Bongaya River.

Considerable sums have been spent in proving the coal measures in the neighbourhood of Sandakan, the capital, where coal was discovered as far back as 1878. On the north side of the bay a number of seams have at various times been examined. In 1927 two boreholes were put down to a depth of 402 ft. and 363 ft. respectively, but the quality of the coal was adjudged to be inferior; moreover, the engineers advised that mining operations would present difficulties. Coal also exists on Timbang Island in Sandakan Bay; an experienced mining engineer from India who examined the seam here in 1928 was well satisfied with the quality.

Further south, coal outcrops occur on the Kinabatangan River and on the Sesui River near the Dutch Borneo frontier, where five seams were examined in 1906.

The most valuable coal deposits in the territory occur in the Cowie Harbour region. In 1900 an extensive coalfield covering an area of about sixty square miles was located in the valley of the Serudong River, and several promising seams were found. Closer examination showed that coal of good quality was present here in almost inexhaustible quantity, and in 1905 the Cowie Harbour Coal Company was formed to exploit this coalfield. A colliery was opened at Silimpopon and continued to function for twenty-five years, the average annual output being about 57,000 tons. But despite the good quality of its product, the undertaking was handicapped by difficulties, foremost among which was the high cost of transport to the ports of shipment, Tawau and Sandakan, and in 1930 the colliery was closed down. It is not unlikely that when the political horizon clears mining operations will be resumed in this region.

Oil.—An oil seepage at Sequati on the north-west coast was examined by Witt soon after North Borneo came under British control, and again in 1881 by Frank Hatton. Boring operations

were, however, not undertaken until 1921, when the Kuhara Mining Company, of Japan, drilled to a depth of over 2,000 ft. without finding oil in commercial quantity.

The Klias Peninsula, where several oil outcrops occur, has attracted a good deal of attention; in 1908, as the result of the researches of H. Lloyd Chittenden and the geologist I. A. Stigand, prospecting operations on a large scale were begun by the British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate. Two distinct classes of oil were found: one "a heavy, tar-like fluid—practically a natural liquid fuel," and the other a volatile oil which experts pronounced to be of very high value. The geological indications were at first disappointing, the formation appearing to be too steep to encourage the hope that productive wells could be sunk, but further investigation allayed anxiety on this score. Drilling was carried on for a while by the Syndicate, but later they transferred their rights over both Klias and Mangalum Island, where oil seepages were also found to exist, to the Dutch Colonial Petroleum Company, by whom four wells were sunk in Klias and two in Mangalum. Oil was struck in one of the Klias wells at 2,303 ft., and yielded for a time 1,200 gallons a day of excellent light oil, but in 1917 the Dutch withdrew both from Klias and from Mangalum, where neither well had reached a depth at which oil might be expected. In 1920 the D'Arcy Exploration Company (a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company) prospected the Klias Peninsula, but decided not to bore, and between 1924 and 1931 a syndicate of Singapore Chinese carried on desultory operations there.

Sebatik Island, in the south-east, was examined by the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company shortly before the outbreak of the Great War. Drilling was started, and a depth of 1,437 ft. had been reached by August, 1914, when operations were temporarily suspended. They were subsequently renewed, but the well was eventually shut down, though small indications of oil had been found.

In 1934 the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (one of the Shell Group), undeterred by the somewhat chequered history of oil research in North Borneo, decided to embark on a thorough examination of the whole territory, and this is still proceeding.* One of the chief considerations which induced the Shell Group to investigate the oil possibilities in North Borneo was undoubtedly the fact that they had achieved success in the neighbouring State of Brunei—where many before them had failed—only after long years of patient and persistent effort and the expenditure of an immense sum.

If the Shell's enterprise in North Borneo is similarly rewarded,

* Since this article was written oil prospecting by the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. has been suspended until after the cessation of hostilities.

and if the finding of oil in paying quantity should be but the prelude to further discoveries leading to the commercial exploitation of other minerals than oil, the hardships and disappointments endured by so many brave men in the search for the territory's mineral riches will not have been in vain. There is a record of heroic endeavour in face of stupendous difficulties, for no country in the world probably presents greater obstacles to the prospector than North Borneo, where, as Dr. Reinhard has written, "every square yard is covered with thick jungle and outcrops are only found along running water." Nor is the geological conformation readily intelligible; it would seem that valuable mineral deposits often occur where the geologist would least expect to find them. It is, however, not in the nature of mankind to be thwarted by Nature's artifices, and the time will assuredly come when the secrets of her hidden treasures in North Borneo will be fully revealed.

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(*Note*.—The geology of the neighbouring territory of Sarawak, with special reference to the occurrence of gold and coal, was dealt with in a report by J. B. Scrivenor published in the *Sarawak Gazette* of May 3, 1905. A copy may be seen at the London Office of the British North Borneo Company.)

MALAYA'S WAR EFFORT

By G. E. CATOR

MALAYA has several claims to distinction, and perhaps it is permissible to include among these the fact mentioned in the January issue of the ASIATIC REVIEW that with an area equal to that of England and a population barely exceeding 5,000,000 persons it supports no less than seven administrations; the number can indeed be brought up to the round dozen if one includes the State Governments of each of the Federated Malay States and that of Brunei in Borneo, which is within the administrative sphere of the High Commissioner.

Its population, mainly represented by Malays, Chinese and Indians, contains in sufficient numbers to merit separate classification in a Census representatives of seventy different races.

In these circumstances Malaya might be expected to be a forcing ground of territorial jealousies and of oppressed minorities longing for the strong arm of a Führer to relieve them from intolerable indignities; but, in fact, the country presents the reverse of the picture.

The various Governments work together in admirable harmony and with a proper respect for each other's rights and their own obligations, and there is complete unanimity of opinion that this war is a just war which could not honourably be avoided, and in which it is Malaya's duty to render all possible assistance to the Allied cause.

The geographical position of Malaya, its great resources, and the diversity of its population encourage political realism; no one could delude himself into believing that without strong external protection Malaya could defend itself from assault and robbery.

That protection has been afforded by Great Britain and particularly by the Royal Navy, and it should be a source of legitimate pride that the manner in which that protection has been operated has been such as to induce in the peoples of Malaya not a dull acquiescence in the less of two evils but an active pride in partnership in the British Empire and a desire to participate in the obligations as well as the privileges of that partnership.

The legal liabilities of Malaya in respect of defence are limited to a contribution by the Colony of the Straits Settlements to the cost of the local garrison and the maintenance by the Federated Malay States of a battalion of the Indian Army stationed in Perak,

but the actual monetary contributions offered and accepted between 1919 and 1939 double this amount.

In addition, each of the States and Settlements of Malaya maintains an efficient and well equipped Volunteer Force, and all combine to provide units of the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force.

It is a particular source of satisfaction to the Rulers that the Malay Regiment, a regular force recruited from the Malay population, has been able to take its allotted place in the scheme of local defence.

Generous contributions have also been made by the Straits Settlements in supplement of their statutory liability, by the Federated Malay States for the purposes of the naval base and for the purchase of aircraft and by each of the States either for specific purposes or free of conditions.

Altogether during the twenty years preceding the present war Malaya has contributed for purposes of imperial defence a sum of not less than £20,000,000.

These contributions have not been benevolences forced on a reluctant Malaya by Whitehall or Government House; in the Colony the initiative has come from the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and in every instance has the unanimous and enthusiastic support of the whole body; in the Malay States the gifts have been offered at the instance of the Rulers themselves, and, as those connected with Malayan Administration know, the task has been not that of persuading or pressing the Rulers to make these offers, but of restraining their loyalty and generosity until the principle of making Malayan needs the first charge on Malayan revenues has been fully satisfied.

Preparations have not been limited to the military sphere. Before hostilities began arrangements had been made for the control of food and other essential supplies, the protection and utilization of transport, the prevention of profiteering and other measures for the security of the population and the maintenance of industry.

Drainage and irrigation schemes on a very large scale had been put in hand for the increase of the rice crop to reduce Malaya's dependence in foreign countries for this vital food supply.

When war broke out the various emergency schemes were brought into operation, and on the whole seem to have worked satisfactorily, a result due in part no doubt to the wise policy of the Administration in taking the public as far as possible into its confidence as to the measures taken and the reasons for them.

A Malaya Patriotic Fund was established for the relief of suffering, and so generous and immediate was the response that \$1,000,000 was collected before the end of 1939. £80,000 was sent to the Red Cross and St. John's War Fund in October and a

Christmas gift of £25,000 for other war charities, including the French Red Cross, was received later. An interesting feature is that women of all nationalities and creeds, including Muhammadans, are participating by knitting and sewing, and over forty cases of comforts have been despatched to England for distribution.

The State of Kedah offered a gift of \$1,000,000 for the purpose of the war, and nobody who read the eloquent and moving words in which His Highness the Regent made the offer could fail to be impressed by the sincerity and loyalty of himself and his people.

More recently the Federal Council, at the instance of the Rulers of the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pehang, have offered \$85,000,000 for the same purpose. As announced a few days ago, the little State of Perlis, with its area of 316 square miles and its population of 50,000 persons, has given \$50,000.

These contributions, like those offered for defence before the war, have imposed no additional burden on the Malayan taxpayer, nor have they been made at the expense of Malaya's development, since they have been drawn either from accumulated assets or from the revenue arising as the result of the war from the demand for Malaya's staple products of tin and rubber; but the universal feeling is that Malaya does not wish to profit from the war, and suggestions are being considered as to how further assistance may best be given.

The remarkable feature of these discussions is that the question of whether Malaya should or ought to make further contributions is simply not raised; the answer is taken for granted. The sole topic is the manner and form which they can most conveniently take.

Altogether Malaya's record both before the war and after its outbreak is an inspiring one. Strikes and labour troubles have recently been reported, but they have only affected a small proportion of the population and are certainly not signs of disloyalty or wide discontent. In the best-conducted community there are always some mischief makers, and the rise in the cost of living which Malaya's dependence on imported foodstuffs has made inevitable has given these their opportunity.

Taking a broad survey, both we in Great Britain and the people of Malaya have reason to be proud of the relationship that has been established and of the indubitable evidence of Malaya's loyalty and willingness to accept a full share of the burden of the Empire.

TRAVELS IN THE ANCIENT PROVINCE OF
ARMENIA MINOR—II*

By E. H. KING

THE HISTORY OF THE CASTLE

At about four o'clock in the afternoon Khurman Kalesi, or as it must now be styled the Castle of Taublur, confronted my gaze, surmounting a rocky eminence as we approached it from the south (Fig. 4); the Khurman Su flows beneath the western front of the fortress, whilst the elusive Marabus Su links up with the main stream at a point to the south of this mediæval Patriarchal Seat just beyond the "field" of my camera.

That Khurman Kalesi must indeed be synonymous with the Castle of Taublur I shall endeavour to prove.

My deductions are principally based on material provided in Volume I. of that most reliable work entitled *Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l'Arménie*, compiled by M. J. Saint-Martin and published in Paris in the year 1818. Much of the information provided by M. Saint-Martin is derived from material supplied by early writers; and in regard to the particular connection with which we are concerned, historic reference is made to the *magnum opus* entitled *History of Armenia*, produced by the Mekhtiarist monk, Father Michael Tchamitchean, in the eighteenth century. The section reproduced in this article forms part of the map specially prepared for that work. Now just beneath the spot where Taublur is marked thereon my reader will observe the name "Jahan" indicated. "Jahan," or as Saint-Martin spells it "Dehahan," constituted the province wherein the Castle of Taublur stood. Within this province he states there also stood the village of Ablesdan, corresponding to that known today as Albistan, which lies at a distance of about 24 miles to the southwest of the castle as the crow flies. Furthermore, this province comprised the ancient seat of a "particular" Armenian Patriarchate situated at Honi, which is marked on the map as lying eastward of Taublur. These three localities are the only ones mentioned in the exhaustive work of M. Saint-Martin as being situated within the confines of the province of Jahan. The geographical relationships of the modern villages of Honi and Albistan (neither of which provide ancient archaeological material) with the position of Khurman Kalesi forcibly support my theory, which is further confirmed by a comparison of the relative positions as between Taublur and the mediæval town known to the Armenians "of the

* The first part of this article appeared in the January issue.

exile" as Coxun lying to the south which corresponds with the modern village of Geuksun.

It is true that Saint-Martin does not refer to a Castle of Khurman in his treatise, for the simple reason that it probably acquired its present name (as is frequently the case) within comparatively recent times, and it is equally true that had it existed under its present name when his work was compiled, an indication of the locality at least of such a substantial fortress would certainly not have been overlooked. The fact that the natives inhabiting these regions have never heard of the existence of a "Castle of Taublur" is of no consequence whatsoever, for over 120 years have elapsed since the publication of M. Saint-Martin's work, and, moreover, the Turkish villager is not historically minded!

Finally, I would emphasize the fact that no other castle is known to exist within the borders of the territory which formerly constituted the province of Jahan.

History does not record the exact date of the construction of this castle, nor do we know by whom it was erected. It may be ascribed to the Middle Ages and is doubtless of Byzantine origin, although, inasmuch as it is historically associated only with its occupation by the Armenian Patriarchs, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was strengthened and extended at their instigation during the period when it constituted their official residence, described as being between the years 1064 and 1113.

At an epoch when bitter religious animosities prevailed between nations it became no unusual custom for the Armenian Patriarchate to be installed in strong fortresses. Gregory III., for instance, in the year 1125 established the Patriarchal Seat in the fortress known as the Castle of Dzovk, his paternal inheritance, the remains of which probably still stand on an island situated on the lake marked on the map as the "Great Zophs Seas" and corresponding with that today known as Geuldjik, lying to the south-east of the town of Kharput.

We learn that he much improved and refortified this castle. Yet again, in the year 1147, the same patriarch caused the seat to be removed from the Castle of Dzovk in consequence of the encroachments of the Sultans of Iconia, and it was then installed in the Roman castle at Hiromcla, indicated on the map as lying to the south of Marash. This fortress was likewise strengthened and a magnificent church was erected nearby. I mention these facts in parenthesis in support of my suggestion that the Castle of Taublur was doubtless similarly treated at the hands of a race which was ever famed for its architectural achievements. I only regret that lack of time and other considerations prevented my visiting these fortresses in person. However, if I am still in the land of the living, I hope to make good the deficiency *après la guerre!*

Catchick II. was the first patriarch to reside in the Castle of Taublur, whither he journeyed from Constantinople in the year 1064.*

Here he received news of the massacres perpetrated amongst his countrymen when the city of Ani was sacked by the Seljouk Sultan Alp Arslan in the same year. Catchick had originally resided in Ani when he was installed in the Patriarchate six years previously, and upon receipt of these sad tidings the good man became so overpowered with grief that he died at Taublur after having dwelt within the castle for a period of only seven months. Residence amidst these lonely wilds could hardly have proved conducive to hilarity under the most favourable circumstances, and doubtless it was upon a bleak and cheerless landscape that he must have gazed from the narrow apertures of the castle's walls.

Upon his death the Greeks endeavoured entirely to suppress the Armenian Patriarchate, hoping thereby to bring about a reconciliation between the Armenian and the Orthodox Church. However, through the influence of the daughter of King Gaghik Abas of Kars (a vassal kingdom created by the Armenian King Ashod III. in the year 961) with the Empress Eudoxia, this move was frustrated, and the year 1065 witnessed the elevation of Gregory II. to the Patriarchal Seat. His original name of Vahram was altered to that of Gregory to signify that the chair of the Armenian Patron Saint Gregory the Illuminator had been filled. Whether this beloved patriarch actually resided in the Castle of Taublur appears doubtful. At all events his election took place at a meeting of the Armenian clergy held in the Fortress of Dzamen-dav, the site of which corresponds with the position of the present-day village of Azizye, through which I passed during the course of my former journey into the Taurus Mountains, but it does not

* Since this article was written I have consulted the chronicle ascribed to the Armenian historian Matthew of Edessa, whose work was completed in the year 1136. According to this authority, Catchick II. must have taken up his residence at Taublur in the year 1062, his tenure of office extending over a period of three years (and not seven months, as stated by Tchamitchean), since he confirms that his death occurred in the year 1065. He likewise corroborates the accession of Kevork to the Patriarchal Seat in the year 1071, but it would appear that Tchamitchean has erroneously stated that Taublur constituted the Patriarchal Seat between the years 1064 and 1113, for subsequent to the deposition of Kevork the localities of the residences are indicated by Matthew of Edessa, and that of Taublur is not thereafter mentioned. In confirming its geographical locality as it has been indicated by me, he mentions that the word "Thauvplour" (an alternative form of spelling) signifies "a hill covered with thick grass or with trees of dense foliage." Certainly after the lapse of 800 years the hill upon which the castle stands is covered with clumps of thick grass, whilst trees such as the historian might have envisaged are to be seen standing at the base of the hill in the photograph reproduced (Fig. 4), though I would hardly advance these features as necessarily conclusive evidence in support of my theory!

Taublur. The Armenian people, however, still regarded Gregory as their Spiritual Father, who had taken up his residence in company with a few friars at the Monastery of Areg, situated on the slopes of the Black Mountain (indicated on the map as lying to the south-east of Taublur). Kevork's jealousy was consequently incited, and he became so unpopular with his flock that, having exercised his office from Taublur for the space of only two years, he was deposed by Gregory after committing actions which rendered him odious in the eyes of the Armenian nation. Gregory then resumed the Patriarchate and resided in a locality named Mutarsum, which I am quite unable to identify. Tchamitchean records that Taublur constituted the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate between the years 1064 and 1113, but if this were the case I can only conclude that with the exception of the two patriarchs to whom I have referred, whose residence for short periods within the castle's walls is definitely established, it must have been very rarely occupied as an official residence. At all events the castle does not appear to figure as such in Armenian history subsequent to the deposition of Kevork.

In fact, the history of this remotely situated old fortress remains, as far as I have been able to ascertain at present, largely shrouded in mystery. Further research may provide enlightenment, and I had hoped that Armenian inscriptions might be discovered *in situ* which would reveal some helpful data; in this hope I was, however, doomed to disappointment.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASTLE

Access to the castle, which is rectangular in form, may today only be achieved from the southern side unless one be a practised mountaineer! The loopholed walls of the fortress are strengthened by massive square towers and circular turrets which, however, have crumbled into a state of advanced decay; the Mukhtar of Tanir told me that even he can recall the castle presenting a more imposing aspect than that which today confronts the traveller's gaze. The western rampart, of which a section is shown in the accompanying photograph (Fig. 5), was exceptionally strongly fortified, being buttressed by the addition of semicircular bastions; it also comprises the recessed entrance portal to the fortress, now, however, almost completely choked up with rubble. In order to

sented a stern and majestic aspect.

I was much exhausted, in my weakened state, by the effort entailed in reaching the southern wall, for the semi-precipitous slope is strewn with loose fragments of masonry. It is consequently extremely difficult to secure a foothold; however, I eventually succeeded in clambering, so to speak, "on all fours" through an aperture situated approximately in the centre of this rampart. It became immediately apparent to me that further investigations would entail considerable energy on my part, since the interior of the castle is more than half choked with débris.

After resting from my labours for a spell, I descended a perilous slope towards the western end of the fortress. Here I was able to identify a cavity about six foot square with the descent to the dungeon, although the tower of the "keep" of the castle by which it was doubtless surmounted has evidently long since collapsed within the ramparts. Access to the dungeon, however, is of course today impracticable, as is likewise a detailed inspection of the inner walls, unless an army of labourers were available to set about the Herculean task of removing the accumulated masses of masonry piled in mountainous heaps in the interior of the fortress. Retracing my steps, I next descended past an arched embrasure hewn out of the walls and reached what once constituted the entrance portal, which I have already described as being comprised in the western rampart. Here a circular cavity revealed the ancient well of the castle, obviously sunk at this spot in order to facilitate the drawing of water from the stream, today referred to as the Khurman Su, but which, in bygone ages, doubtless bore a different name. This stream, as I have already remarked, flows at the base of the rock on which the fortress stands, and, in fact, the photograph reproduced (Fig. 5) was taken from a point in close proximity to the right bank.

I felt far too weary and unwell and quite unequal to the task of scrambling along the northern rampart to the eastern extremity of the castle, and in fact nothing would have been gained by my so doing, since my friend the Mukhtar assured me that no mural inscriptions were to be seen and that no traces of habitations today existed amidst the confused masses of fallen masonry and rubble which abounded on every side. I had already examined the most important section of the fortress, and I am firmly convinced that I might have continued my investigations until I was black in the face without discovering any traces of its occupation by the

Armenian patriarchs of old. Equally convinced am I, nevertheless, that I had indeed located the ancient Castle of Taublur, although my satisfaction may have been tinged with regret at the apparent lack of corroborative evidence which I had ventured to hope might have been discernible in inscriptions upon those rugged stones.

Upon descending the rock in company with Bayezid and the Mukhtar, I repaired to a nearby mountain spring, from which I eagerly drank, since, although I was quite unable to partake of any substantial food, I was perpetually consumed with thirst. Close to this spring stood a deserted peasant's hut, and within this luxurious abode (which barely sufficed to accommodate us) we spread the "yorghans" and bedding which we had carried with us, and ultimately composed ourselves to slumber almost within the shadow of that venerable yet mysterious pile !

HOMeward Bound

Upon the morrow (August 24) we returned to Tanir, the journey through these silent wilds proving uneventful except in so far as a personal *contretemps* of minor importance was concerned. Scarcely had we set forth when my restive little steed took fright and bolted ! Standing, as I do, six feet five inches in height, it will be readily appreciated that I am invariably unable to maintain any grip with my knees about the middle of these wiry little Cappadocian horses, and I therefore adopted the line of least resistance and executed a graceful "stage fall," sustaining no more serious damage than a grazed wrist. Honour apparently being satisfied, the fiery little rascal soon quietened down, and the journey was resumed without further mishap ! We reached Tanir at about six o'clock in the evening, and here we passed the night as the guests of the Mukhtar as before, and upon the following day (August 25) we were ready to resume our journey by car, our destination, the small town of Derendeh, lying about 35 miles to the eastward as the crow flies.

The country through which we now travelled is similar in character to that which I have already described when dealing with the journey from Gürün to Yarpuz, no features of interest being encountered until we reached the main track leading from the village of Albistan to Derendeh. Close to the point of junction with this track stands the hamlet known as Arslan Tash (lion stone), so called from its proximity to a pair of lions of Hittite origin, crudely executed in granite and each measuring about eight feet in length. The lions appear in a "couchant" attitude, and it is difficult to account for their presence on this lonely plain. Mark Sykes mentions the existence of these lions in the course of his entertaining book entitled *Dar-ul-Islam*. He noticed them whilst travelling from Marash via Albistan to Derendeh in the year 1903,

and remarks that one of them was overturned, a defect which has evidently since been remedied! In the absence of any alternative explanation one might perhaps suggest that they once served to adorn a palace or other edifice, remains of which might be revealed by excavations carried out on the site.

Resuming our journey in the direction of Derendeh after covering a distance of about five miles, we reached the village known as Ashodeh. Its very name bespeaks its Armenian associations, since amongst the kings of the Bagratyd Dynasty Ashod I., Ashod II. and Ashod III. figure as three of the most prominent monarchs who ruled during the period of its sway (viz., 859 A.D. to 1042 A.D.). In all probability this centre was so named by the exiled King Gaghik in honour of his predecessors when it was founded by him during the eleventh century.

Here formerly stood a famous Armenian monastery built against the face of a cliff, and which Mark Sykes mentions as being in a ruined condition when he passed this way. Today, alas! even the ruins have been completely swept away, the old stones having been doubtless incorporated by the villagers in the construction of new dwellings. This practice, though deplorable, is by no means uncommon. The viewpoint of the Turks, however, is easily appreciated. In the first place, one must bear in mind the racial animosity which at all events formerly prevailed between the Turks and the Armenians; in the second place, the religious aspect of the position must not be overlooked where Islam and Christianity become involved; and, thirdly, it is only fair to point out that in nine cases out of ten these old churches and monasteries have fallen into desuetude and no longer serve their original purpose.

The village of Ashodeh lies, for the greater part, at the head of a deep and picturesque gorge. Glancing across this ravine I noticed, situated up on the side of the cliff, what appeared to be a small monastery hewn out of the living rock. From where I stood I could only discern a number of apertures surmounted by a tall cone of probably natural formation, such as may be found in profusion in the neighbourhood of the village of Urgub, lying to the west of the city of Cæsarea, where these curious troglodyte dwellings have been put to both secular and religious usage.

The villagers were unable to offer any reliable information as to the origin of this excavation; it would be quite inaccessible from the bottom of the ravine, being only approachable from the top of the opposite cliff, and to have reached it would have necessitated our undertaking a long détour. I endeavoured to photograph it from where I stood, but mist overhung the gorge, and the resultant effort would not justify presentation in the pages of the *ASIATIC REVIEW*, nor, for that matter, in those of any other reputable journal!

We reached the small town of Derendeh at about five o'clock in the afternoon and were hospitably welcomed by the Kaimakam, who had received notification of our eventual arrival some days previously from his colleague of the kaza of Gürün. My interpreter and I were most comfortably installed in spotlessly clean little rooms in the Kaimakam's house, and as he spoke fluent French I was able to converse freely with him.

My indisposition had, to some extent, abated, although I was far from being capable of fulfilling my kindly-host's expectations at the supper table, much to his dismay and disappointment. The following morning my eyes were gladdened by the delightful spectacle of the Kaimakam's three little daughters arrayed in all their festal finery in honour of my visit (as I was informed), though I suspect that they welcomed any excuse to deck themselves out in their full native attire! Be that as it may, the vivid colouring of their costumes, coupled with the golden hair ornaments and jewellery with which they had adorned themselves, contrast most pleasingly with the drab workaday clothing habitually worn, as exemplified in the family group photographed at Tanir. These little ladies were only too willing to pose for the photograph reproduced (Fig. 6), and the Kaimakam appeared mightily thrilled at the prospect of his offspring's likeness being portrayed in the British Press. He besought me to send him a copy of this article, and I promised to forward him a reprint, which will doubtless be treasured amongst the family archives! I am conscious of the fact that I have so far failed to present to my readers an example illustrating the Armenian national attire, and therefore I am now taking the opportunity of remedying this defect. Unfortunately the head-dress, which forms the most striking feature of the costume, is but rarely encountered, and I am indebted to a resident of Erivan for the reproduction of the accompanying photograph (Fig. 7), which I have selected in preference to one or two other examples photographed by myself on account of the handsome and characteristic features of the subject, an Armenian girl dwelling close to the shores of Lake Sevan. I think it will be generally admitted that whilst extremely picturesque in appearance the massive collar and the golden metallic discs suspended over the brow, combined with the heavy folds of the rich silken material of which the head-dress is composed, must cause extreme discomfort if worn for protracted periods!

The little town of Derendeh, boasting a population of about 3,000 souls, is charmingly situated amidst extensive gardens and constitutes the principal market for the sale of much of the fruit that is grown in the surrounding country. Many of the houses of the new town are built of stone, and an imposing arch marks the entrance to the bazaar. A stream forming a tributary of the

PLATE I^r



FIG. 4.—FORMERLY THE SEAT OF THE ARMENIAN PATRIARCHATE : KHURMAN KALESTI, AS APPROACHED
FROM THE SOUTH.

Travels in the Ancient Province of Armenia Minor.

ATE V.




FIG. 5.—KHURMAN KALESI, AS VIEWED FROM THE WEST.

PLATE VI.



FIG. 7.—THE HEAD-DRess OF THE ARMENIAN
NATIONAL COSTUME.

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



FIG. 6.—TURKISH CHILDREN IN FESTAL,
ATTIRE AT DERENDEH.

Travels in the Ancient Provinces of Armenia Minor.

PLATE VII.



Aghon Su meanders through the town, the houses of which are scattered along its banks over a considerable distance. Whilst the new town stands in an opening of the Gorge of Derendeh the old town lies, or rather lay, at the narrowest part of the gorge, which we descended by a gradual slope on our arrival. The castle, which probably dated from the period of this centre's colonization by the Armenians "of the exile" in the eleventh century, once stood high up on the side of a cliff at the mouth of a small ravine. Part of the outer wall, constructed of sandstone, presents a romantic and picturesque appearance as viewed from beneath, but upon investigation after a somewhat arduous climb I found that it merely served to conceal a conglomeration of ruinous stone walls and fallen débris completely devoid of archaeological interest. The minarets of two mosques constructed of the same material stand between the road by which we travelled and the foot of the cliff, and were probably erected when Derendeh fell into the hands of the Seljouk Turks after the Armenians had, as previously explained, pressed southward into the Cilician Taurus Mountains. Between this point and the new town a most imposing lateral cleft in the cliff, probably some 15 feet in width, stretches as far as the eye can see, at the base of which the waters of the Aghan Su flow into its tributary.

Later in the day we set out for Gürün, which is easily reached by car from Derendeh in the space of little more than an hour, standing as it does at a distance of some 30 miles to the northwest of the latter town. We were warmly welcomed by the "mudir," who corresponds to some extent to a magistrate, but who also occupies himself in supervising the territory to which he is assigned, investigating any complaints and generally advising the natives on matters of local import and interest. This functionary was absent at the time of our former visit. He deplored the fact that he could not offer us accommodation for the night, as every room in his house was occupied, but he invited us to partake of his supper, an offer of which we were glad to avail ourselves. There was present at this repast an individual who appeared immensely intrigued to hear that we had visited Khurman Kalesi in the course of our wanderings. He spoke German about as badly as I do, but we were able to maintain some conversation. "Were you seeking the tomb of the king?" he enquired. "What tomb and of which king?" I replied. Somewhat nonplussed, he proceeded to explain that according to an ancient legend an Armenian monarch was buried, together with his jewelled sword and a ring of fabulous worth, close to the Castle of Khurman, if not indeed within its walls. No other member of the company was able to corroborate the existence of the legend, however, so that I am afraid our friend was playing

a lone hand! I suggested that he could not better employ his time than by repairing forthwith to the castle, armed with pickaxe and shovel, with a view to removing the accumulated débris of centuries. This Herculean task would provide him with occupation of a strenuous character for the space of the next few years, at the end of which period he would then be able to set about his excavations beneath the castle itself in search of the tomb! I am bound to admit that he took my chaffing in very good part, and upon bidding him farewell I begged him to remember my advice, "for," I observed, "you are youthful and strong, and reflect upon the potential reward that may await you. If you so will it, you may be able to live in indolence and affluence to the end of your days!"

After passing the night at the same khan where we had formerly stayed, we set out upon the following morning in the direction of Kangal, which lies at a distance of about 45 miles to the north-east of Gürün.

The country through which we passed is of a bleak and desolate description, the landscape being rendered the more dreary by reason of the prolonged torrential rain which descended upon us. On reaching the village we sought out the Mukhtar. The Armenian church, which dated from the eleventh century, has been largely demolished, as in the case of the monastery at Ashodeh, little beyond the lower portion of the edifice today being visible, but the Mukhtar showed me a number of the old stones of which it was built inserted into the walls of some of the dwellings. Upon a few of these stones crosses and traceries were carved, but I could discover no fragments of inscriptions. Within this church was once preserved the famous *Book of Kangal*, a fine illuminated manuscript of the Gospels compiled in the eleventh century and reputed to have been used by the exiled King Gaghik himself.

As to this beautiful historic volume's whereabouts today I can proffer no suggestion, but if it is indeed still in existence it would never surprise me to learn of its being offered for sale by one of the legion of enterprising traders of the bazaars of Istanbul. There being nothing of further interest to induce me to prolong my stay amidst this sadly woebegone little community, we now set out on our return journey to Sivas, which lies about 60 miles distant in a north-westerly direction.

From Kangal, which stands at an altitude of 5,220 feet, the road at first traverses undulating hills, and ere long a fine view is obtained of the imposing peak known as Yilanli Dagh and of the ridge that marks the limit of the basin of the River Euphrates. A short, steep ascent next leads to a curious crag known as Delik Tash, a perforated stone in which a small chamber has been excavated. This point is situated at a height of 6,293 feet, and a

subsequent sharp descent leads to the village of Ulash, through which we had passed in the course of our outward journey. We duly reached Sivas as night was falling on Sunday, August 27, only to learn of the dramatic turn of events which darkened the international horizon.

I had planned to return to Venice and to proceed thence to a delightful villa situated at Cap d'Ail on the shores of the French Riviera. Here I had joyfully anticipated passing a few serenely happy and sunlit days in the charming company of two ladies, who themselves are able to recall vivid memories of the Middle East and who had been entertaining a series of house parties at this delightful resort. Miss Molly Pears, who had originally proposed this wholly enchanting contrast to the rigours of travel in the wilds of Asia Minor, was herself born in Turkey, being the daughter of Mr. Henry E. Pears, formerly one of the most prominent British residents of Istanbul, and the son of an equally prominent father. He practised as a barrister in the Turkish courts for nearly half a century, and since Mr. and Mrs. Pears are today close neighbours of mine in London I am thus most fortunately placed in touch with a never-failing source of advice and kindly assistance in so far as Turkish customs are concerned.

This blissful prospect which I had envisaged was, needless to say, of necessity abandoned forthwith, and I was compelled to board the Orient Express at Istanbul on Thursday, August 31, no 'plane service to England operating at that time. On that fateful Sunday, September 3, all passengers were required to leave the train at Lausanne, and thus it became necessary to wend my way homewards by easy stages.

And so, until the tyranny and thraldom imposed by this pestilential Nazi régime be overthrown, a halt must perforce be called to my wanderings in Armenia. Gladly would I have travelled southward from the Castle of Taublur towards the stronghold of Zeitun, and yet again from thence to the Castle of Hiromcla, lying to the south-east. In spirit, at least, I continue to pursue my way through the wild country stretching to the northward, where the fortresses of Behesne and Kesun must still stand, bearing silent witness to the exploits of Vasil the Crafty, the Armenian chieftain whose predatory bands in mediæval times spread terror and destruction far and wide, throughout these regions. Please God, the day may not be far distant when these flights of fancy may become crystallized into realization, since that day must, of a surety, witness the dawn of a new era when the nations of the world shall dwell together in peace, security and prosperity, freed from the threats to political independence and the stranglehold of aggression which bid fair to sap the vitality and the life-blood of the human race.

3**

INDIA'S WAR-TIME TRADE AND FINANCE

By R. W. BROCK

(Formerly Editor of *Capital*, Calcutta)

In the January issue of the *ASIATIC REVIEW*, which contained Sir Frank Noyce's valuable analysis of "India's Economic Contribution to the War" and the accompanying discussion, I ventured to add the short supplementary comment:

It is not possible at this stage to forecast the final outcome of the renewed and intensified demand of Congress for a larger measure of Constitutional autonomy; but that one result of present international complications will be a further development of Indian industries appears to be, not merely probable, but certain. There is, however, a further possible line of advance—towards financial independence—which, perhaps, merits closer consideration than it has hitherto received. India's sterling debt still remains at the substantial figure of approximately £300,000,000. . . . A substantial further increase in India's favourable (trade) balance with this country certainly ranks among the possibilities. . . . In the event of the war lasting three years, India on this basis may well find herself in a position to reduce her sterling indebtedness, and, if so, certainly every facility should be afforded to enable her to do so.

Elaborating this suggestion in *Capital's* Annual "Indian Industries, Trade and Transport Supplement," dated December 14 last, I wrote:

One immediate advantage of the war to primary producers has been a return to a more profitable price-level, from which India is benefiting in common with other countries similarly circumstanced. For this reason the near future may be expected to witness a further considerable improvement in India's balance of trade with the United Kingdom, arising from larger purchases as well as higher prices, and not improbably this balance will be increased by at least a temporary diminution, owing to lack of supplies, in British exports to India. If so, the United Kingdom will find itself in the position of buying more from—and selling less to—India than at any previous period in their long commercial association. In that event an interesting possibility arises, which merits the most careful consideration. If, happily, the war is short in duration, no very large balance will accumulate in India's favour. If, unhappily, the conflict is prolonged, and Indian shipments of war necessities attain abnormal dimensions, it may be hoped that consideration will be given to the possibility of offsetting these exceptional shipments, as far as such a device may be practicable, by the repatriation of Indian sterling securities, thereby reducing permanently the burden of India's sterling obligations. Today the sterling debt of India is still of the order of £300,000,000, and it is to India's credit, in every sense of the word, that the interest charges have always been fully and promptly met. Nor will any competent and unbiased economist challenge the view that India herself has benefited immeasurably from the productive undertakings which British loans have made possible. There will, however, also be

equally complete agreement that, if India's sterling debt can be reduced, every opportunity should be taken to reduce it. That policy has been followed in the past, and, if adventitious circumstances permit, it should be resumed in the future. The Congress claim to political independence may excite opposition and anxiety; but it is no longer doubted in any quarter that India has benefited by the larger measure of industrial independence she has gained since the last war, and if she can now proceed to acquire a larger measure of financial independence the benefits so conferred will not be confined to India alone. For, in practice, the less India has to pay in the way of interest charges, other things remaining equal, the larger will be the proportion of the sterling proceeds from her shipments of produce to the United Kingdom which she will be able to devote to the purchase of British goods. One may go further and say that, of the many possible methods of reviving British exports, this method, always assuming that circumstances render it practicable, is not the least hopeful or the least potent. . . . India, it will be agreed, can only benefit by reducing her sterling debt as quickly and to as large an extent as circumstances permit.

INDIA GOVERNMENT'S REPATRIATION SCHEME

Ample justification of the general accuracy of this diagnosis was afforded by the following official announcement reproduced in the *Financial Times*, dated February 23:

NEW DELHI,

February 23.

With a view to facilitating repatriation of the Government's sterling debt, the Central Government of India today issued a notification providing for the creation of rupee loans as counterparts of various Indian terminable sterling loans.

As sterling non-terminable 3 and 3½ per cent. loans already have existing counterparts, it is not necessary to include them in the notification, but similar arrangements will be adopted in regard to them.

In order to introduce these new rupee loans to the market, the Government will at first issue them on its own account in conversion of corresponding sterling securities purchased by it. From April 1 next these facilities will be open to the public on terms to be announced by the Reserve Bank from time to time.

The amounts quoted in London of the above India sterling loans and the current middle quotations are set out as below :

£9,500,000	3 per cent.	1949-53	96½
10,000,000	3½ " "	1954-59	101
11,355,000	4 " "	1948-53	106
£38,902,780	4½ " "	1950-55	110
£17,500,000	4½ " "	1958-68	111
£8,879,614	5 " "	1942-47	107

The aggregate amount involved totals £66,137,394. The 3 per cent. and 3½ per cent. (non-terminable) sterling loans are quoted at 78 and 91 respectively, the amounts quoted being £76,784,185 and £87,317,884 respectively—together, £164,102,069. There is also the £11,539,986 2½ per cent. sterling loan, which stands at 65½. All three so-called non-terminable loans are redeemable at the option of the Government of India.

India's sterling balances in London at present are estimated at £150,000,000. In the first ten months of the current fiscal year from April 1

last remittances of Government funds by India have been made to the extent of £55,000,000. Between the years 1927-28 and 1938-39 the India Government borrowed some £32,000,000 on balance in London by loan issues.

Welcoming this announcement as affording "solid evidence of the exceptionally strong sterling position of the India Government," the City Editor of *The Times* wrote on February 24: "How strong this is can best be judged by the returns of the Reserve Bank, which since just before the beginning of the war have shown an expansion of about £50,000,000 in sterling assets. . . . Incidentally, the ability of the India Government to deal in this manner with much of its shorter-term sterling debt removes the prospect of additional sterling loans on the London market on their maturity. And to the extent that the service of India's sterling loans is diminished by this operation, the country's exchange position is the stronger."

INDIA'S LARGE STERLING RESOURCES

In order to explain this sudden and impressive reinforcement of India's sterling resources one further quotation will suffice. It is taken from the *Financial Times*, dated February 24, and runs as follows:

INDIA TRADE BOOMING

Remarkable figures are disclosed by the January returns for Indian sea-borne trade. They are indicative of the beneficial effect of the war on trade in this part of our Empire, and are the more interesting in view of the decision of the India Government to take steps to facilitate repatriation of its sterling debt.

Total merchandise turnover actually exceeded 4,000 lakhs of rupees, a figure certainly not bettered for any single month of the past decade, and probably the highest since the halcyon days of the Great War. It must be remembered, too, that prior to April, 1937, all returns included figures for Burma, which became separated from India at the end of March of that year.

Both exports and imports increased substantially last month to the highest total for years, but the expansion in exports was the greater . . . on merchandise account alone; the favourable balance was as much as Rs. 805 lakhs. The change from January, 1939, is extraordinary, since that particular month ended with an adverse balance, both on merchandise and treasure account.

Huge Remittances

By a curious coincidence gold exports from India in January were the same as the merchandise surplus—namely, Rs. 805 lakhs. Incidentally, this was the largest gold shipment on private account from India since the Rs. 1,000 lakhs for February, 1934.

Imports of silver also swung upwards last month, but only to a modest extent, and the net result of the various movements was a favourable visible balance of trade of no less than Rs. 1,562 lakhs, the best figure since December, 1931.

For the ten months of the fiscal year to date the total balance in favour of India on all accounts is Rs. 6,063 lakhs, as compared with only Rs. 2,660 lakhs for the corresponding period of 1938-39.

Furthermore, remittances of funds last month amounted to Rs. 1,478 lakhs, making a total of no less than Rs. 7,430 lakhs for the current fiscal year. This is equivalent to more than £55,000,000.

Previous expectations having thus been justified by the sequence of events, the question arises: what of the future? And to that question the answer must be that, as far as can be calculated, the trend in Indo-British trade relations which has characterized the first months of the war is likely to persist until the conflict and the abnormal conditions and requirements it has created come to an end. In other words, as during the World War, so long as the present struggle continues, India's imports will be abnormally small, and her exports will be abnormally large. Today, as the outcome of two decades of intensive industrial development, India has a larger and more varied capacity for manufacture, and is better equipped to meet emergent and even normal requirements, than at any previous stage in her history. Furthermore, fuller utilization of her existing industrial equipment makes possible considerably larger outputs than were being achieved before the war began. To quote only one example, if the only relevant consideration was her technical capacity for production—regardless of reciprocal trade agreements and revenue considerations—India could dispense with imported cotton goods altogether, as well as with various other imported goods only slightly less important. Under war conditions, moreover, many of her normal imports will inevitably decline either owing to a temporary diminution in demand, or, in many cases, owing to lack of supplies and difficulties of transport, arising from the concentration of British productive capacity and shipping facilities on war requirements. It is not difficult to envisage many instances in which the suspension of imported supplies will be compensated by a further expansion in local manufacture, as in 1914-18 and the years that followed. Many important munition contracts have been placed in India, in respect of goods which were outside her range of production a quarter of a century ago, and if further justification was required for the programme of industrial development which has been pursued in the intervening years, it has been provided by India's additional value today as a source of supply in terms of war requirements.

INDIA'S WAR EFFORT

Indeed, it is no disparagement of India's other war efforts to say that her principal contribution to victory in the present conflict will be economic and financial—viz., in materials and money rather than in man-power. It is therefore of additional importance that India's resources in these two vital spheres should be utilized to the limit of her often underrated capacity in these

directions. In the event, indeed, of a prolonged conflict the question arises whether the United Kingdom can meet the huge expenditure involved without mobilizing the financial resources of the whole Empire, including, as a necessary corollary, the repatriation of Empire securities, valued in the aggregate at about £1,000,000,000, at present held by British investors. The assumption, implicit or explicit in so many current programmes of war finance, that repatriation is impracticable is unsupported either by ascertained facts or by reasonable probabilities. On the contrary, as attested by the official announcement quoted above, so far as India is concerned, repatriation is not only feasible. It is already in operation, and funds thus released will be available for re-investment in British War Loans.

For war and post-war purposes alike, even viewing the project exclusively from the angle of the United Kingdom, there are excellent reasons for extending every possible encouragement and facility to the repatriation process. In so far as sales of British oversea securities are in any event unavoidable, to assist in paying for essential imports, there is the not unimportant consideration that, at any rate, repatriated Empire securities, although lost to British investors, would remain within the Empire, and would continue to contribute to its aggregate financial strength. And as, apart from all other considerations, Empire markets absorb approximately 50 per cent. of all British exports, any influence making for their greater prosperity becomes of vital importance to the future welfare of British industry.

DEBTS—AND LOW COMMODITY PRICES

It is also apt to be forgotten that, owing to the low level of commodity prices during the last decade, the sterling obligations of India and the Dominions have become far more onerous than in earlier years, when primary products, which form their principal exports, yielded higher returns. This aspect of Empire indebtedness was debated very fully at the Ottawa Conference in 1932, although it attracted less attention than the more spectacular issue of preferential tariffs, which have been largely stultified by the loss of purchasing power which low commodity prices entail. Moreover, the intervening years, except for short periods, brought no substantial improvement in the commodity position: India, until the outbreak of war, being able to meet her sterling commitments, totalling about £40,000,000 yearly, only by exports of dehoarded gold which, since Great Britain left the gold standard, have aggregated over £250,000,000. As regards India, the persistence of the low-price handicap is sufficiently attested by the fact that, taking 100 as representing the price level in 1929, after working up to

72·3 in 1937 the Calcutta Wholesale Prices Index relapsed to 67·6 in 1938, and remained at about that level until late in 1939.

As I have urged, war-time trading and financial conditions afford an opportunity to cut this Gordian knot which it would be shortsighted to neglect. For India, as for the Dominions, financial independence and self-sufficiency is undoubtedly the next step forward; and economically as well as politically, the imperial structure will be immeasurably stronger when it has been attained. To summarize the position in a single sentence: only at war levels are commodity prices high enough to enable India and the Dominions to meet sterling charges without recourse to fiscal and financial measures deleterious to their purchases of British manufactures. British industrialists have for many years been fully conscious of this handicap, but no opportunity has hitherto arisen to remove it. The exigencies of war finance have created conditions rendering possible the removal of this massive hindrance to inter-imperial trade once and for all. During the World War, largely as the result of British expenditure, the United States evolved from a debtor to a creditor country. This time let our own Empire be afforded a like opportunity, and a comparable gain!

INDIA'S LATENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES

In the British Commonwealth "freedom broadens slowly from precedent to precedent." Under the Statute of Westminster the four Dominions achieved a Constitutional status which India hopes, within a measurable period, to share. Concurrently, India and the Dominions alike have made a considerable advance towards industrial maturity, and, as a result, as every newspaper reader can realize, the Empire has been made stronger for every purpose of modern warfare—in which victory depends primarily on superior industrial and financial strength—than ever before. The major units of the Commonwealth, however, will attain their full stature only when, to political autonomy and industrial development, is added the further advantage of financial self-sufficiency; and, that being so, British war expenditure, as far as practicable, might well be employed to promote the materialization of that objective. By no measure less spectacular or stimulating can the latent financial resources of the outer Empire be fully mobilized. The prompt over-subscription of the Canadian War Loan for £55,000,000 afforded one indication of the resources waiting to be tapped, and the Indian official scheme for the repatriation of sterling securities adds another. India and the Dominions are unanimously anti-Nazi, but an additional incentive may be required to ensure in these countries War Savings campaigns as extensive and intensive as that now going forward in the United Kingdom, and such an incentive would be supplied by setting before these

dynamic communities the now practicable, as well as desirable, goal of financial independence. That goal is worth striving for, even though circumstances may deter its attainment in a single stride.

After the World War Indian investors acquired substantial blocks of Indian industrial shares formerly held by British residents, and during the last couple of decades there has been no more striking feature of Indian finance than the growing ability and readiness of Indian investors to finance capital expenditure by the Government of India, and, more recently, similar commitments of the Provincial Governments and progressive Indian States. In recent years very considerable sums have also gone into industrial development: a process assisted by the exchange of hoarded gold for active currency, much of which has gone into profit-yielding investments. India's direct monetary contribution to the cost of the World War approached £150,000,000: a sum which may be contrasted with the £300,000,000 of sterling debt which, under the new official scheme, it is proposed to begin to repatriate. It is a scheme which may well enlist Indian sentiment and resources, if reinforced by skilful propaganda. For, whereas the Congress slogan, "Political Independence" provokes doubts and disunity, all classes and interests are at one in recognizing the desirability of "Financial Autonomy"; and, apart from the very solid advantages it would yield, this objective has the further considerable merit of coming within the range of practical attainment, supported by every administrative authority from the Secretary of State downwards. The Congress programme, however chimerical, may nevertheless serve as a reminder that politicians, like Stock Exchange operators, are happy only when they have "something to go for": the difference between Political and Financial Independence for India, however, being that, whereas the former would represent a reckless gamble, the latter can be vouched for as a sound investment, and therefore justifying a very strenuous, continuous and co-operative effort to attain.

POTENTIAL GAIN TO BRITISH INDUSTRY

I have indicated above that, apart from the immediate exigencies of war finance, reduction or elimination of India's sterling indebtedness would carry the considerable post-war advantage of enabling India to use her sterling resources, constantly replenished by the export to the United Kingdom of one-third of all her exports, to buy British manufactures instead of paying interest and redemption charges. And as the latter obligation, at, say, 40 crores, absorbs the sterling equivalent of approximately one-quarter of all Indian exports (which, in 1938-39, were valued at approxi-

mately 160 crores)* the potential gain to British exporters would be substantial. In fact, if the Indian remittances now allocated to British investors could be diverted wholly to the purchase of British manufactures, the result would be that British exports to India would be nearly doubled, and the profits of the exporting industries concerned would increase correspondingly. *Mutatis mutandis*, comparable benefits would ensue from the repatriation of Dominion securities. At the Ottawa Conference the New Zealand delegate epitomized the commercial consequences to that Dominion of low-commodity prices when he said: "In 1928 and 1929 the external debt charges of New Zealand absorbed little more than one-sixth of the value of exports, whilst at present they absorb about one-third of the value of exports," and that calculation remained more or less applicable up to the outbreak of the present war.

The argument here presented is therefore quite clearly that, if these interest charges continue, it can only be at the expense of British exports. Commercial conditions, it is essential to remember, are always changing, never static, and we must face the fact that a stage has been reached in the economic evolution of the British Commonwealth when British investments in India and the Dominions—although originally beneficial, by supplying the capital needed for essential developments, especially public utilities—have survived to become a burden, owing to fundamental changes in recent years in the whole system and content of international trade. In India itself, the three most decisive factors contributing to the diminution of British exports have been: the cessation of the former flow of British capital, except to a minor extent; the expansion of local manufacture; and, last not least, the sharp decline in Indian exports to Continental Europe, the proceeds of which used to go, for the most part, to the purchase of British goods. As all these new factors have come to stay, British exports to India require some new and powerful stimulus which the elimination of India's sterling obligations would unquestionably provide. Equally potent would be the restoration of commodity prices to the 1929 levels, as urged so fervently by the Empire representatives at the Ottawa Conference, but never implemented.

A certain amount of British capital continues to trickle into India, but, as compared with earlier years, there is a vital difference, alike in its destination and in its effect. When, for example, British capital, in hundreds of millions, was being utilized to build railways and extent irrigation the investment was complementary, stimulating the production and export of primary pro-

* *Review of the Trade of India in 1938-39*. Statistical Research Branch, India.

ducts; which ultimately were exchanged for British manufactures. In more recent years, however, British investments in India have contributed not to complementary, but to *competitive*, production—textile mills, chemical factories, cigarette factories, tyres, etc.—leading, not to an increase in British exports to India, but, directly and designedly, to their diminution. Such developments can be counteracted only by measures of equal magnitude and potency. On the one hand, as urged above, the restoration of commodity prices to 1929 levels would revive the purchasing power destroyed at the beginning of the Great Depression, and since dormant. On the other, the reduction or elimination of sterling debts and obligations would release purchasing power now mortgaged elsewhere. In this context two forecasts may be hazarded. If the two measures just specified are adopted, there is no inherent reason why British exports to India should not regain their former dimensions and value. Alternatively, a further decline will be extremely difficult to avert.

INDIA'S AGRICULTURAL INDEBTEDNESS

Even more formidable and intractable than India's external indebtedness, as a hindrance to maximum production and trade, is the onerous burden of agricultural indebtedness which has formed the theme of so many authoritative analyses: accompanied, so far, by a disproportionately small measure of remedial activity. At about £900,000,000 the aggregate amount of this rural indebtedness is approximately three times the volume of India's external indebtedness; and whereas the latter represents monies borrowed at very low rates of interest and employed to build up highly profitable assets, the former has been borrowed at very high rates of interest, and, for the most part, is not represented by any new assets at all.* In the latest Hyderabad Administration Report it is announced that in order to find out the extent of agricultural indebtedness "a thorough enquiry was conducted." Hyderabad State comprises an area of 82,698 square miles, of which 21,697,447 acres are cultivated by occupants or landholders numbering about 1½ millions. The total agricultural debt is estimated to aggregate about 64½ crores of rupees, the average rate of interest is calculated at 18 per cent., and it is stated that "land is passing rapidly out of the possession of agriculturists into that of moneylenders." It is also reported that though the volume of agricultural debt is large, the agriculturist is solvent and he should be able to pay off this debt from the surplus produce of land, if suitable relief measures are adopted, as the value of agricultural land is said to be twenty-six

* *Report on the Administration of H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions for the year 1346 Fasli (1936-37).*

times the land revenue assessment. A number of relief and remedial measures are prescribed, and the results will be awaited with interest.

Taking India as a whole, it may be calculated that the amount of interest payable to moneylenders by the peasantry ranges between £150,000,000 and £200,000,000 per annum, and the depressing effect of this excessive toll on all forms of productivity can be readily inferred. India's economic system today, in fact, presents an anomalous juxtaposition of modern industrialism and medieval methods of cultivation and finance. The net result, as might be expected, is that while, in the main, agriculture remains stagnant—rural production failing to keep pace with the growth of population—industry remains relatively stunted, and will be unable to make a further considerable advance unless and until rural production and finance conform to more modern standards. In the last two decades it is legitimate to say that Indian industries have been sustained and stimulated largely by a form of economic cannibalism—namely, by feeding them on the import trades. As, however, nearly all such trades, coming within the range of India's powers of industrial digestion, have now been absorbed—although perhaps a few small and delectable morsels remain—not much further sustenance is available from that source. And that means that further expansion of Indian industries, in any major sense, must await the creation of new purchasing power in India itself, where the agriculturists form between 70 and 80 per cent. of the total population. In India, modern industry will, in other words, only really begin to live when usury dies. The moneylender is marked down for legislative strangulation, and the sooner he is so disposed of, the sooner India will attain a level of productivity appropriate to a country whose resources are large and whose population is rapidly approaching 400,000,000.

The solution of one economic problem often facilitates the solution of another. If and when India is able to liquidate her sterling debts, and the forty crores per annum now reserved for external payments are released for use inside the country, it need hardly be said that many developments would become possible which are at present either carried on only in a very limited way or are debarred altogether owing to lack of funds. In particular, there is vast scope in India for public utility projects. In the years preceding 1930 capital outlay on railway extensions and improvements was running at the high level of over £30,000,000 a year. All but a small fraction of that considerable commitment was abandoned in 1930, with serious reactions on many Indian and British industries, and that gap has never been refilled, either by the resuscitation of railway construction programmes, or by the

emergence of alternative outlets for surplus capital. The scope for public works nevertheless remains vast, as is incidentally indicated in the administration report of the Mysore Public Works Department* whose activities include irrigation works, the construction of roads and bridges, industrial projects, etc.—all, however, on a much more limited scale than would be possible if larger funds were available. And, of course, the report of every other State and Provincial Public Works Department reveals the same story. Every document bearing on India's economic resources carries the same lesson, including the report of the Imperial Institute† which, as Sir Harry Lindsay's annual survey shows, has meanwhile been converted from a peace-time into a war-time machine, although still preserving many of its normal functions and activities. To revert to my original theme, if circumstances enable India to repatriate her sterling debts, certain links with this country will be snapped, but new ones will be forged and many old ones will be strengthened. The British Commonwealth will achieve the highest attainable measure of political unity and economic strength when—but only when—it includes a prosperous and contented India. It is permissible to hope that a not unimportant by-product of the present conflict will be the fulfilment of that ideal.

**Administration Report of the Public Works Department, Mysore State, 1937-38.*

†*Imperial Institute, London, Annual Report, 1939.*

THE THREE MONTHS
A CANTICLE OF SPRING

By JOHN KAVANAGH

PERCE-NEIGE

(January)

On field and pasture, barren snow-wreaths lie,
And, in the hedgerows, song-birds droop and fall,
Tracing some pattern, vaguely miserable,
Of cold and hunger. One after one they die,
Liltless and disregarded. Old and dry,
Like some cheap, pauperworthy, holland pall,
A milkless mother-breast broods over all,
The unpitying, frozen, bare, and listless sky.

Bracken! O God! The crackling to the feet,
Warm, brown, and human! Gorse! The rabbits lurk,
Shelter, and crop their food here. And, beyond,
A woodland of young spruces, trim and sweet.
And there, between the woodland and the pond,
A pool of perce-neige—God's own handiwork.

COME! SISTER DEATH!

(February)

Come! Sister Death! Beloved Cousin, come!
That sealest up in peace the weariest eyes,
And lettest dream, in quiet of the tomb,
Until, by Jesus' grace, we do arise!
Let there be mosses strewn about my grave,
And lonely fern, and simples, bitter-sweet,
Like Jesus', who both lived and died to save,
To follow whom 'twere surely right and meet.

Come! Sister Sleep! for this is now thine hour,
And, in thy loving arms, thou cradlest deep
The loneliest soul who lived, save Him alone,
The Master and the Servant of His sheep.
He holdeth still His own within His power,
And giveth Sleep to those whose work is done.

EUCHARISTICA

(March)

Thus do the holiest and the lowliest meet,
 Thus do the heavens bend to touch the earth,
 And skyward springs Life's answering flame, to greet
 Its Lord Redeemer, jocund with all mirth;
 For birds do hasten mated nests to build,
 And blithe, the crocus gilds the sunny glade,
 And all the land with fecund hosts is filled,
 Whom God our Father for His joy hath made.

And shall the sons of men in hovels shrink
 God's blessed Daystar, who his chains hath riven,
 Leaping to kiss and bless both brook and brink,
 Whereat the armies of the newly-shriven,
 Clad in their sin-washed robes, forgathering, drink
 In lauding That, which He, the Lord, hath given?

MICHAEL

IN MEMORIAM M. O'D.

Or eagle vision, and of patient life,
 He laboured for a people not his own.
 Soaring above the frets of paltry strife,
 To meannesses and cowardice unknown,
 He planned and wrought; fashioning like a blade
 His steel-true mind, that blue like steel did burn.
 God give him rest! In spirit, be he laid
 Beneath Killarney's tasselled Royal Fern!

J. K.

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LEADING ARTICLE

TALES OF HORROR AND MYSTERY

By STANLEY RICE

EVEN if the title-page has not said so, it would not have taken Sherlock Holmes or, for the matter of that, Watson to discover that the author of these tales is an Indian Civilian or that he had served most, if not all, of his time in the Bombay Province. For the heroes belong very largely to the Indian Civil Service and live in Sind or Khandesh or Kathiawar. But it would have taken these famous detectives longer to discover why the book is called *Indian Christmas Stories*.^{*} For, in fact, there is nothing in any one of them that is even remotely suggestive of Christmas, except that the scene is sometimes (but not always) laid in the Christmas camp which seems to be a feature of life in Bombay and in the North of India. None of them conjures up any vision of snow or holly, of the junkettings at Dingley Dell, nor, if that is too much to expect of tales which are avowedly Indian, is there anything which touches on the usual festivities—the ski-racing, the tournaments, the dances, the banquets, sometimes over-up-roarious, which at any rate in some parts of India try to make up for their counterparts in England. On the contrary, Mr. Kincaid is, for the most part, tragic. His themes are the tiger-hunt, the camps in the Gir forest for lions, narrow escapes from an elephant, and other subjects connected with jungle life. Nor does he spare the tragedy. If he wants to, he kills the hero of his story without mercy, or slaughters an animal with equal non-chalance. As an example of the former, we may turn to the story called "A Christmas Morning in the Gir"—that is, the large forest in Kathiawar where the only lions still remaining in India are to be found. Curiously enough, this and one other are the only tales in the collection in which a European makes no appearance, and this second one is also called "A Christmas Eve in Sukkur." In the first of these the hero dies a horrible death at the hands of a lioness and her cubs; the second is the tale of an educated Indian who is afflicted with leprosy and drowns himself in the river.

Mr. Kincaid evidently knows best and loves the part of India where he has spent the best years of his life. He touches on some of the best points in the Indian character, as in the tale called

* *Indian Christmas Stories*, by C. A. Kincaid, c.v.o., i.c.s. (retd.). Times of India Press. Price 3s. 6d.

"The Old Graveyard at Sirur," in which the old Risaldar Major, who had been told off to avenge a feud arising out of the interruption of a *sati* ceremony by an English officer who married the young widow he had rescued, is himself carried wounded out of battle by the very man whom he had been commissioned to kill, and who thereafter becomes his devoted friend. One supposes that this story at least Mr. Kincaid picked up at first hand, for he begins: "When I was judge at Poona, several years before the Great War"—though, of course, it is not difficult to invent such a phrase.

India is an inexhaustible source for stories of the bizarre and the seemingly impossible. She has herself invented world-famous stories such as the Panchatantra, to say nothing of those which are embedded in the Mahabharata or which form part of the structure of the Ramayana. Mr. Kincaid has used with skill what would seem to be Indian material adapted to an English setting. Take, for example, the last story in the collection, called "The Werewolf." It is, of course, well known that in certain parts of India there is a belief that some men have the power of becoming beasts of prey and of destroying their fellows in that shape. In the story in question it is the *khansama* of a rest-house who becomes a hyena and all but kills an English officer, and does kill his servant. Now, from the Indian point of view there need be nothing very extraordinary in the story, though, of course, no educated Indian would today believe in it. One supposes that Mr. Kincaid has taken the story and embroidered it with the setting of two Englishmen who are travelling in a railway carriage in the hottest and most sultry time of the year, and are detained in a very hot station for a whole night. It would not be fair to tell how this episode is made to fit in to the tale of the werewolf. It must suffice to say that it is cleverly done and convincing, so far as any such stories can be convincing.

"The Naked Fakir" and "The Kidnapping of Major Mulvaney" are stories which exhibit the Indian in a less pleasant light. Both these stories hinge upon tricks. The naked fakir is really a disguised thief, who with a confederate, a disguised sepoy, manages to rob a Christmas camp of several hundred rupees while the officers are engaged in listening to a presumably cock-and-bull story of the fakir about a dancing-girl who had become *sati*. Major Mulvaney contrived to get himself kidnapped by a robber and then ransomed by the Government of Bombay, himself sharing the ransom with his bogus captor. To my mind the least satisfactory of the whole collection, which maintains a high level in the ranks of gruesomeness and mystery, is the one called "The Consequences of a Duck-Shoot." It is the story of a girl who attracts two young men; they agree that whoever shoots the

most duck shall propose to her first, and she contrives that the one she likes best shall win. There is nothing particularly Indian in this tale. Given slightly different circumstances, the whole incident might have happened in Norfolk. Nor is Mr. Kincaid quite so successful with his women as with his men, though it should be added that women figure very little in his collection. Such as there are, are too stereotyped, with "adorable smiles" and bewitching costumes and of great beauty. It may be ungallant, but I could take no interest at all, either in the sorrows of Mary, except when the elephant charged, or in the gaiety of Beryl, who pays her lover a very left-handed compliment when she tells him that she chose him because his rival had never even proposed to her.

Many of us who have lived in India must have regretted the opportunities we have lost of seeing a little further into the lives of the people. No doubt you cannot expect men who are tired after a long day's work in an uncongenial climate to deny themselves the recreation which they feel is only their due in order to poke about in search of local colour. On the other hand, these opportunities seldom come to a man in the towns and cities, and there are many officials of the I.C.S., the Forest Department, the engineers, and the police who have spent months, if not years, alone in the jungles and amongst the villagers, not suspecting, perhaps not caring, that there was an unexplored mine at hand ready to be worked. I have been into many Indian houses when visiting plague or cholera cases or intent on other business, but I have seldom delved below the surface, and could not even say whether my visits were taken in the spirit in which they were offered or were regarded as occasions for ceremonial cleansings or other Levitical purifications. It is true that I have now and then gleaned a few of the grapes of Ephraim, but not so many that I have not left more behind. Mr. Kincaid has done far more. If, as I suspect, the germs of most, if not all, of these stories is Indian, if he has heard tales of panther people, werewolves, elephants, tigers, and the rest roundabout jungle camp-fires and told in the Marathi or Gujarati or Sindi that he evidently knows well, he deserves no less credit than if they are simply the creation of his imagination. There are not many of us who could do as well. Unfortunately, the stories are so full of Indian names and Indian allusions, only some of which are explained, that not many outside those who know India would understand them properly. What would an ordinary English reader make of this: "In those days the Collector of Khandesh lived at Dhulia in almost royal state. His charge has not yet been divided, and the head of the vast collectorate was more like the governor of a province than a district magistrate. He had under him three and sometimes four

préfets, or English assistant collectors, and more than a dozen *sous-préfets*, or Brahman *mamlatdars*"? Not that it really matters to the story, but human nature, sitting down to be amused, is put off by meeting at the outset something it does not understand. Mr. Kincaid, in spite of this, has written some stirring tales for an audience which he must know is limited.

INDIA

THE RESTORATION OF THE PEASANTRIES. With special reference to that of India. By G. T. Wrench, M.D.(Lond.) (London: C. W. Daniel,) 6s. net.

(Reviewed by SIR ALFRED CHATTERTON.)

Dr. Wrench is a student of Hindu philosophy, an admirer of the simple life and an advocate of peasant cultivation such as in India is represented by the ryotwari system of land tenure. Looking round the world, apart from Egypt, which is dependent on Nile silt, only in the Far East, in China and Japan, does he find a system of agriculture carried out on a large scale which permanently maintains the natural fertility of the soil. There what he terms "the wheel of life" revolves. What is taken out and used is again returned, and there is no depletion of the soil of those elements which are essential to the growth of healthy and abundant crops. There the cultivators experience the joys of the gardener who watches his flowers and fruit respond to his gentle care. The other extreme is to be seen in America, Canada and Australia, where with ruthless mechanical efficiency the heart is dragged from the soil and in a few years the countryside is turned into a dusty desert. In this way fifty million acres are said to have been destroyed and double that area is approaching a similar condition in the United States alone. Bad farming not only leads to the impoverishment of the soil, but by the removal of the protective covering of vegetation it renders it liable to serious erosion, and the loss due to this cause is overwhelmingly greater. In the comparatively newly settled countries the ravages in this direction are most apparent, but in nearly every land they are visible and a source of anxiety to those responsible for rural well-being.

Dr. Wrench attributes this ill-treatment of the land to the rise in the first place of capitalistic owners in supersession of peasants and small-holders and later to the domination of the country by the growing ascendancy of industry in the towns. The peasant looks to his land for subsistence and cherishes its fertility; the capitalist landowner regards it as a source of power and prestige and not seldom wrings what he can out of it to obtain an adequate return on his investment. In turn, however, the landowner has become subject to the growing political power of the towns, and the interests of agriculture in industrial countries have been subordinated to the provision of cheap food for those engaged in industry. National self-sufficiency, the pressure of population or the desertion of the countryside

are each factors which have served to draw attention to the evil plight in which agriculture is floundering in many parts of the world, and vigorous efforts are being made to remedy matters.

With these problems Dr. Wrench is not concerned; his interests lie mainly in India and in the restoration of the ryots to the prosperity which he thinks there is evidence that they enjoyed in a somewhat distant and shadowy past. If, and the proviso is a very big one, they were allowed to enjoy the fruits of their labours it may be conjectured that they were better off, as then there was a choice of land, a much larger area of forest and possibly better grazing for their cattle. With greater certainty we know that they suffered from the ravages of war, pestilence and famines. Further, since the establishment of the *pax Britannica*, we know that their numbers have roughly trebled, which can only be explained on the supposition that conditions of life under British rule have been more favourable than they were in the past. The really great problem that looms ahead is that, having eliminated the major causes which kept the numbers to be fed within reasonable limits, we have not sufficiently recognized the necessity of increasing the fertility of the soil by methods capable of very wide application. Irrigation has been enormously extended, new and improved varieties of crops have been introduced, transport of surplus production and non-food crops has been facilitated. With what results? Mainly numerical, and the creation of a large class of small landowners who rack-rent their petty sub-tenants. Much is made of the so-called enormous burden of agricultural indebtedness. No doubt it is a great burden, but not so much because it may amount to perhaps nine hundred crores of rupees as that the rates of interest charged on it are very exorbitant. The market value of the total agricultural produce of India in an average year is certainly considerably larger than this sum, and may be possibly nearly double. The indebtedness therefore represents from a half to perhaps two-thirds the gross annual income. Crops may be on the ground from five to six months and sometimes longer. During this period the cultivator must live on his capital and pay the expenses of cultivation. Living as most do from hand to mouth, it is not surprising that he must get into debt. That he is not more in debt is due to his lack of credit and the intolerable burden of his comparatively small debt is due to his lack of business acumen and his callous indifference to a state of indebtedness. The much-maligned *sircar* is often his friend, but there is no doubt he is also a very expensive one. The Co-operative Credit movement has been a practical failure, and those who have administrative experience of its working have not been able to modify it in such a manner that it can be worked successfully. It is perhaps another example of our ill-advised efforts to introduce into the East ideas evolved in a totally different environment. Possibly village banks managed by a local panchyat would prove more suited to deal with the problems presented by the irresponsible and improvident ryot. The restoration of the authority of the village council and its endowment with real responsibility would probably solve many of the agrarian troubles that are fritting rural India. The headmen of the villages today exercise less influence as recognized agents of the *sircars* than would be the case if elected

by their fellows. There is much that can be done in the villages to improve their amenities by the co-operative working of the villagers themselves, and they have plenty of time in which to do it, as in the hot dry months of the year they have ample leisure.

The standard of cultivation in India varies enormously : in well-favoured tracts it is very high, in others where the soil is poor and nature is harsh it is perhaps to the credit of the cultivator that he can make any kind of living. The research institutes and the agricultural colleges have so far not succeeded in improving his lot, and it is probably not to their discredit that they have accomplished nothing. It would seem that Sir Albert Howard, by his Indore process of producing humus, has made the most likely advance which is capable of a very wide application. The manufacture of the compost is, however, beyond the resources of the individual ryot with a small-holding and must be undertaken by groups or by the village as a whole. Experiments in this direction might well be tried under competent supervision. It is hopeless to expect that any substitute will be found for the *brashe* or cow dung cake which is almost universally used for domestic fuel. The value of right soil is appreciated in some places, and though there is much prejudice to be overcome it is possible that in conjunction with the Indore process its use could be extended.

Compared with other Oriental countries—China, Japan, Egypt and Java—the employment of chemical fertilizers in India is comparatively small, though due to much commercial propaganda their use for special crops and by the wealthier ryots is slowly extending. The very large exports of oil seeds are a drain on the country. The displacement of vegetable oils by kerosine has intensified this movement. Oil milling in India is still in the main an indigenous industry and little has as yet been done to render the vegetable oils available for domestic use in cooking. This is relatively an expensive luxury only to be availed of by the rich, whilst margarine products and vegetable glue would, because of their lower price, command a much larger market and by their manufacture would increase the supplies of oil cake to be used either for cattle food or manure.

There is no evidence in this book that Dr. Wrench has been in any way closely in touch with the lives of the peasantry whose cause he advocates. His position is that of one who would urge the practical men to action by placing before them an historical account of agrarian movements through past centuries beginning with Carthage and Republican Rome, where the sturdy peasantry were displaced by the latifundia and slave labour which ultimately proved a potent cause of the decline of the Empire. This is contrasted with the relative stability of the peasantry in China and the development of an unrivalled system of agriculture which in spite of natural catastrophes, foreign conquests and internecine feuds has persisted to this present day. Similarly is the history of our own country treated with a view to showing that the attempt to create in Bengal the counterpart of the English landed gentry at the end of the eighteenth century was a grave mistake which has brought misery and degradation to millions. By implication Dr. Wrench claims to be one of the thinkers, and as such the function they perform is stated thus : "The thinkers do but prepare

and anticipate the time for the appearance of these men of action; by establishing a change in the sphere of thought they help to create a change of values in the sphere of action. It is not the thinkers' function to direct or control the actions of the men intimate with the soil, but to bring about positions which promote that action. They are not the actors, but by pre- vision they assist the men of the fields to become actors in the field of social life or politics as well as those of agriculture. The choice of values is the sphere of the thinkers, that of action the sphere of the agriculturist."

Dr. Wrench has collected a lot of information pertinent to his thesis from a great variety of sources and he has produced an interesting memoir on a very complex subject. He fairly describes the drift of events and assigns reasonable causes for them, but there as "a thinker" his function ends and he leaves it to the politicians, the administrators and the men with intimate knowledge of rural life to discover or devise the ways by which an ignorant and rather passive peasantry are to be restored to a position in which they can at least obtain as a reward for their labours the means whereby to live in health and moderate comfort. A perusal of his book may well incite some men of action to provide a sequel to his story.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE. By Rai Bahadur Diwan Chand Obhrai. (India : *The London Book Co.*)

(Reviewed by Sir WILLIAM BARTON.)

As an old Frontier officer I have read with much interest the book *Evolution of the North-West Frontier*, by a friend of former days.

The plan of the work is comprehensive, including in its scope a sketch of events on the borderland from Vedic times to the present day. Here one may comment that more details on tribal history and origins would have been interesting, especially as regards the relations of the tribes with the Mughal Empire.

As was only to be expected, the survey of border politics in the present century shows a Hindu bias. Mr. Diwan Chand Obhrai sees in a strong unified Province, with the Pathans of the hills and the plains closely compact under a national government, a danger to India. He would prefer to amalgamate the North-West Frontier with the Panjab in the hope of Indianizing the Pathan. But would not the adhesion of five or six million Muslims of the Frontier give overpowering weight to the Muslims of the Panjab and make the united provinces a still greater danger to the Hindus of India? It is interesting to note that in the Legislative Assembly of the Panjab, Hindu members voted for amalgamation in the hope that it might benefit the tiny minority of their fellow-Hindus beyond the Indus; the Muslims, on the other hand, voted against it; they preferred a strong North-West Frontier.

The course of evolution of the Province since it was founded in 1901 has not fulfilled the hopes of those responsible, and the solution of the problem of a peaceful borderland still seems remote. Mr. Diwan Chand indulges in no forecasts, and ends his book with a brief sketch of the Congress Govern-

ment in office, a government which has now sacrificed itself on the altar of truth and non-violent non-co-operation at the summons of a little Hindu Faqir.

The book is dedicated to Mahatma Gandhi.

FEDERAL FINANCE. By Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan. (Baroda : *Baroda State Press.*) 12 annas.

(Reviewed by G. FINDLAY SHIRRAS.)

This little book by Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan contains the two papers read by him at Baroda on March 6 and 7 of last year and are known as the "Shrimant Sayajirao lectures." The Baroda Government was fortunate in its choice, as Sir Shafaat is not only a well-known historian but was also a delegate to the three Round-Table Conferences, 1930-32. He was, it will be recalled, a member of the two Federal Finance Committees.

Here we are given a very readable account of the exhaustive enquiries into federal finance in India, enquiries that continued from 1928 until their results were incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1935. The relation of the Federal Finance Committee's proposals to the famous White Paper incorporating the views of the British Government is perhaps the best part of the book, and without any peradventure of doubt the clearest exposition of what the Federal Finance Committee did apart from the reports themselves.

Provincial autonomy came into force on April, 1937, and the Federation itself, including the Indian States and the new form of government at the centre, would have come into being in 1940 or 1941 but for the war. The postponement, regrettable in some ways, was unavoidable. At the end of the war, to quote the Viceroy, Government "will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties, and interests in India, and with the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and co-operation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desirable." Sir Shafaat, like most leading Indians of our time, sees as clearly as the noonday sun the benefits of federation to India, and does not hesitate to place before his readers the courage of his convictions.

He describes the financial administration of India before the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, which came into being in 1921. He does not conceal the disadvantages of a highly centralized bureaucracy. To him provincial autonomy before these reforms "was a farce or a tragedy or both, and provincial representatives competed with ill-concealed jealousy among themselves for a generous helping of the loaves and fishes which the Burra Sahibs of Simla doled out to hungry governments enclosed within the circuit of their parochial pride and strongly marked by the peculiar complexion of their administration." Hard words these. The close student of Indian public finance will hardly agree with our author in this respect, especially when he traces the development of the financial powers of the Provinces right up to the Reforms. When we look back on the history of these Pro-

vincial Settlements and remember the Gladstonian outlook on public expenditure and public income we are not oblivious to their advantages. Those were not the days of huge expenditures on the social services, notably education.

It will be remembered that the Constitution of 1919, which came into operation in 1921-22, separated central and provincial heads of revenue in order, it was thought at the time, to make provincial autonomy a reality. Even then the system did not work, and from 1921 to 1937 the financial relations between the Central and Provincial Governments were unsatisfactory. The heads of revenue assigned to the Provinces were, as compared with those of the Central Government, both inelastic and insecure. I believe, with Sir Otto Niemeyer, that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the extent to which the Provinces have been dependent upon central assistance, and Sir Shafaat Khan's two lectures are an illustration of this view.

The two main problems of federal finance in India—the assistance required by certain Provinces if they are to maintain financial equilibrium and the transfer of a share of income-tax proceeds to all Provinces—are dealt with adequately in spite of the wide field to be covered in the space of two lectures. The apportionment of taxes and the adjustment of the financial relations between the Federal Government and the units in Canada, Australia, South Africa, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States have been matters of great difficulty, and India, especially in the relationship between the Centre and the Indian States, had a like experience.

Sir Shafaat Khan is particularly effective on the issues raised by the Report of the Davidson Committee in regard to the Indian States.

In years to come the Government of India Act, 1935, will be looked upon by economists and students of politics alike as a signal triumph of a written constitution. The task bore no resemblance to that of Alexander Hamilton and other Fathers of the American Union, nor like that of Sir John Macdonald and his colleagues in Canada. In India it was the very reverse. As the authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report aptly put it: "We have to demolish the existing structure, at least in part, before we can build the new. Our business is one of devolution, of drawing lines of demarcation, of cutting long-standing ties. The Government of India must give and the Provinces must receive; for only so can the growing organism of self-government draw air into its lungs and live." It is evident that with normal years ahead, and given the appropriate political environment, the Centre should be able to meet the demands of the Provinces even if they are larger than was in some quarters anticipated.

Sir Shafaat Khan is to be congratulated on covering so skilfully and with such clarity a wide and difficult field of public finance. Although the table of contents is a full one, there is no index. The Baroda State Press deserves praise for the printing, so singularly free of error, of a book which ought to be bought, read and kept.

EAST VERSUS WEST : A DENIAL OF CONTRAST. By P. Kodanda Rao. (*Allen and Unwin.*) 10s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by H. S. L. POLAK.)

In this book Mr. P. Kodanda Rao has rendered a very real service by applying not merely a breath, but a powerful gale, of common sense to a superstition that has done infinite harm to international and interimperial relations, and he has blown it to pieces with devastating thoroughness. Not that there will not be for a long time large numbers of people who will remain blind to all the evidence against the doctrines of racial, religious, or cultural superiority or exclusiveness; for it requires much objective frankness, much tolerance, and much self-abnegation before liberation from one such complex or another is achieved.

Mr. Kodanda Rao has been fortunate in his experience of life, which has admirably fitted him for his task. At an early age, under the personal influence of Mr. G. K. Gokhale, its President-Founder, he became a member of the Servants of India Society. He later came to be the editor of its weekly organ, the *Servant of India*, and he is now the Secretary of the Society. He was the personal secretary of the Right Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri (to whom he dedicates this book) during the latter's period of office as the first Agent of the Government of India in the Union of South Africa, where he had ample opportunities of studying race-problems at close hand. He was one of Mr. Sastri's assistants during the Indian Round-Table Conferences in London, where he made an intimate study of some of the problems connected with Indo-British relations and of the arguments used on either side in connection with the constitutional questions arising therefrom. Later, he spent a period of intensive study of Race Relations under Dr. C. T. Loram at the Yale University; and he afterwards attended and participated in an international conference on racial relations. Finally, he has married a lady from the West to whom, among others, he pays a tribute for help received.

As is evident from the Bibliography annexed to the text and from the richness and variety of the quotations upon which he bases much of his argument and which help him in his conclusions, Mr. Kodanda Rao's reading has been wide and catholic. It has included the views of those from whom he differs profoundly as well as those with whom he equally profoundly agrees. What one notes with interest is the calmness of his treatment of his subject, the objective quality of his analysis, the readiness and aptness of his illustration, and the pungency and terseness of his conclusions.

The results of his study, he claims, not unjustly, "tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, the doubts regarding the validity and value of the current concepts of Western and non-Western civilization, and of the development of culture by one group and its diffusion to another. They reveal that several concepts current among students of anthropology, sociology and civilization are invalid. The study seeks to suggest what seems to be a truer interpretation of the nature of civilization, and of its origin and diffusion, particularly the differential diffusion of different culture elements."

He shares with Professor Julian Huxley a regret for the continued lamentable confusion, "in spite of the work of the geneticist and anthropologist," between the ideas of race, culture and nation, as also Professor Huxley's conclusion: "It would be highly desirable if we could banish the question-begging term 'race' from all discussions of human affairs and substitute the non-committal phrase 'ethnic group.'" Mr. Kodanda Rao's own conclusion on the whole matter is that "civilization is one and is indivisible into Eastern and Western; its elements are a function ever of time, decreasingly of space, but never of race."

We may be grateful, too, for Sir S. Radhakrishnan's characteristic and appreciative Foreword to this excellent book, which deserves a wide public. In times like the present, when many preconceptions and misconceptions are in the melting-pot, it is good to be reminded by the author that "civilization is a common heritage; each individual is heir to all knowledge," and that "the only right course is to secure universal accessibility to universal culture."

The report of the Administration of Jails in Hyderabad for the past year throws an interesting light on one of the difficulties of abolishing capital punishment. The Nizam's Government abolished or rather suspended the death penalty some years ago and the Director-General of Jails in noting a large increase in the breaches of jail discipline attributes it to the number of life prisoners who in former days would have undergone the death penalty. "They have nothing to hope for and little to fear, and many of them defy the jail authorities and instigate other convicts to commit breaches of jail discipline. On many occasions life convicts of this nature have appealed to me to execute them rather than keep them confined for the rest of their life." So it would seem that life imprisonment is a severer penalty than death, in the criminal's mind. This reinforces the plea for the abolition of capital punishment, but it also prompts consideration of measures to remedy the desperate temper of the prisoners. Mr. S. T. Hollins, the Director-General, formerly Inspector-General of Police in the United Provinces of India, proposes that convicts should be released after thirty years' imprisonment. They would be less undisciplined he thinks if they knew that they were not destined to spend the rest of their lives in prison. His Exalted Highness' Government is contemplating action on those lines and has accordingly approved Mr. Hollins' new rules. Otherwise the administration of the jails seems to have satisfactorily dealt with a prison population of just under 3,000. Special attention is being given to reformatory activities and to elimination of recidivism.

FAR EAST

COLONIAL REPORTS : HONG-KONG, 1938. (*H.M. Stationery Office.*) 3s. net.
(Reviewed by SIR WILLIAM SHENTON.)

The 1938 Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Hong-Kong has recently been issued from the Colonial Office. It grows in magnitude year by year. In 1934 it ran into forty-nine pages; the 1938 Report contains no less than 186 pages.

A new departure is an appendix giving a list of publications of general interest relating to Hong-Kong, and another appendix dealing with the effects of the Sino-Japanese hostilities. This second appendix is of particular interest, as it deals with the great influx of refugee population and the steps taken to meet it and its general effect on the trade of the Colony.

A phenomena of such a nature must have called for clear vision and careful administration, and a perusal of this appendix goes to show that the many problems were solved with human consideration and on an economic basis.

This influx not only brought in its train a large increase in disease, but cast on the financial resources of the Colony a largely starving and homeless population.

The year under review was prosperous, the normal population showed a substantial increase, trade generally was good, and both revenue and expenditure indicated a healthy expansion.

The old and difficult question of overcrowding came under consideration, and the Housing Commission appointed in 1935 presented its Report. The problem is mainly how to get a quart into a pint pot, and the recommendations, if followed, should, at any rate, alleviate an almost chronic condition.

The Colony, as a Crown Colony, is an interesting study of the City State, for here is an island thirty-two square miles in extent, with a Governor, an Admiral, a General, a Chief Justice, a Legislative Council of seventeen members, working under standing orders similar in many respects to those of the House of Commons, and exercising general legislative and municipal powers in a comprehensive form, a leading international port of the world, comprising banking, insurance, shipping, and general interests all co-operating happily, irrespective of nation, race, or creed.

Surely it would be difficult to find anywhere else in the world an example for microscopic investigation by either the student of government or the enthusiastic exponent of psychology.

The Report makes interesting reading.

KHYBERIE IN BURMA. By Major C. M. Enriquez and illustrated by K. F. Barker. (*A. and C. Black.*) 5s. net.

(Reviewed by THEODORA BENSON.)

If any child you know is laid up with a cold or a sprained ankle and there's reading aloud to be done, spend 5s. on *Khyberie in Burma*, by

Major C. M. Enriquez, and the chances are good that everyone will be pleased. It fits a wide range of ages, since it is extremely simple and plain-sailing in manner, and the matter is not only exciting, but interesting and even true.

Khyberie in Burma tells us "the adventures of a mountain pony," and it tells them in the first person. We have long had to accept the first-person device, and are used to the autobiographies of fictional characters who in real life would be almost as inarticulate as ponies, but Khyberie himself is sometimes a little apologetic about it and explains that his master, Captain Malcolm, has really helped him out.

This is a sympathetic story, unsentimental and beautifully concise. It is happily supported by the pen-and-ink illustrations of K. F. Barker, and the whole thing is alive not only because in the main outline the episodes are true (which might only make it informative), but because it is written realistically.

"At one corner there was a small crowd, with three policemen in the centre holding a middle-aged man who was covered with blood. On the ground beside them lay a youth dead in the sunshine, with a horrible gash across his head, and over him a woman was weeping distractedly. The young man's dog had eaten the breakfast of the older man's dog, and in a sudden fury the older man had cut the other down with a dah. And there he lay dead in the cool, dancing sunshine."

"'And all for a plate of food,' mused the old Commissioner as we rode on. 'Well, I have known it done for a box of matches, and that is less.'"

Not that this is a tough book. In just as matter-of-fact a way, it puts over enormous charm; and not the same charm for the Burmese and the Chinese either! It makes one want to travel, and there is nothing that even parents—so much tenderer than children—can't take.

Here is my favourite example of the well-chosen word.

"'My Second Coronation'" (the diary of a usurper king is being quoted) "'was solemnized this day in a stately cave; a lovely place forty cubits long and thirty cubits wide, garnished with figures of gnats, dragons and animals, not the work of men, but of Nature. This day the Earth shook, the Moon eclipsed, and two Suns rose together in the East.'

"There was never any suggestion that Saya San was mad. Simply he was medieval."

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

To PERSIA FOR FLOWERS. By Alice Fullerton. (*Oxford University Press.*)
10s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by LADY FOWLER.)

This is a very pleasant book, which can be enjoyed both by those who know Iran ("Persia" until recently), and those who have never been and can never hope to go there.

There is an appendix with a full description of the flowers found, but this part is headed by the warning "For Flower-Lovers Only." The book

itself, with its intimate account of day-to-day life in the Persian village of Sultanabad as seen by the author and her friend Miss Lindsay during the months in which they made it their headquarters in their search for specimens, should delight all those who like to know how "the other half of the world live."

If these are the only Englishwomen the local inhabitants met, our stock must be rated very high, for they went prepared to be friendly and helpful and in return they received kindness and hospitality.

The medical help given to the very best of the travellers' ability and equipment must have taken up a great deal of time and the descriptions of some of the "cases" make amusing reading, for sound common sense added to rapid improvisation often won the day.

The photographic illustrations are numerous and attractive.

The expedition was made in 1935 under the auspices of the Natural History Museum.

FRENCH BOOKS

SOLDATS D'ORIENT VOUS AVIEZ FAIT UNE EUROPE NOUVELLE. By René Vanlande. (Paris : Peyronnet.)

(Reviewed by C. A. KINCAID, C.V.O.)

Some two years after the war of 1914-1918 I was asked in India to set a general knowledge paper as an after-dinner amusement. One of my questions was, "Who was the Allied general who conquered Bulgaria?" Every English competitor gave the name of Lord Allenby. The only correct answer was given by a young Hellene gentleman, who had been in the Greek contingent of the victorious army. He wrote down the name of Franchet d'Espérey.

Strangely enough this ignorance is almost as widespread in France as in England. This is partly due to the very natural interest in Foch's campaign, so much nearer home, and partly to the really undue modesty of the victorious hero of the Eastern expedition. General Franchet d'Espérey has published a book on this aspect of the Great War, but in a style so unassuming as to make the author of the *De Bello Gallico*, surely no braggart, seem as much a boaster as the late Mr. Barry Lyndon.

On June 28, 1918, General Franchet d'Espérey, one of the army commanders of the Marne, arrived from France to take over the command of the allied army in Greece. It consisted of a heterogeneous force of 210,000 French, 120,000 Serbs, 100,000 English, an Italian division and some newly raised Greek regiments. In front of them were the tremendous natural barriers of the Vardar hills, fortified with the skill and industry of German engineers, and defended by a homogeneous Bulgar-German army of 450,000 men, while in Roumania was cantoned Von Mackensen with another half million German soldiers. In these natural ramparts there seemed no gap, but the very strength of the position was its weakness. Judging it impregnable, the Bulgarian command had prepared no secondary

defensive lines. Thus if the impossible happened and the Bulgarian lines were stormed, there were no further defences to which the beaten force could rally, and because genius was in command it was just the impossible that did happen.

On September 15, 1918, the Franco-Serbian army advanced to the assault. By evening, after fearful fighting, the Bulgarian lines were pierced, but at the cost of 2,000 French dead alone; but neither fatigue nor losses checked the advance of the Allies. The Serbs in an ecstatic frenzy poured through the breach in the Bulgarian lines. The French, invincible as ever in victory, charged alongside. On September 23, six days after the first attack, the allied troops entered Gradsko, forty miles from their starting-point. Franchet d'Espérey then launched his African cavalry. They only numbered 2,000 men, but after four sleepless nights and days they reached Uskub, and by occupying the passes of Kalkandelen cut off the retreat of 100,000 of the beaten enemy. On September 26, thirteen days after the first offensive, the Bulgarian Government sued for peace. Ninety thousand prisoners had been taken, and the hostile army of 450,000 men were dispersed, killed or captive. This victory cut off the Turks from Germany and made Allenby's victories possible.

The Paris authorities, unable to grasp their general's magnificent success, thought that he had risked enough and refused him both reinforcements and supplies. Nothing, however, checked the ardour of Franchet d'Espérey and his troops. The Serbians drove the Germans first out of Nissa and then out of Belgrade. On November 1 the Turks surrendered; on November 4 Austria-Hungary did the same. Still the Armée de l'Orient continued its northern march. Von Mackensen, who combined the courage of his Scotch ancestors with the treachery of his German brothers, began to think how he could escape back to Germany with all his plunder. He sent back so many lorry loads of troops and loot that in the end he had not a force large enough to protect himself. At last the French general, exasperated at the Feld Marschall's trickery and mendacity, took him prisoner.

This was the fitting climax. In three months Franchet d'Espérey had crushed Bulgaria, freed Servia and Roumania, occupied Croatia, Dalmatia and Hungary, annihilated with a force half its size an army of a million men, and he finally had completed his gigantic achievement by taking prisoner the hostile commander-in-chief.

I do not propose to follow M. Vanlande through his criticisms of the statesmen, who squandered the results of the Allied victories by creating a Germany stronger and greater than the one they had overthrown. Nevertheless, M. Vanlande's strictures are well worth reading. I shall close by thanking him in the name of the readers of the *ASiATIC REVIEW* for having written with French lucidity and a soldier's restraint the story of the most astonishing campaign of which I have any knowledge.

LES EMPIRES COLONIAUX. By C. A. Le Neveu. (Paris: Editions J. de Gigord.)

(Reviewed by C. A. KINCAID, c.v.o.)

In this charming book, admirably printed and also supplied in profusion with maps, sketches, and reproductions of old pictures, M. Le Neveu has attempted to put before his readers a short history of the origins of European colonies and their progress, as well as the advantages and disadvantages brought by them to their mother country. It gives me great pleasure to assure them that in this interesting experiment M. Le Neveu has admirably succeeded.

Historians have long fixed the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times as the year 1453, the date of the Turkish capture of Constantinople; but about that time many other important events happened. In 1469 modern Spain sprang from the union of Castile and Arragon. Burgundy and France were united in 1479. In 1492 Ferdinand the Catholic retook Granada, and his admiral, Christopher Columbus, discovered America; while in 1498 Vasco da Gama doubled the Cape and landed in Calicut.

The struggles that led to the consolidation of France and Spain were based on political considerations; but the motives of Christopher Columbus and of Vasco da Gama were largely commercial. This was especially the case with the Portuguese, who sought to reduce the innumerable middlemen, who one after the other extorted profit from every bale of silk, perfume, gums, etc., that made its way from the East to Western Europe.

M. de Neveu has contrasted the different procedure adopted by the colonizing nations. The Spaniards went as conquerors to North and South America, and to the end remained conquerors. They stayed in the Americas and made the inhabitants learn Spanish and adopt the Catholic faith, but the number of the Spanish emigrants was so great that Spain was depopulated. The English, largely fugitives from religious persecution, set up at once free institutions of their own, similar to those that they had sought to set up in England. To realize this ideal it was necessary that the colonial community should be homogeneous. This could only be achieved by the expulsion of the native inhabitants; so they expelled or massacred them. The Portuguese mixed more freely than other nations with the local populations and created a large half-caste community that reduced rather than added to the strength of their colonial government. The French tried to turn Indians both in the West and East into good Frenchmen. It is impossible to say whether they would have succeeded, for both from America and India they were driven out by their rivals. They are now continuing the same policy in their vast African empire, and so far with admirable results; but it is as yet early to judge of their ultimate success. The Germans did not become colonizers until the nineteenth century; but as their only method was the extermination of the autochthones, it was fortunate that the Great War, 1914-1918, put an end to their *lebensraum* ambitions outside Europe.

In a new colonial possession the most important question is that of transport. The English in India have built many railways, but they have badly neglected their roads, which are often no better than the tracks that existed at the time of their conquest. The French, inspired by the old Latin

tradition, have everywhere built admirable roads, but their railways, especially in North Africa, might well be more plentiful. The Italians, only recently become a colonial Power, have followed the French example and have created wonderful autostrades throughout Libya. The Belgians have made both roads and railways, but they have harnessed the giant Congo and use river transport more than any other colonial Power. The latest form of transport is aviation, and this has been most largely adopted by the French, although by no means neglected by the English.

Curiously enough, the increased efficiency of transport is not entirely without its disadvantages. In the French and English possessions the administration derived great benefit from the slow progress and efficient supervision of the official, who toured on horseback. Even when he passed through his district in a railway train he could still be seen and petitioned when the locomotive stopped at the numerous wayside stations. Now all that the dwellers of vast districts in French Africa see of their proconsul is a speck in the sky, travelling at 250 miles an hour towards some remote province, of which none of the skygazers has ever heard.

Colonies may hinder as well as increase the mother country's commerce. During the early occupation of a colony ploughs are needed to replace the wooden surface scratchers used by the natives. Mechanical reapers and threshers take the place of hand labour. Locomotives and lorries oust man-and horse-borne traffic, and, as the necessary implements are manufactured in the homeland, its industries profit greatly. A time, however, comes when local factories are erected and ploughs, lorries, and locomotives are manufactured in the colonies, and the colonial industrialists, helped by distance, oust their home competitors from the local trade. We have seen in our time Lancashire piece goods driven out of India by the Bombay mills, and Algerian and Moroccan wines even threaten the wine trade in France itself. Fortunately, we have also seen Indian and North African troops fighting in France on the side of the Allies.

Much as I should like to continue my examination of M. Le Neveu's charming book, I am afraid I must stop. I shall end my critique by recommending it to all readers of the ASIATIC REVIEW, especially to those still obsessed with the idea that only English colonies are efficiently administered and that "Frenchmen have no idea how to colonize"—a doctrine that was very prevalent in my Victorian youth!

GENERAL

THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH. By Sir John Marriott. (*Nicholson and Watson.*) 12s. 6d. net.

(Reviewed by SIR FRANK NOYCE, K.C.S.I., C.B.E.)

In one of the recent Oxford pamphlets on World Affairs, Mr. H. V. Hodson, the Editor of *The Round Table*, points out that the relations between the different parts of the Empire to each other and to the whole are essentially derived from their history and cannot be understood without refer-

ence to that history. Sir John Marriott's book removes any excuse for ignorance of the evolution and development of the Empire and Commonwealth, as both he and Mr. Hodson call it. He traces them in considerable though not unnecessary detail from the great outburst of maritime activity at the end of the sixteenth century to the present day. He explains that his book is expository and not argumentative. In his last chapter he therefore refuses to indulge in prophecy, and is content to indicate a few of the problems of Empire which await solution. Among them is one which may well prove of vital importance to India in the near future, that of the relationship of Federal to Provincial Governments, a question which has arisen in an acute form both in Canada and Australia. Others are defence, foreign affairs and migration. The least satisfactory chapter of a good book is the somewhat cursory and pessimistic survey of developments in India, but Sir John Marriott has the excuse that he dealt with India at length in his work on *The English in India* published some seven years ago. His latest book should prove an admirable textbook for the upper forms of schools, though it has, of course, a far wider appeal. There are three slips which should be corrected in the future editions which will certainly be called for. Archbishop Whately was Archbishop of Dublin, not of Dunedin (page 142); Sir Patrick Duncan became Governor-General of the Union of South Africa in 1937, not 1931 (page 303); and the author of *The India We Served* is Sir Walter Lawrence, not Laurence (page 322).

LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE AND TROPICAL MEDICINE (UNIVERSITY OF LONDON) INCORPORATING THE ROSS INSTITUTE. Report for the year 1938-39.

(Reviewed by SIR ALFRED CHATTERTON.)

The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine was founded in 1898, the year in which Sir Patrick Manson announced to the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association the completion of the unveiling of the mystery of malaria by Sir Ronald Ross. It was of supreme importance to have discovered the part played by the Anopheles mosquito in the transmission of the disease from one man to another, but there yet remained much work to be done before practical results on a large scale could be obtained. Thus arose the Ross Institute, which ultimately in 1934 joined hands with the London School, so that under one general control scientific research and its practical application to local conditions could be carried on. The Report shows that both School and Institute still retain their individuality, since each submits a separate account of its activities. There are many departments in the School and the record of their work is quite unintelligible to the layman, and only here and there can one pick out titbits which refer to matters within the ken of the ordinary citizen. Such examples may be found in the application of chemical manures to soils infested with parasites; in the investigations of Professor Buxton into the natural populations of head lice and on the relation between the number of

these insects and the season of the year and the age and sex of the human host; in the studies of Mr. Muirhead Thomson on a particular species of mosquito that prefers shade to sunlight but is never found at the edge of a stream or channel if it is in the shade; whilst the work of Dr. Birkinshaw on wood-rotting fungi is of interest to many, as it is best exemplified in the "dry rot" which is the cause of so much trouble in private houses.

On the other hand, the activities of the Ross Institute of Tropical Hygiene are more easily appreciated, since they consist mainly in the reduction of the results of scientific work to practical measures. As such they are classified as follows: 1. Work overseas consisting of (a) Practical assistance to governments and industrial undertakings, (b) research in connection with this practical work. 2. Work in London consisting of (a) advice and assistance chiefly to commercial companies and (b) the teaching of tropical hygiene both to medical men and laymen who have been or are going abroad. To quote from the Report of the Director, Sir Malcolm Watson: "In other words, the Institute, by actual demonstration overseas and by teaching at home, attempts to show how the scientific knowledge acquired in the other departments of the School may be applied to everyday life in tropical countries with the object of preventing, controlling and limiting the diseases which hamper the development of those countries." Malaria is still by far the most important of these scourges, and the great measure of success which has attended the work in this direction is well set forth in the address given on Mosquito Day, May 13, 1938, by Mr. Eric Macfayden, in which he described the result achieved in the Malay Peninsula in which Malcolm Watson, then Government surgeon in Klang, played an initial and leading part. He rendered the great discoveries of Manson and Ross fertile in the extreme, and in the words of Mr. Eric Macfayden: "If it had not been for malaria control British Malaya as we know it today could never have been realized. Its populous towns, its railways and roads which have unlocked its natural resources, the monster dredging plants representing an outlay of millions sterling which excavate its tin, its 300,000 acres of rubber, not a tithe of these developments could have been achieved had malaria remained uncontrolled." Dutch medical men and scientists appreciate the nature and value of the work in Malaya, and later the co-operation of the Rockefeller Foundation was obtained in the initiation of similar measures to deal with malaria in Europe. From the date of his discovery, Ross favoured the destruction of the mosquito in its larval stage as the best means of eradicating malaria in towns, and advocated research into the life history of the various species of mosquito. But many in the medical profession thought otherwise, and under the leadership of the late Robert Koch, an eminent German bacteriologist, put forward the idea that the way to prevent malaria was to cure the patient, and that if this was done everywhere the disease would be entirely eliminated, since there would be no source from which the mosquito could become infected. Quinine and other drugs were to be produced on an enormous scale, but the efforts of many medical men in the last twenty years have failed to produce any useful result, and the Malaria Commission of the League of Nations stated in 1937: "Experience has so far shown that the eradication of malaria from a

locality by the curative and prophylactic treatment with the drugs at present available is practically impossible."

Apart from training hundreds of medical men in tropical medicine more than fifty expeditions have been sent to tropical regions to carry on research. The work is carried on systematically. The first stage is to find out how the disease is caused, then follows investigation into the means by which it is spread.

It will give some idea of the wide range of the activities of the School and Institute to quote again from Sir Malcolm Watson's 1937-38 report: "Some diseases, like yaws, passed from one human being to another by direct contact; Malta fever was acquired by drinking goat's milk; yellow fever, relapsing fever, dengue fever, typhus fever, plague, sleeping sickness, phlebotomus fever were acquired from the bites of mosquitoes, ticks, lice, sand flies, fleas or tsetse flies; while some parasitic worms had a complicated life history, part of which was passed in snails. Some appeared to be primarily diseases of animals which at times spread to men. That raised many new, strange and difficult problems in the control of tropical disease, some of them still unsolved."

An important feature of the Ross Institute is the Industrial Advisory Committee consisting of representative men of all branches of industrial and agricultural activity carried on in tropical regions. They are drawn from India, Ceylon, Malaya, the African colonies and the dominion of South Africa. There are also representatives of some of the great British corporations whose ramifications are world-wide. This committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. G. H. Masefield, with the assistance of the organizing secretary Major H. Lockwood Stevens, was formed in 1928 to keep industry in touch with science, to make the tropics healthy and to expand the markets of the world. An annual meeting is held in London in the City about the end of April, and to it the Director, Sir Malcolm Watson, submits a report of the work done during the past year. Memoranda on the subjects to be discussed at the meeting are also circulated. At the last meeting, held on April 21, 1939, the subjects brought up for discussion were: Malaria in Ceylon; the India and West Africa Branches of the Ross Institute; housing in the tropics; standard health returns for tea estates; air conditioning in the tropics; anti-malarial oils; septic tanks; eye fly and domestic refrigeration. In addition Col. F. P. Mackie gave a short address on the transmission of disease by aircraft, with special reference to the terrible results which might ensue from the introduction of yellow fever into Asiatic ports. Detailed references to so wide a range of interests is beyond the scope of this note, but it may be well to draw attention in this Journal to the importance and variety of the work being done in India. It was in this country that Ross began his work in 1892, and early in 1898, mainly at the instance of Dr. Manson and the United Planters Association of Southern India, he was placed on special duty by the Government of India to continue his investigations, which were followed with great interest by many who had experience of the difficulties created in the Public Works Department and the planting industries by the ravages of malaria. Compared, however, with the Malay States, comparatively little was done till 1930 when

a branch of the Institute was started in Calcutta with Dr. G. C. Ramsay as principal. Since then both in research and in the control work great progress has been made. It has been established that in Northern India the chief carrier has its maximum prevalence during the rains, whilst in Southern India the carriers are of other species and they are washed away by the rains during the monsoon. The work in India has so greatly developed that it has become necessary to reorganize the branch and increase the staff. A committee of control for the branch has been formed under the chairmanship of Sir James Reid Kay, and this committee will in future be responsible for the administration of the Ross Institute in India and will forward the work of the branch in the best interests of the subscribers and for the benefit of industry generally. Apparently it is expected to be financially independent of the parent Institute. The Director in London is to be responsible for advising the committee of control in Calcutta on matters affecting the interests of the branch, on the medical policy of the Ross Institute and on the appointment of medical officers to the staff in India. It may be well to emphasize the fact that in eight years the results of control have been recognized by the tea industry both in Northern and Southern India as an important economic factor in reducing the costs of running an estate. The success of such work depends entirely on the co-operation of the planter, and it is necessary that he should realize that a healthy labour force is just as necessary as healthy tea bushes to the production of satisfactory commercial results. To obtain his intelligent assistance there is an annual malarial control course for laymen held in London in the early summer months, and year by year it is becoming increasingly popular. In the year 1939 the attendance was 222, of whom 120 were tea planters from India. Since this course was first started over 1,000 persons have attended, and of these 590 were planters. Figures which speak for themselves.

The home of the School and Institute is in Keppel Street, W.C. 1, near the new buildings of London University. It is a worthy monument to the memory of the great pioneers Manson and Ross, whose discoveries are therein rendered year by year more fertile in the development of prosperity and happiness in many regions of the world which were formerly regarded as little better than death traps for human beings. In conclusion, tribute should be paid to the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and his two sons, Sir Austen Chamberlain, K.C., and the present Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, for the abiding interest they have, each in turn, taken in the work of rendering the tropical regions of our Empire fit for men to work in without undue toll upon their health and energy.

THE BAIGA. By Verrier Elwin. (*John Murray.*)

(Reviewed by MRS. MARGUERITE MILWARD.)

Verrier Elwin's great work on the Baiga is the outcome of seven years of close study and firm friendship with the Baiga people. By great good for-

tune I happened to visit the Ashram at Sanhwachhapor in 1937, and came in for the making of the book in its final stages.

Everything that happened in or out of the village was centred round the book. Verrier Elwin lived in a typical Gond hut backed up against the wild jungle and facing the sunset and distant plain; a wide verandah, a long room with all the front open to the elements, and in the centre a great desk covered with the Baiga manuscript piled high. No one dared disturb the author at his work except the Baiga himself; and he knew that he was always welcome, for was he not the soul and essence of the book?

A great fête was held at Sanhwachhapor during my stay and at least four distant Baiga villages participated. The girls were gay with waving head-dresses and the young men looked like wandering minstrels. Dances on the green were a special point of study, and the mysteries of steps were discussed again and again.

Later we all went for a tour of Baiga villages and I had the good luck to meet the Maikal Hill people and to visit the true Baiga country with its wealth of scenery and sal trees. At Arnerdor it was wonderful to see how Verrier Elwin tackled the people and how he made friends. At Lumni we discovered the prize door (page 34). Of Bohi I have unforgettable memories. Its wide village-green with huts on three sides, its little black scavenger pigs, its friendly fires in the centre with Verrier Elwin joking with all the men.

Here most of the line-drawings were evolved. Fascinating models of all kinds were brought to my tent door where I sat and drew traps and charms, baskets and Baigas. To copy the tattooing on the legs and arms of Jitho was a *tour de force* (pages 20 and 21).

The Baiga book provides astonishingly easy and interesting reading even for those who are not learned in anthropology. It is so exceedingly well put together, subdivided and classified that it carries one on from page to page.

Added to this the book is interspersed with revealing photographs, which not only picture the gaiety and charm of the Baiga but minutely explain their customs and manners. Some of the most fascinating subjects that are dealt with are the description of food (page 46), the Baiga superstitions (page 64), thrilling stories of ceremonies such as the Mati Uthan (page 298) and the festivals of the Dassara and the Laru Kai (page 401). But perhaps some may find the greatest charm in chapter eleven, entitled "Myths of the Baiga," written in Verrier Elwin's simple and inimitable style.

I agree with the author that the life stories (page 132) are the most valuable part of his book. Some are full of humour and tell of many wives and many husbands. Some are heartrending and make one weep. These simply told tales express what Hunting and Bewar mean to the Baiga. The descriptions of their method of cultivation (Chap. III.) is of vital interest. To quote from one of them : "Government has tried hard to take away my bow and arrow, but I said, 'The day the bow leaves my hand I will die.'"

The poetry of the Baiga language is very striking. Many songs occur in all parts of the book and they are exquisitely translated, notably the Dadaria on page 438. Their Mantras, too, are great reading. This is for the honey-gatherer : "Mahadeo Parvati, when my pot is full, then into the seven seas and the sixteen rivers I will make a river of honey to flow."

Their proverbs are both shrewd and amusing (page 68). "The boastful man goes everywhere talking, talking, but he ends up in the little hut where he started." Scandal is well described : "Once it is sown outside the house the harvest fills all the world." An idle man is rebuked : "All you can do is to stretch your hands and feet, and bring your plate at meal-times." But a good man is the real divinity to the Baiga : "He who gives a stick to the blind, a rag to the naked, water to the thirsty, food to the hungry, and a son to the childless—he is a god."

The headings of three of the chapters are arresting : The Great Crises : Birth, The Great Crises : Marriage, The Great Crises : Death. Are not these the great crises of all human life, so-called civilized or otherwise? This places us at once on an equal footing with the Baiga, and indeed with all the tribes of the human family. Here is the appealing humanism in all Verrier Elwin's books.

The author's frank description of the intimate sexual life of the Baiga may be criticized by some. But if he had left this out or curtailed it the book would not present the Baiga as he is or show the enormous importance of sex to the primitive. How can it be otherwise? It is a simple law of nature to live with a mate. His own apology is noteworthy : "Our picture of tribal life will be devoid of all contact with reality if we omit what is to the Baiga the most important and the most enthralling thing in life."

After reading this book one feels that nothing will crush the Baiga : "A tribe that can control tiger," spirited, dignified, sure of themselves. Verrier Elwin pleads for consideration of the Baiga case with a moving appeal in the last chapter, and outlines what appears to be a workable and just proposition. May it not fall on deaf ears!

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